Case law

Estate of Gaither v. District of Columbia

653 F. Supp. 2d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 8, 2009

This was quite clearly a serious error and not, as Defense counsel claims, a simple inadvertent mistake resulting from substitution of new counsel. … For example, Defendant Brown argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity, that claims against him in his official capacity must be dismissed as redundant, and that Plaintiff cannot show that he proximately caused

Kazenercom Too v. Turan Petroleum, Inc.

590 F. Supp. 2d 153 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 19, 2008

Rather than clearly tying defendants’ acts to specific violations of the securities laws, plaintiffs merely provide a laundry list of securities statutes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 270.) … Plaintiffs also allude to several other provisions for establishing venue.

Achagzai v. Broadcasting Board of Governors

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 20, 2018

Regardless, Stanazai’s editing responsibilities clearly did not decrease when the April 2013 schedule was revised in July 2013. 7    II. … First, as discussed above, the schedule did not reduce Stanazai’s previously established responsibilities.

United States v. Zabavsky

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 2022

[and] [s]uch facts are clearly admissible to show Mr. Hylton-Brown’s motive [to flee the police].” Sutton Crim. … If this issue were before the Court on a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment or as an effort to raise a qualified immunity defense under Section 1983, things would be different.

Cobb v. Harker

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 25, 2023

In 2014, her supervisor did not select her for a position for which “she was certified as qualified,” and in March 2015, she was “abandoned while on TDY in Hawaii.” Id. at 9–10. … It requires federal agencies to comply with requests for records unless such “information is exempted under [one of nine] clearly delineated statutory [exemptions].” Id.

Perez v. Goldin

360 F. Supp. 2d 12 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2003

In sum, Perez contended in the administrative complaint that NASA had promoted her white co-workers to positions for which she was qualified. 1 Perez now asks this Court to rescind the settlement agreement she entered with … The facts clearly demonstrate that Perez voluntarily entered the settlement agreement with NASA; therefore, recission is unwarranted. See Kessler v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins.

Garza v. Blinken

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 27, 2023

“[T]o establish constructive discharge, the plaintiff must make a further showing beyond that needed to establish a hostile work environment.” Carter v. Nelson, No. 20-5111, 2021 WL 6139250, at *2 (D.C. Cir. … To the extent Plaintiff alternatively asserts that her “constructive curtailment” is a qualifying adverse action, that contention also fails, as discussed below. C.

He v. Blinken

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 13, 2023

. ¶ 130; see Curry, 195 F.3d at 661 (finding absence of negligence as a matter of law when employer “established an effective complaint procedure,” “reli[ed] on its employees to bring problems with their co-workers to … Because FECA’s exclusive-liability provision “carves out certain suits . . . from the FTCA’s 8 sovereign-immunity waiver,” it limits this Court’s jurisdiction.

COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M.

900 F. Supp. 515 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 15, 1995

The non-resident defendant in Cohane clearly sought out contact with the District of Columbia when it specifically endeavored to make sales in the District. … Having concluded that COMSAT has satisfied all the requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., and Rule 55(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., on September 13, 1995, this Court entered a Final Judgment for

United States v. Sum of $70,990,605

4 F. Supp. 3d 189 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 2014

District of Columbia, 256  - 28 - F.R.D. 267, 271 (D.D.C. 2009) (declining to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds because of “the nature of facts alleged” … - 29 - Afghanistan Attorney General’s office, which are not clearly answered by the proffered Afghanistan Attorney General’s opinions. Compare 2d Am.

Agility Public Warehousing Company K.S.C.P. v. U.S. Department of Defense

246 F. Supp. 3d 34 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2017

In state court, the federal government is protected by sovereign immunity; thus, the state court cannot enforce a subpoena against the agency, and the third party’s only option is to bring a collateral challenge under the … Opp’n at 36; see, e.g., Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (“We do not hold that opposing trial counsel is absolutely immune from being deposed.”) (emphasis added); Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox v.

D'ONOFRIO v. SFX Sports Group, Inc.

534 F. Supp. 2d 86 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 18, 2008

STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant. … Court of Appeals held that a high level official can qualify as an “employer” under the DCHRA and thus incur individual liability under that act. Id. at 714-15 .

In Re: Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 29, 2025

A “question of law” is defined as “an abstract legal issue or what might be called one of pure law, matters the court of appeals can decide quickly and clearly without having to study the record.” … See ECF No. 641-1, at 39, 41, 43, 44. 10 qualify as a legitimate, unilateral explanation for its conduct.

Environmental Defense Fund v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 13, 2022

If the requester is deemed eligible for fees, it still must establish entitlement to an award. … Rather, what the declaration demonstrates is that counsel’s firm receives LSI Matrix–based fee awards for cases that more clearly qualify as complex federal litigation—like, for example, class actions—and not for its other

Perkins v. Wcs Construction LLC

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 12, 2020

Perkins cannot establish the required connection or “fit” between the policy and the allegedly wrongful termination. Id. at 3–4. As at the motion to dismiss stage, Ms. … On this view, a criminal statute—which obviously has its own method of state-sponsored enforcement—might not qualify as a source of a public policy exception.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 27, 2019

Army Corps has established that the withheld documents were a part of a deliberative process. … Similarly, CBP has established that the withheld documents were a part of a deliberative process.

Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 29, 2021

Starting from the top, the Court concluded that “actual misuse” of exposed information clearly qualified as “actual damages.” Attias II, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 11–12. It stressed, however, that under the D.C. … And third, plaintiffs maintain that the Court clearly erred in concluding that CareFirst’s alleged breach of contract is not actionable under the D.C. CPPA.

In Re NAVY CHAPLAINCY

850 F. Supp. 2d 86 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 21, 2012

See Pls.’ 1st Mot. to Alter or Amend at 31 (noting that expert analysis “clearly shows denomination is an important factor in determining which denominational representatives are awarded or denied government benefits). … The court proceeded to dismiss those claims, holding that they were merely another way for the plaintiffs to attempt to establish standing to raise their Establishment Clause challenges. Id.

Rodriguez v. U.S. Department of Army

31 F. Supp. 3d 218 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 27, 2014

First, Exemption 6 “encompasses ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasions of privacy, while Exemption 7(C) omits the adverb ‘clearly.’” Id. … This Court has recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute. See, e.g., Boehm v. FBI, 2013 WL 2477091 (D.D.C. June 10, 2013); Tampico v. EOUSA, No. 04-2285, slip op at 8 (D.D.C.

(Leave of Court is Needed for Plaintiff) Chandler v. Williams

District Court, District of Columbia · May 4, 2011

Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 771 (D.C. 2009) (“Civil conspiracy . . . is not an independent tort but only a means for establishing vicarious liability for an underlying tort.” … The Court is certainly not prepared to rule on such a potentially complex issue as qualified immunity. See MTD at 23.