Case law

Safari Club International v. Jewell

213 F. Supp. 3d 48 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2016

that the data for 2012 was more than ten years old and that “[v]ery few new surveys have been conducted since 2007,” the Service said the government of Zimbabwe’s population estimates of more than 100,000 elephants was “clearly … /Reply at 17 (“[T]he document SCl/NRA cited does establish a proposed quota of 380.”) (emphasis added).

Bolden v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n

669 F. Supp. 1096 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 28, 1986

If OPM had chosen any one of these alternatives, plaintiffs clearly would have no claim *1105 of entitlement. … Once 0PM decided to benefit current enrollees, the issue was how to identify current enrollees, not whether past enrollees should also qualify.

United States v. Gottesfeld

319 F. Supp. 3d 548 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 19, 2018

Defendant avers that, because Attorney Ekeland was not a member of the Massachusetts Bar nor admitted to practice in the District in Case No. 16-mc-91064, he was not qualified to act as counsel and assent to any motion to … Defendant is judicially estopped from adopting a position that is clearly inconsistent with his earlier assent to the motions for exclusion of time. Id.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

239 F. Supp. 3d 77 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 7, 2017

“To qualify for RFRA’s protection, an asserted belief must be ‘sincere,’” not pretextual. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014). … Indeed, Cheyenne River has clearly stated that its “RFRA claim does not rely on the Corps’ trust duties to the tribe.” Reply at 9.

Schoenbach v. District of Columbia

309 F. Supp. 2d 71 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 2004

that it gave any weight at all to DCPS’s witnesses: “The DCPS witnesses were not competent to testify as they did, and the hearing officer offered no explanation for his decision to defer to their opinions above those of qualified … Private School Placement - Once a plaintiff establishes that the proposed public school placement was' Inap *84 propriate, the second inquiry is whether or not the private school placement is appropriate.

Presidential Bank, Fsb v. 1733 27th Street Se LLC

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 9, 2018

Here, the parties are clearly the same: Presidential Bank, Mr. Green, and six of his LLCs. See Compl. at 1; Md. Op. at 1. … “Parties, at least in situations where summary procedure is clearly to be desired, may in advance contract to waive a trial by jury.” Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

Quick v. Educap Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 12, 2018

To establish EduCap’s standing, Weinstock attached to both the Quick and 3 This allegation is incorrect. … Cir. 2015), but not every alleged fraud qualifies.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Binance Holdings Limited

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 28, 2024

Thus, courts applying these principles to the crypto industry have clearly understood that Howey requires “an examination of the entirety of the parties’ understandings and expectations.” SEC v. … Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2012), defendants argue that allegations that a parent company is “responsible for establishing” strategies for local subsidiaries are insufficient for establishing specific jurisdiction.

Schoenman v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 9, 2011

Clearly, there are various reasons why Meeropol is inapposite, not the least of which being that the FBI has never been found to have acted “intransigently” at any time in this action. … Cir. 1996) (intimating that the rationale provided for the exemption must be “clearly inconsistent” with other disclosure decisions to require more searching judicial review).

Humane Society of the United States v. Kempthorne

579 F. Supp. 2d 7 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 29, 2008

Opp. at 17, the ESA unambiguously defines the term “species” to include DPSs, see 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (16), and therefore it clearly authorizes FWS to delist DPSs under some circumstances. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (c)(2)(B). … The DPS Policy does not qualify as a construction to which this Court can defer because the DPS Policy does not directly address the interpretive issue before the Court.

Americans for Immigrant Justice v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 1, 2023

As noted above, upon establishing such a presumption, a makeshift burden then generally shifts to the defendant to establish that the conditions are rationally related to a non-punitive purpose and those conditions are … on the present record that Plaintiffs have clearly shown that the challenged restrictions on in-person visitation are not related to non-punitive interests or that the restrictions are “excessive” relative to those interests

Ampe v. Johnson

157 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 20, 2016

As relevant here, to qualify for naturalization under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., an applicant must have “been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence,” 8 … It instead offers a presumption, but one which the applicant can rebut by “establish[ing] extenuating circumstances.” Id.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2021

under ESA’s section 7(a)(2)”). 14 decisionmaking that “reflect[s] the collection, culling and assessment of factual information or scientific data” is of a kind that is clearly … The Court finds this explanation sufficient to establish foreseeable harm. C. FWS properly concluded that the Alternatives document is not segregable.

Williams v. Walsh

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 23, 2022

This involves making two determinations: “(1) [that] qualified workers are not available in the United 2 States to perform the employment for which foreign workers are … Plaintiffs have also established injury under a theory of competitor standing.

Canonsburg General Hospital v. Sebelius

989 F. Supp. 2d 8 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2013

For hospital-based SNFs, the qualifying amount for reimbursement under an exception is measured from 112 percent of the SNF’s peer group mean per diem cost, not the SNF’s peer group RCL. … Circuit has been primarily concerned with whether “the losing party clearly lacked any incentive to litigate the point in the first trial, but the stakes of the second trial are of a vastly greater magnitude.”

National Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

773 F. Supp. 2d 151 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2011

Economic harm may qualify as irreparable, however, “where a plaintiffs alleged damages are unrecoverable.” Sterling Commercial Credit —Michigan, LLC v. Phoenix Indus. … However, they proffer different grounds to establish a showing of irreparable harm. The Court addresses each individually. a.

United States v. Washington

907 F. Supp. 476 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 16, 1995

Stinson is clearly a significant holding for its impact on sentencing and the authority of the Sentencing Commission. However, a close inspection reveals that it fails to even minimally address questions at issue here. … While the Magistrate Judge based his order on the risk of flight and the safety of the community, the Court finds that the government has not established that the defendant presents a risk of flight.

United States v. Neely

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 6, 2023

He argues, however, that Vice President Pence was not “temporarily visiting” the Capitol, as he had a “permanent office” there and it should qualify as his “place of employment.” Id. … Nonetheless, Neely argues that his “limited education and understanding of the criminal justice system shows that he clearly did not understand the consequences of talking to the FBI.” Mot. to Suppress at 5.

Pinson v. U.S. Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 4, 2016

If a substantial privacy interest exists, a court next tests whether release of such information would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. … Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998) (noting that, while no heightened burden of proof is required to defeat a summary judgment motion raising qualified immunity, where a plaintiff “files a complaint against a public official

Wang v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 25, 2016

Your actions during and following my attempt to issue that warning clearly demonstrated to me that you had no remorse for your behavior. … Of course, in a case in which an employer’s action does not clearly qualify as an adverse employment action, “the Court still first must determine whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action.” Donovan v.