Case law

Dhiab v. Obama

70 F. Supp. 3d 486 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 3, 2014

a qualified one. … However, the Court of Appeals in Busmillah, 501 F. 3d at 188, clearly stated that "[i] t is the court, not the Government that has discretion to seal a judicial record

Pinson v. United States Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 9, 2022

They may well fail to do so— Pinson does not, for example, seem to clearly identify any criminal proceeding that might bring 18 U.S.C. § 1510 into play. 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (“Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery … When confronted with latter, courts often treat the claim as cognizable and reach the merits or resolve it on the basis of qualified immunity or on procedural grounds. See Brown v.

United States Association of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Jewell

103 F. Supp. 3d 133 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 12, 2015

Cir. 1987) (section 2401 creates a “jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity”). … The hurdle of establishing an amendment by implication, however, is a high one.

Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2019

As to Apple and Google, the Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing standing at this initial stage. … As a result, it held that private companies operating public access television channels can qualify as state actors. Id. at 307.

United States v. Klein

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 12, 2021

The Court thus sees no reason to depart from the weight of authority concluding that § 111(b) qualifies as a “crime of violence.” … But his actions are distinguishable from other detained defendants charged under § 111(b) who clearly sought to incapacitate and injure members of law enforcement by striking them with fists, batons, baseball bats, poles

Common Cause v. Federal Election Com'n

692 F. Supp. 1397 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 25, 1988

held that Common Cause is nonetheless correct that the FEC’s failure to regulate improper or inaccurate allocation between federal and nonfederal funds with respect to these activities was contrary to law, since Congress clearly … The court will not countenance further delay simply because regulations cannot be readied in time for November; to do so would reward inaction with further immunity from judicial review.

Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft

321 F. Supp. 2d 107 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 10, 2004

In addition, the level of creativity necessary to qualify for a copyright is extremely low. 1 Nimmer’s Copyright § 2.01[B]. … Thus, works to which Section 514 retroactively grants copyrights already contain the modicum amount of creativity necessary to qualify for a copyright. Id.

Conservation Force v. Salazar

916 F. Supp. 2d 15 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 7, 2013

On this record, the answer to that question is clearly “yes.” Plaintiffs are hence not entitled to fees for Counts I and II under the catalyst theory. II. … Even assuming that an offer to settle attorney fees can qualify as an offer of judgment, the fees plaintiffs seek are not “costs incurred after the offer was made.” Id.

Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey

600 F. Supp. 1396 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 10, 1985

Thus the President clearly has inherent authority to act to protect the United States from harmful illegal immigration. … Clearly the interdiction program does not run afoul of this statute.

Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH

99 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2000

(Col. 5, Lines 21-24) This purpose of “maneuvering” is clearly supported in the specification. … But Erbe has not asserted that either the Office Action or the Amendment related to the probe application qualified for nonpro-duction under this first objection.

In Defense of Animals v. United States Department of Agriculture

656 F. Supp. 2d 68 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 18, 2009

LSR was judicially estopped from raising this untimely argument that was clearly inconsistent with the position it maintained for years. See In Def. of Animals v. USDA, 589 F.Supp.2d 41, 43 (D.D.C.2008). 5 . … Nor did the defendants establish that Caul-field would be qualified to give such an opinion.

Smith v. Pro-Football

420 F. Supp. 738 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 8, 1976

While these cases do not leave the precise manner of applying the doctrine to the circumstances of professional football entirely free from doubt, they do establish rules and guidelines clearly dispositive of defendants’ … The defendants have attempted to establish at trial that the draft fits within these criteria.

Jackson v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 24, 2018

Circuit itself recently held, in a case where officers used a tactical takedown on a plaintiff who was resisting arrest, that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity. … immunity in their motion. 17 (Bolton report) at 3.

Sack v. U.S. Department of Defense

6 F. Supp. 3d 78 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 13, 2013

Here, the four corners of Sack’s request clearly limited the scope of records she was seeking to records maintained by the Office of Security, not the NCCA. … This explanation sufficiently establishes that a more detailed search was unnecessary and would have been futile. See American-Arab Anti- Discrimination Comm., 516 F.

Sculimbrene v. Reno

158 F. Supp. 2d 8 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 16, 2001

Given that the facts underlying Agent Sculim-brene’s statement were clearly in conflict, Mr. … To the contrary, the facts underlying the subject of Mr, Davis’ statements belie any such conclusion, as the “truth” was clearly in dispute. Turning now to Mr.

Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board

557 F. Supp. 23 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 4, 1982

It does so by further defining the scope of the qualifier “general” and clarifying the circumstances under which the Board will permit an exception to its “general” rule. … Congress can limit the broad discretionary authority it has previously clearly granted the Board if it chooses to do so.

Picur v. Kerry

128 F. Supp. 3d 302 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 11, 2015

The agency further explained that it had determined that Picur did not qualify for the “grandfather provision” in the Gambatesa memo because “[the] grandfather provision [was] for only those employees whose total compensation … By its plain terms, this provision clearly indicates that Congress intended for the State Department to base the high three average on the annuitant’s actual basic salary as a historical fact, rather than on what the agency

Kay v. Federal Communications Commission

867 F. Supp. 11 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 8, 1994

The agency bears the burden of establishing a “ ‘relatively detailed justification’ for assertion of an exemption, and must demonstrate to a reviewing court that records are clearly *17 exempt.” Id. … The Court finds that the FCC’s statutory authority to revoke licenses or deny license applications is a qualifying law enforcement purpose. Cf. Church of Scientology, Int’l v.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus

77 F.R.D. 448 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 10, 1978

It must initially determine whether the party qualifies under the tests set forth in 19(a) as one of those parties which should be joined. … While a general equitable exception has not been established, there is authority for not invoking collateral estoppel if injustice would result.

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U. S. Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 21, 2011

It is established that the “usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is to multiply the hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar’ amount.” … Supp. 907, 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (compensation for work performed after records were released “would assess a penalty against defendants which is clearly unwarranted”).