Case law

Young v. Covington & Burling, LLP

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2010

Although not articulated with precision, this administrative complaint was clearly sufficient to put both the EEOC and Covington on notice that a disparate-impact charge was being asserted. Def.' … (emphasis in original), and also that she would have actually been qualified for a higher position, id. at 9.

Wyche v. United States

317 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 23, 2004

Thus, Apprendi does not qualify as a right “newly recognized” and “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 6(3). … Yet, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Congress clearly intended for the AEDPA to bring greater finality to convictions by restricting use of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams v.

Rosier v. Holder

833 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 24, 2011

Conversely, in the instant Case, the August 2008 date found on the deposition and interrogatories establishes that the administrative proceedings continued past Rosier’s August 2007 alleged constructive discharge. … Rosier was a qualified individual with a disability as defined under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 121-01-17 . 70.

Groobert v. PRESIDENT AND DIRS. OF GEORGETOWN COL.

219 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 27, 2002

A witness may qualify as an expert through knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Id. … Pickerell is clearly reliable and admissible. Assuming arguendo that Dr.

Friends of Animals v. Salazar

626 F. Supp. 2d 102 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 22, 2009

qualify because standing “depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” … Through this language, Congress clearly contemplated that the FWS would exercise its authority to grant exceptions under “this section” (i.e., section 10) by responding to individual applications.

Petchem, Inc. v. United States

99 F. Supp. 2d 50 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 15, 2000

Petchem claims that the tug work does not qualify for any of the regular statutory exceptions to CICA, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (a)(3)(c)1-7. … First, it cites Canon U.S.A., Inc., 1986 WL 63273 (Comp.Gen.) to establish that a plaintiff must show that there was a specific intent to fragment a known requirement in violation of CICA and FAR.

Johnson v. District

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 4, 2023

’s attempt to hold him liable “fades into respondeat superior or vicarious liability, clearly barred under Section 1983.” … There is an alternative route to establishing deliberate indifference, but it is not applicable here.

Kvech v. Holder

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 19, 2011

Our Circuit has held that “emotional trauma alone is sufficient to qualify as an ‘adverse effect’ under Section 552a(g)(1)(D) of the Act.” Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984). … “Sovereign immunity, however, . . . bar[s] suits for money damages against officials in their official capacity absent a specific waiver by the government” and no such waiver has been given for First Amendment claims.

Nohria v. Cuccinelli

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2021

The burden of proof rests on petitioners to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are “eligible to receive [the] visa” for which they are petitioning. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; see Matter of EB-5 Immigrant … The agency’s process is clearly governed by a solid rule of reason—the visa availability approach—meeting the first factor, see Def.’s Mem. at 12; Pl.’s Opp’n at 16, and, under the fourth factor, any delay “reflects USCIS

Michel v. Anderson

817 F. Supp. 126 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 8, 1993

In the instant action, the required showing of particularized injury is clearly met. … The plaintiffs here sufficiently established this connection.

National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Bell

488 F. Supp. 123 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 11, 1980

Id. 22 Smoking marijuana does not qualify as a fundamental right, Ravin v. … The Supreme Court has established a framework for examining challenges to the severity of a criminal statute.

Payne v. Barnhart

725 F. Supp. 2d 113 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2010

To qualify for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Act, a claimant must establish that he is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (a)(1)(D), 1382(a)(1). … The government clearly failed to demonstrate good cause for their final, out-of-time motion to enlarge time, and their motion is DENIED.

Chang v. Department of the Navy

314 F. Supp. 2d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 22, 2004

The third step is “to determine whether the identified public interests qualify for consideration.” … The fourth step is “to balance the personal privacy interests against the qualifying public interest.” 32 C.F.R. 701.112(b)(2)(iii).

Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hargan

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 19, 2020

See, e.g., Kaufman, 896 F.3d at 484 (applying the Barnhart factors but also considering whether the agency interpretation was “clearly intended to have general applicability and the force of law” (quoting Fox, 684 F.3d … That is clearly reflected in the FDCA’s implementing regulations defining and authorizing sNDAs, which establish a separate approval process that applies whenever a manufacturer wishes to make “[s]upplements and other

Marin v. Wormuth

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 12, 2025

A Glomar response is properly supported by Exemption 6 where acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of responsive documents in and of itself “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 … And that exception is construed “narrowly” to apply to misconduct that is “severe enough to qualify as nefarious or extreme government wrongdoing.” Id. at 14.

In Re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing

794 F. Supp. 2d 65 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 30, 2011

(declining to establish a bright-line rule but noting that the agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation for its definition). … The Draft Final Rule does not clearly articulate the scientific reasoning behind dismissing an “endangered” designation for parts of the range ....

Jackson v. Bergland

448 F. Supp. 1146 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 1978

The Court concludes that the plaintiff has more than carried the burden of proof and has clearly established that he was the subject of racial discrimination. He, therefore, is entitled to appropriate relief. … Priorities were to be established for handling promotion requests and he was asked to rank the personnel in his Laboratory for promotion.

Robb v. Vilsack

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 8, 2025

Having established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, the burden shifts back to Robb to establish that the Department’s stated reasons are merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. … But Robb did not discuss the Office of Special Counsel, OSC immunity, or any similar argument in her opposition. She cannot raise the argument for the first time here.

United States v. Morten

730 F. Supp. 2d 11 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 4, 2010

No. 104-8, § 101 (a) (“[T]he Authority is established as an entity within the government of the District of Columbia, and is not established as a department, agency, establishment or instrumentality of the United States Government … But the Court need not consider that possibility further, because Unfoldment does not qualify for intervention as of right and will not be granted permission to intervene.

Center for Medical Progress v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2026

Here, plaintiff challenges whether categories of information qualify as confidential commercial information subject to protection under Exemption 4: (1) the number of tissue disbursements made and shipped by the University … Yet, this fact, standing alone, does not, as plaintiff posits, mean the information has no relation to the funding of the University of Pittsburgh—and such funding qualifies as a financial interest that is commercial, within