Case law

Mariano v. Gharai

999 F. Supp. 2d 167 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 21, 2013

In the absence of the statement in Third-Party Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court has little to draw on in assessing whether SGA Holdings qualifies as a third-party beneficiary. … Indeed, the evidence is clearly not “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Federal Communications Commission

810 F. Supp. 1302 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 22, 1992

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 , 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2689 , 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), the record clearly reveals that no deprivation of defendants’ making is presently occurring, and none is likely to occur before the merits of this controversy … Section 9 of the Cable Act of 1992 directs the FCC to determine and establish reasonable rates that operators may charge unaffiliated users, and to establish reasonable terms and conditions for such use.

Chiang v. Kempthorne

503 F. Supp. 2d 343 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 30, 2007

The Supreme Court has held that to qualify as “ ‘adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning’ of a statute, a plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of ... falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought … Thus, although defendants now self-serv-ingly assert that the Guidelines do not bind MMS, the record clearly indicates otherwise. See CropLife, 329 F.3d at 883.

Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 23, 2010

constitutional challenge, without an injunction it will incur the expenses related to these activities without any potential of recovering them from the defendants due to the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of governmental immunity … While these expenses are likely to be substantial based on the plaintiff’s representations, the Supreme Court has clearly held that this alone is insufficient to establish irreparable harm.

Cuban v. Securities and Exchange Commission

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 22, 2010

But just because numerous forms of records can qualify does not mean they do qualify in their entirety. … s Mem. at 28, nor has the defendant established that any resulting invasion of privacy is "clearly unwarranted" when balanced against the public interest as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), Pl.'s Reply at 18.

Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Board

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 5, 2022

Because he has not established a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court will deny his Motion. I. … While Kroll addressed the issue in the context of ruling on whether Capitol Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity 9 and therefore had no occasion to definitively

Youssef v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

19 F. Supp. 3d 167 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 28, 2014

Youssef may establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an available position; (3) despite his qualifications … As with Youssef’s evaluation of his other competency examples, the Court finds this argument insufficient to establish that Youssef’s examples or experiences were clearly superior to Powers’.

United States v. Al-Imam

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2019

Charter to the ‘prosecute or extradite’ regime they establish[.]”). … itself is established.”

United States v. Bryan

72 F. Supp. 58 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 21, 1947

The burden is on one who j maintains the contrary to establish his contention. … Moreover, the right of freedom of speech is, in itself, a qualified right.

Omotoye v. Td Bank

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 12, 2024

As to the length of assignment, his several-month tenure does not clearly indicate an employment relationship. See Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 940 (D.C. … Only two allegations clearly qualify as adverse employment actions: the purported denial of promotions and Omotoye’s termination in April 2022. But neither supports a plausible claim of discrimination here.

NOBLE ENERGY, INC. v. Salazar

691 F. Supp. 2d 14 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 2010

Ultimately, the IBLA held that “the record developed during the hearing process clearly supports MMS’s decisions to exclude the leases from their respective units.” Id. … The IBLA also noted that the “technical staff was more qualified than [the Regional Director] by training and relative familiarity with the relevant data to render an opinion on whether the leases should have been removed

United States v. Shepard

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 2021

And relying on the established standards is preferable to conducting an unmoored inquiry into what qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling.” … As explained above, to qualify under this provision, the defendant must be “at least 65 years old; . . .

Saunders v. District of Columbia

711 F. Supp. 2d 42 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 13, 2010

Having established as much, the Court must next determine whether Plaintiff qualified as an employee subject to the provisions of section 142, such that she was an at will employee at the time of her termination. … Plaintiff has therefore clearly alleged that the Special Project Team was tasked with and responsible for “accounting, budget [and/or] financial management.”

Naacp Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. v. Barr

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 1, 2020

For instance, “it would clearly violate the ‘fairly balanced’ requirement if the Secretary were to announce that he would exclude all points of view except one.” Id. … Because UMRA uses “established” as a past participle, those programs must already have been “established.” See id.

El-Bey v. Mead

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 26, 2021

Craige clearly knows his conditions of detention—none could argue that he is “likely unaware” of the alleged deprivations he has suffered. Lepelletier, 164 F.3d at 43. … Cir. 1997) (stating that an organizational plaintiff may have standing to sue on its own behalf “to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy”).

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations v. National Labor Relations Board

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 7, 2020

Thus, each of those provisions too, qualify as substantive for the purpose of the APA’s notice-and-comment prescriptions. … Binding precedents have also clearly established that the agency decides what happens next when all or part of a challenged action has been invalidated. See Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v.

Ruiz v. Vilsack

763 F. Supp. 2d 168 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 9, 2011

Because “[pjrocedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants,” Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 152 , 104 S.Ct … Plaintiff was clearly informed that he had 90 days to sue from the date that he received the final EEOC decision, and he decided to submit his IFP application with his complaint only six days prior to the 90-day filing deadline

Tomac v. Norton

193 F. Supp. 2d 182 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2002

The Band’s claim of rights and status as a treaty-based tribe, and the need to restore and clarify that status, has been clearly demonstrated. S.Rep. No. 103-266 at 6 (emphasis added). … Marie Tribe, 78 F.Supp.2d at 707; Grand Traverse Band, 46 F.Supp.2d at 699 . 8 I conclude that the taking of land in trust pursuant to the Pokagon restoration act qualifies as the “restoration of lands for an Indian tribe

National Mining Ass'n v. Chao

160 F. Supp. 2d 47 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 9, 2001

The Supreme Court did not find that a rule clearly intended to displace APA standards, which unambiguously shifts the burden of proof, would be invalid. … The SSA definition conferred full benefits on each individual qualifying as a wage-earner’s “widow” regardless of any other qualifying individual. See Peabody Coal Co. v.

Pourshakouri v. Pompeo

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 11, 2021

Ifthe moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must then identify specific facts establishing a dispute as to material facts to defeat the motion. See id. ANALYSIS A. … Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting the Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune