Case law

Bronner v. Duggan

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 4, 2019

The Court considered the parties’ supplemental briefing and held that it could not conclude, at the pleadings stage, that District of Columbia law immunized the Individual Defendants from money damages. … Plaintiffs assert that these requests for relief “clearly satisf[y] the $75,000 requirement.” Pls.’ Opp’n to Original Defs.’ Mot. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 37, ECF No. 114.

Crowley v. Vilsack

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2018

Nor do Plaintiff’s protestations to the proffered reasons for the PIP establish pretext. … Keegan’s report does not clearly state what evidence he actually reviewed to form his opinions.

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States

170 F. Supp. 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 20, 1959

in § 209(b) by the 1957 amendment; and whatever may have been the original reason for instituting the legislation which culminated in the 1957 amendment, § 209(b), as it read at the time the Commission issued this order, clearly … Subject to section 310 of this title, a permit shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor authorizing in whole or in part the operations covered by the application, if it appears from the applications or from any

Arora v. Buckhead Family Dentistry, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 8, 2018

Paige or Buckhead Family Dentistry was not “qualified, honest and ethical.” Dkt. 6 at 22 (Am. Compl. ¶ 126). … As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has put it, “there is no reason to raise false hopes and waste judicial resources by transferring a case that is clearly doomed.” Phillips v.

Democracy Partners, LLC v. Project Veritas Action Fund

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 14, 2021

The presence of a valid, non-tortious purpose does not immunize a defendant from liability under the wiretap statutes if that defendant also has a tortious purpose that is “the primary motivation” or “a determinative factor … EVID. 401, and therefore, they have failed to establish that evidence connecting defendants to Mr. Trump is relevant on this basis.

Daniels v. Potomac Electric Power Company

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 10, 2011

See Def’s Opp. at 8-11 (“[Plaintiff] also complains that . . . he has been deemed qualified for long term disability and has not returned to work . . . . … However, these cases are clearly distinguishable.

Shah v. Broadcasting Board of Governors

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 29, 2020

Although a refusal to promote qualifies as a materially adverse action, see Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. … SHAH: So in order to become GS-13, you have to go through the requirements to then be able to qualify for GS-13.

Ndondji v. InterPark Inc.

768 F. Supp. 2d 264 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 9, 2011

These grievances cannot qualify as adverse employment actions. “Not everything that makes an employee unhappy” is an adverse employment action. Broderick v. … Ndondji’s amended complaint is vague in its allegations and does not clearly set forth all causes of action.

Steele v. Esper

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 15, 2019

To establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a member of the protected class (i.e., is over 40 years old); (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment … Here, the evidence 19 clearly established that Colonel Bell, the Chancellor of CISA, made the key determination about which probationary faculty members would be released

Dellinger v. Bessent

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 2025

The Act was meant to separate the Office of Special Counsel as an independent entity, and to clearly establish OSC’s authority to “protect employees, especially whistleblowers, from prohibited personnel practices.” … While the Supreme Court has not established a bright-line rule or clearly defined test to distinguish between principal and inferior officers, see Edmond v.

Ervin and Associates, Inc. v. Dunlap

33 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 14, 1997

Based upon this assumption, Ervin has clearly met his burden of pleading facts to support his allegation that the termination of his preex *8 isting relationship with HUD was motivated by his speech on matters of public concern … He alleges that Williams, the contractor who won the First Due Diligence contract, was not qualified as an 8(a) contractor. Complaint at 19, 63.

Crockett v. Reagan

558 F. Supp. 893 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 4, 1982

Defendants have urged several grounds for dismissal: that the complaint presents a non-justiciable political question, that plaintiffs have not established standing, that the Court should exercise its equitable discretion … The 1981 Act clearly does not do so.

Organization of Chinese Americans, Inc. v. Damron

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 2023

to do so, and [defendant] did not even qualify to do business in California” at the time of signing the contract). … The fact that the Brokers’ allegedly inadequate initial efforts to measure the property may have proximately caused plaintiffs’ harm does not mean that the Lawyers’ actions were thereby immunized from liability.

American Society of Dermatology v. Shalala

962 F. Supp. 141 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 5, 1996

The RUC and the RUC Advisory Committee clearly furnish advice or recommendations to HCFA. The Secretary disputes whether the CPT Editorial Panel and its Advisory Committee furnish advice or recommendations to HCFA. … The Supreme Court qualified the term “utilize” in Public Citizen v.

Bennett-Bey v. Shulman

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 3, 2010

Bennett-Bey states that “[a]s a wakeful beneficiary, Sovereign people, Sovereign immunity and Sovereign rights I am confident, my rights and interest are constitutionally protected.” Compl. at 6-7. … DISCUSSION Bennett-Bey’s Complaint, which he filed pro se, does not clearly delineate the various claims upon which he seeks relief.

Shelton v. Babbitt

921 F. Supp. 787 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 26, 1994

However, upon closer examination, the charges regarding that trip illuminate most clearly the anti-EEO, and inferentially, possibly an anti-black, bias that animated from Mr. Ary and others under his command. When Ms. … A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff shows that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was discharged [actually or constructively] from that position and (4) similarly

Benjamin v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 13, 2024

Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted), the Court will not disregard specific evidence, if any, that Benjamin has clearly identified in her opposition brief as responsive to a particular statement of material fact set forth in … Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a debt collector’s argument that it had common law immunity from an FDCPA claim premised on statements it made in court).

Smith v. United States

522 F. Supp. 2d 233 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 29, 2007

Hashimoto’s inaction does not qualify as ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. See 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . C. … Yet, the supervised release portion of petitioner’s sentence was both legal and clearly conveyed to petitioner during the plea agreement hearing. (See Plea Tr. 9:8-11.)

Zhengxing v. Nathanson

215 F. Supp. 2d 114 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 5, 2002

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. … Zhengxing qualified as an employee or an independent contractor. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32 .

100reporters LLC v. United States Department of Justice

248 F. Supp. 3d 115 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2017

Cir. 1973) (“If the factual nature of the documents were so clearly established on the record, then the court would inquire no further and would make the legal ruling as to whether they fit within the defined exemption … First, Exemption 6 “encompasses ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasions of privacy, while Exemption 7(C) omits the 59 adverb ‘clearly.’” Id.