Case law

Kessler v. Continental Casualty Co.

132 Ill. App. 3d 540 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 2, 1985

Such an order is clearly mandatory in nature. Mandatory preliminary injunctions are not favored, and the only justification for such an order is the maintenance of the status quo to avoid irreparable injury. … In order to establish irreparable injury, the plaintiff must show that his legal remedy is inadequate in that money damages will not be adequate compensation or the damages escape pecuniary valuation.

Schultz v. Kant

148 Ill. App. 3d 565 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 10, 1986

Clearly, the presence of crops on a portion of defendant’s acreage south of the Green River indicates defendant’s southerly land was not vacant. … The common and ordinary use establishing the right to an easement by prescription limits and qualifies it so that it cannot be given to different uses and purposes. (Sell v.

Pilarski v. Schmidt

298 Ill. App. 3d 682 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 1, 1998

The court’s order also established a visitation schedule for Tom, Mandy (Cindy’s daughter, Amanda), and Cindy’s other relatives. William timely appeals. … The law clearly permits such a decision by either the guardian or the surrogate, but only if certain criteria are met.

La Salle National Bank v. County of Lake

27 Ill. App. 3d 10 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 21, 1975

We find that these additional requirements would not substantially benefit the future residents of the development and thus the additional requirements are clearly unreasonable. … The association or a public body would not be immune from the financial maladies associated with the operation of a golf course in these times of rising prices.

Brown v. Kirk

33 Ill. App. 3d 477 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 20, 1975

They should not be extended by implications beyond the office or offices expressed or to persons not clearly within their meaning. In other words, they should be construed in favor of eligibility. … A tenant is well qualified to attest to the legitimate needs of low-income tenants, the intended primary beneficiaries of this governmental program.

Canfield v. Spear

99 Ill. App. 2d 107 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 23, 1968

Spear on his own initiative decided to establish a practice in Rockford. They have not, as the trial court found, lost a dermatologist, for they are free to bring in another dermatologist as an associate or partner. … Spear, as the trial court found, as these were earnings from the practice of a specialty that none of them are qualified to engage in.

Smith v. Menet

175 Ill. App. 3d 714 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 21, 1988

Golomb's testimony was insufficient to establish that Dr. Menet was negligent, testimony by defense witness Dr. Rosen did establish such negligence. We disagree. Dr. Rosen stated that if, on April 5, 1984, Dr. … Use of the phrase "good medical care" in qualifying the expert witness was clearly not intended to elevate the requisite standard of care and would be considered as equivalent to the phrase "acceptable medical standards"

Auten v. Franklin

Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 6, 2010

While the legislature clearly intended a minimally responsible tortfeasor to be jointly and severally liable for all medical expenses for an injury he partially caused, we find the legislature clearly did not intend for … The instructions clearly established that the rights of defen- - 54 - dants, Franklin and Nord, are separate and distinct from one another: "The rights of the defendants,

People v. Chattic

21 Ill. App. 3d 986 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 21, 1974

Any such collateral notation could not have been qualified as part of the statement if offered by the prosecution. … Our principal reason, however, for affirming this cause, despite the ruling of the trial court referred to, is based on the record which clearly shows that evidence established the guilt of defendant, and the introduction

People v. Jacobazzi

Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 17, 2009

We are not convinced that the qualifier stated in Wilson is a definitive part of the law-of-the-case doctrine. … The qualifier is not enforced to the letter even among the courts that subscribe to it.

21 Kristin Condominium Ass'n v. Pioneer Engineering & Environmental Services, LLC

2020 IL App (1st) 191868 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 30, 2020

“[A] cause of action should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429. … ¶ 15 For the remaining element of the cause of action, Pioneer argues that its statements cannot qualify as misrepresentations because it only expressed its opinion about the condition of the property.

Ernzen v. Board of Trustees

96 Ill. App. 3d 1143 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 5, 1981

I am of the opinion that the plaintiff’s claim for disability pension was clearly supported by the manifest weight of affirmative evidence in the record. … The manifest weight of the evidence in the record rests upon the opinions of two qualified physicians, each of whom made a thorough study of the current literature in the field.

Friedman Electric Co. v. St. Clair County Housing Authority

23 Ill. App. 2d 16 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 27, 1959

It was plaintiff’s burden to establish its compliance with the contract. … We have spent long hours studying the record here, and we cannot arrive at any other conclusion than that the plaintiff, on this whole record, clearly has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

Leadertreks, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

385 Ill. App. 3d 442 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 19, 2008

The Department appeals, arguing that the Department’s decision was not clearly erroneous. We agree and reverse the circuit court. … The Failure to Establish That the Property Was Not Used Primarily With a View to Profit The Department asserts that LeaderTreks did not establish that its property was not used primarily with a view to profit, because it

People v. Thorpe

52 Ill. App. 3d 576 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 16, 1977

Kirts, qualified as a forensic psychiatrist, gave his opinion based on the statute that defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined in the Act. … The record clearly shows that the statements were voluntarily and understandingly made and there is no plausible suggestion to the contrary.

Samoylovich v. Montesdeoca

13 N.E.3d 90 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 13, 2014

it would be clearly wrong. … To determine whether a lawsuit qualifies as a SLAPP, thus activating the Act’s protective mechanisms, the legislature articulated a test, the first part of which is contained in section 15 of the Act: “This Act

Miller v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago

374 Ill. App. 3d 188 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 22, 2007

To establish title by adverse possession as provided by section 13 — 101 of the Limitations Act, the party must possess the disputed land for 20 years. 735 ILCS 5/13 — 101 (West 2000). … App. 3d 750 (1990) (holding that parking lot did not qualify as a “public use” as defined by Brown.)

Wise v. St. Mary's Hospital

64 Ill. App. 3d 587 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 10, 1978

Mary’s Hospital established the existence of a pedal pulse until November 8, 1970, cyanotic nails and a blue tinge spreading in the toes. … Illinois law is clearly to the contrary. (Borowski v. VonSolbrig, 60 Ill. 2d 418 , 328 N.E.2d 301 .)

Geisberger v. Willuhn

72 Ill. App. 3d 435 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 1, 1979

The cases cited by the plaintiff herein are clearly distinguishable from the majority opinion quoted above. Costa v. Regents of University of California (Cal. … Finally, in a related context, the name and the identity of a client does not generally qualify as confidential information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. (Leindecker v.

Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Department of Revenue

313 Ill. App. 3d 469 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 17, 2000

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the circuit court and affirm the Department’s determination that the District’s property did not qualify for an exemption from taxation. … This is a mixed question of law and fact; thus, this court may only overturn the Department’s decision if it is clearly erroneous. See City of Belvidere v.