Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
8,912 results
1.83s
745 F. Supp. 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 30, 1990
approve a petition for the importation of alien workers, the employer seeking the approval must first obtain from the Secretary of Labor certification that: (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified … Accordingly, the regulation establishes a floor wage for agricultural workers, the “adverse effect wage rate.”
Cited 6 timesPublishedPrater v. Fedex Corporate Services Inc
District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 18, 2009
plaintiff has established an inference of discrimination. … Clearly, “the plaintiff can meet [his] burden of [establishing pretext] by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Cited 0 timesPublishedQueen City Brewing Co. v. District of Columbia
134 F.2d 44 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 8, 1943
This, we think, clearly appears from Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 127 U.S. 117 , 8 S.Ct. 1037, 1038 , 82 L.Ed. 94 . … The Oil Company was an Illinois corporation and on that.ground claimed immunity from taxation in Oklahoma.
Cited 1 timesPublishedCitizens for Responsibility & Ethics v. U.S. Department of Justice
822 F. Supp. 2d 12 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 9, 2011
Information need not be intimate or embarrassing to qualify for Exemption 6 protection. Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 279 (D.C.Cir.2005). … First, whereas Exemption 6 requires that the invasion of privacy be 'clearly unwarranted,’ the adverb 'clearly' is omitted from Exemption 7(C)____[And,] whereas Exemption 6 refers to disclosures that 'would constitute' an
Cited 6 timesPublishedHodes v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
532 F. Supp. 2d 108 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 31, 2008
Well-established doctrines of interpretation counsel against reading a statute so as to render any word or phrase meaningless. See Tax Analysts v. … Although HUD does not raise the argument, the Court notes that Ginnie Mae may, in fact, qualify as a financial institution.
Cited 12 timesPublishedWp Company LLC v. U.S. Department of State
District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 9, 2020
Its reply brief similarly maintains that “this lawsuit clearly caused the State Department to release records.” ECF No. 17 (Reply) at 6. This, of course, is a prong-two argument. But the Post’s key case, Davy v. … The Circuit has not ruled on whether an agency’s speedier release of records can qualify as a “voluntary or unilateral change in position,” 5 U.S.C.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAlabama Association of Realtors v. United States Department of Health and Human Services
District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 25, 2021
To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Summers v. … Cir. 2019), because “Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied if one plaintiff can establish injury and standing,” id. B.
Cited 0 timesPublishedReinhard v. Department of Homeland Security
District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 11, 2019
It thus clearly predates Plaintiff’s actual administrative separation. Id. … In order to meet its burden of showing confidentiality, Defendant must supply a reasonable foundation to establish that the individuals who received the email fall within the scope of the privilege.
Cited 0 timesPublished217 F. Supp. 3d 84 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 8, 2016
A party seeking to intervene as of right must additionally establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 731–32. … The Liquidators’ ability to establish its right to the Venus Account Funds is clearly impacted by the interpleader action, which has been stayed due 9 to the Court’
Cited 6 timesPublishedTexasgulf, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.
610 F. Supp. 1329 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 1985
When the tariff states in section 12.1 that in the event of a shortage United may prorate “without liability” in accord with the priorities established by the tariff, it is not establishing a separate fault standard. … However, in Phase III of the curtailment proceedings before the Commission, United argued that its curtailment qualified for exculpation under section 11 of the tariff.
Cited 3 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Sep 16, 2019
In a non-selection case, an employee may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing: “(i) that [s]he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [s]he applied and was qualified for a job for which the … Here, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case because she has not shown that she was qualified for the job.
Cited 0 timesPublished455 F. Supp. 837 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 18, 1978
Plaintiffs’ principal line of attack focuses on the rule established by the Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Education v. … The prohibition described in this section does not include the establishment of magnet schools.
Cited 2 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Jan 25, 2021
First, Haysbert never explains why his own interest in the remedy of prejudgment attachment qualifies as a public-interest consideration. … Aug. 3, 2005) (quashing prejudgment writs of attachment only on sovereign immunity grounds where the parties “agreed that the substance of the breach of contract claims must appropriately be decided in New York” and plaintiff
Cited 0 timesPublished436 F. Supp. 2d 17 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 2006
Specifically, the defendant argues that because the BOP is a component of the DOJ it does not qualify as an “agency” under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (f), and therefore, because the DOJ was not named as a defendant, this case should … PLN clearly stated its intention to “analyze and publish” the requested information in its printed journal and on its website. PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 1.
Cited 35 timesPublishedEmeronye v. CACI International, Inc.
141 F. Supp. 2d 82 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 17, 2001
Between March and October 1998, plaintiff applied for several open "senior paralegal" and "supervisory paralegal" positions that she alleges she was qualified for. … John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 , 183-84 & n. 2 (3d Cir.1998) (whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under "ordinary, well established principles of contract law rather than [a] heightened [knowing
Cited 18 timesPublished744 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2010
FWS found that some activities were not initiated in a timely manner and some were not performed by qualified personnel. Id. … FWS found that some Activities were not initiated in a timely manner and some were not performed by qualified personnel.
Cited 16 timesPublishedAssociation of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton
813 F. Supp. 82 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 10, 1993
Consequently, they are not directly ‘established or utilized’ by the President or any agency ‘in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations’.’ 557 F.Supp. at 529 . … On the other hand, the congressional interest in openness and accountability clearly is present at these meetings.
Reversed on other grounds by a later decision, 997 F.2d 898 (1993)Cited 12 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Jul 29, 2019
Upon review, the Court can see why: at least one Plaintiff clearly has standing. Only a few sentences are needed to show as much. … By defining a statute’s purposes up a level of generality, the Secretary can justify actions as consistent with the law even if they are clearly at odds with it.
Cited 0 timesPublished729 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 2, 2010
A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . … Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which protects the secrecy of the grand jury, was affirmatively enacted by Congress and thus qualifies as an exempting statute pursuant to Exemption 3. See Sussman v. U.S.
Cited 62 timesPublishedNortheast Hospital Corp. v. Sebelius
699 F. Supp. 2d 81 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2010
Massachusetts hospitals may qualify for a Medicaid DSH payment from MassHealth in several ways. … It concluded, at Chevron step one, that the Ohio regulation requiring treatment of these charity care patients was “clearly not part of a ‘State plan approved under [Medicaid].’ ” Id. at 178.
Cited 22 timesPublished
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