Case law

Robb v. Vilsack

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 8, 2025

Having established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, the burden shifts back to Robb to establish that the Department’s stated reasons are merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. … But Robb did not discuss the Office of Special Counsel, OSC immunity, or any similar argument in her opposition. She cannot raise the argument for the first time here.

United States v. Morten

730 F. Supp. 2d 11 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 4, 2010

No. 104-8, § 101 (a) (“[T]he Authority is established as an entity within the government of the District of Columbia, and is not established as a department, agency, establishment or instrumentality of the United States Government … But the Court need not consider that possibility further, because Unfoldment does not qualify for intervention as of right and will not be granted permission to intervene.

De Deaux v. Saul

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 25, 2022

Stone offered in support of her opinion, the ALJ did not clearly explain his reasons for discounting it. He acknowledged that “Dr. … Stone’s . . . letter even qualifies as a ‘medical opinion,’” Def.’s Mot. for J. of Affirmance at 17, Dkt. 14, despite the fact that the ALJ explicitly found that Dr.

Federal Trade Commission v. Alliant Techsystems Inc.

808 F. Supp. 9 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 23, 1992

However, Alliant and Olin are well-qualified to produce all the varieties of the product. Both companies are involved in the production of all current training and tactical rounds. … Under such circumstances, deference to clearly stated and authoritative military caveats would be appropriate and substantial. Compare, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel.

Kvech v. Holder

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 19, 2011

Our Circuit has held that “emotional trauma alone is sufficient to qualify as an ‘adverse effect’ under Section 552a(g)(1)(D) of the Act.” Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984). … “Sovereign immunity, however, . . . bar[s] suits for money damages against officials in their official capacity absent a specific waiver by the government” and no such waiver has been given for First Amendment claims.

Gorbey v. United States

55 F. Supp. 3d 98 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 17, 2014

The Court, therefore, may grant Gorbey relief here only if the D.C. court’s adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal … Clearly, Burton advanced several compelling arguments on Gorbey’s behalf – as mentioned earlier, the D.C.

Evans v. Leavitt

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 17, 2009

In analyzing the plaintiff’s claim regarding the LDDS position, she clearly has shown that “[s]he is [a] member of a [protected class,] . . . … Here, the plaintiff only clearly establishes that she belongs to a protected class (African-American, age fifty-five) and “other employees of similar qualifications who were not

United States v. Hammond

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 7, 2018

Second, Hammond must establish that without the residual clause, his prior convictions do not qualify as crimes of violence. … Yet, each rebuke those circuits cite enforced 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)’s limitation of federal relief to cases in which a state court unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

American Chiropractic Ass'n v. Shalala

108 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 7, 2000

In 1997, Congress established the M + C program as a new “Part C” to title XVIII. See id. §§ 1395w-21 — 1395w-28. … When Medicare was originally established, “physician services” did not include services provided by a chiropractor.

DeGeorge v. United States

521 F. Supp. 2d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 13, 2007

The Court held, in relevant part, that Plaintiffs allegations “clearly fall within the intentional tort exception to the *38 limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA [ 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) ] such that the … Id. at 8 (“Plaintiff can prevail by establishing either that the agents were negligent or the U.S.A. failed to properly supervise *40 run away agents”). Plaintiffs argument is without merit.

Codrea v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

239 F. Supp. 3d 128 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 7, 2017

The withheld four pages appear to qualify as both guidance to the ATF hearing officers implementing the GCA licensing scheme and reveal law enforcement techniques for ferreting out GCA violations. … Cir. 10 1993) (“[A] district court clearly errs when it approves the government’s withholding of information under the FOIA without making an express finding on segregability

Tibbs v. Williams

263 F. Supp. 2d 39 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 13, 2003

Plaintiff must establish that the official policy or custom is “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C.Cir.1986). … Tibbs’s claims was clearly set out — the entry onto his premises by agents of the District who are alleged to have “unlawfully seized and removed personal effects.”

Harpole Architects, P.C. v. Barlow

668 F. Supp. 2d 68 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 9, 2009

As a matter of law, HAPC qualifies as a RICO enterprise because it is a corporation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (“ ‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity”). … To meet this requirement, plaintiffs must establish that the predicate acts are “related” and “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 235 F.3d at 633 (quoting H.J. Inc. v.

Thompson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys

587 F. Supp. 2d 202 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 24, 2008

Rule 6(e) qualifies as a statute because it was affirmatively enacted by Congress. Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. … Clearly, transcripts of grand jury testimony and grand jury exhibits fall within the foregoing categories of protected information.

Robinson Ex Rel. T.R. v. District of Columbia

61 F. Supp. 3d 54 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 28, 2014

P. 72(b)(3)), the defendant strays from the correct review standard to state, as the summary of its primary argument, that “Magistrate Judge Kay’s determination . . . is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law,” see id. … Cir. 1995) (“[T]he fee petitioner bears the burden of establishing all elements of his entitlement.”).

Blue Thunder v. United States Parole Commission

133 F. Supp. 3d 5 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2015

Whether the facts of each lawsuit are similar enough to qualify as “the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same nucleus of facts.” Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. … The court found the claim “clearly successive,” as it “concerns his parole revocation hearings in 1998.” Id. at *9.

Battineni v. Mayorkas

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 2, 2024

The burden of proof in an adjudication of an EB-5 visa application rests with the petitioning investor, who must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is fully qualified. … In this case, the money clearly came from Mr. Seelamneni. . . .

Heartland Hospital v. Thompson

328 F. Supp. 2d 8 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 3, 2004

To qualify for SCH status, a hospital must meet requirements promulgated by the Secretary of HHS. Id. … A hospital in an urban area could qualify as an SCH if it was more than 35 miles away from the nearest like hospital. Id. at 5 .

Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, for an Order Authorizing the Release of Certain Grand Jury Materials

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2019

As already noted, the identity of an individual who testified before the grand jury is clearly a “matter occurring before the grand jury.” … “[T]he government cannot immunize” the identities of non-grand jury witnesses from disclosure “by publicizing the link” between witnesses and non-witnesses. Wash. Post Co. v.

United America Financial, Incorporated v. Potter

531 F. Supp. 2d 29 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 22, 2008

This falls far short of establishing that the emails identified by the Compensation Office were “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” … More specifically, the thresholds for withholding differ slightly because “while Exemption 6 requires a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' to qualify for withholding, Exemption 7(C) requires only that disclosure