Case law
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507 F. Supp. 2d 2 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 15, 2007
handicapped employee,” but had concluded that plaintiff was not a “qualified handicapped employee” as defined by the Act. … Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim also fails because he has not established that he " 'was "qualified” for [his] position with or without reasonable accommodation.’ ” Thompson, 422 F.Supp.2d at 166 (quoting Duncan
Cited 16 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Nov 24, 2020
However, plaintiff does not allege that any of these circumstances apply to him. 3 Alcohol is a qualifying substance. … “[A] writ of mandamus will issue ‘only where the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory, and clearly defined.
Cited 0 timesPublishedHamilton v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., Inc.
628 F. Supp. 2d 59 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 24, 2009
See, e.g., he plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). … In addition, Defendant contends that neither Thompson nor Hersh qualifies as “realistically the alter ego” of Defendant, so that any intentional actions by them cannot be imputed to the company. Def.’s Mem. at 6.
Cited 7 timesPublishedAuburn Regional Medical Center v. Leavitt
District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 11, 2010
Here, plaintiffs' claims clearly arise under the Medicare Act – and hence are covered by § 405(h) – because they arise from the calculation of payments under the Medicare DSH provision and have as their ultimate goal the … Plaintiffs contend that they fall within this exception because, without judicial review of their DSH payments under § 1331, the Secretary's actions would be immunized from judicial scrutiny.
Cited 0 timesPublishedNAT. ASS'N OF PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT v. Mendez
857 F. Supp. 85 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 6, 1994
Defendants' unrebutted affidavits establish, however, that OCHAMPUS has not delegated such authority. … The referenced sections states that a qualified mental health provider must "practic[e] within the scope of his or her license."
Cited 0 timesPublishedPerkins v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs
District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 2010
However, the dispute is not genuine as defendant’s denial letter clearly cites factors (ii), (iii), and (iv) as grounds for denying plaintiff’s fee waiver request. (Def.’s Mot., Attach. 1 at 16.) … However, plaintiff does not explain how his background in information technology qualifies him to perform statistical analysis, which is an entirely different subject matter.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCannady v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys
District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 23, 2022
Having established Barrett’s legitimate privacy interest, the court turns to whether Cannady has asserted a public interest in disclosure. Id.at 756. He has not. … That doctrine provides that “materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.” Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C.
Cited 0 timesPublishedNational Maritime Union of America v. Herzog
78 F. Supp. 146 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 21, 1948
In the clearly established circumstances, it is difficult to follow plaintiff’s argument that § 9(h) imposes “penalties on trade unions * * * for the conduct and opinions of their officers * * * in altogether unrelated fields … It is not necessary that the government, in order to ask whether the prospective agent is qualified, show a clear and present danger to the national economy from selecting one not qualified.
Cited 27 timesPublishedTobey v. General Services Administration
District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 11, 2020
The Rehabilitation Act does not immunize Plaintiff from those consequences, and he offers no evidence that GSA’s non-discriminatory reasons for the discipline were in truth motivated by his disability. … The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a qualified individual or that GSA had notice of Plaintiff’s disability. Am. Compl. ¶ 37 (“At all times, Tobey was a qualified individual.”); Defs.’
Cited 0 timesPublishedPetit v. U.S. Department of Education
756 F. Supp. 2d 11 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 21, 2010
A “genuine issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense *14 and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. … As an initial matter, the court observes that the 1983 regulatory definition of audiology fails to expound as to what qualifies as “fitting” an appropriate aid. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (a).
Cited 1 timesPublishedA.L. Laboratories, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
674 F. Supp. 894 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 23, 1987
In addition to notifying EPA of the error in the RTECS data base, CMA cited other sources that allegedly establish that the phthalate esters are not acutely toxic. … The argument implausibly ascribes to Congress an intention to immunize or ignore any errors, clerical or otherwise, in the CEPP list from which the Right-to-Know list was copied.
Cited 1 timesPublishedWashington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane
400 F. Supp. 186 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 27, 1975
Clearly the police department must have some flexibility in its choice of techniques to carry out its lawful duties. … At trial, Zanders qualified his original assessment, stating that no written policy changes had been made, but that changes were instituted through verbal orders. 32 .
Reversed on other grounds by Washington Mobilization Committee v. Maurice J. Cullinane, Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department, 566 F.2d 107 (1977)Cited 19 timesPublishedRubio v. District of Columbia Department of Human Services
District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 12, 2024
It is clearly established that the District of Columbia executes a policy and custom by failing to issue timely notification to beneficiaries,” Dkt. 25 at 8, and Plaintiff argues that the District has a “policy or custom … The Court 11 The District argues that adding § 1985(3) and § 1986 claims would be futile, seemingly on behalf of the individual Defendants, including by raising qualified immunity.
Cited 0 timesPublished766 F. Supp. 2d 230 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 2, 2011
A “genuine dispute” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. … PLEASE CONTACT THE PARTY LISTED BELOW IMMEDIATELY IF YOU ARE INTERESTED TO SEE IF YOU QUALIFY FOR THIS PROGRAM. THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WILL CONTINUE IN THE INTERIM. ■ Notice at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
Cited 8 timesPublished109 F. Supp. 3d 12 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 10, 2015
Clearly the Court thoroughly considered the fourth subclass’s claims relating to transitions and determined that then, as now, there were no genuine disputed facts. … Cupingood to be a “qualified expert in statistic[s].” 2011 Opinion at 8.
Cited 15 timesPublishedIntegrated Design & Electronics Academy Public Charter School v. McKinley Ex Rel. K.M.
570 F. Supp. 2d 28 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 8, 2008
After the student is identified as potentially disabled, the LEA “must conduct a full and individual initial evaluation” within the District of Columbia’s established time frame of 120 days. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 ; D.C. … McKinley “clearly requested” evaluation of K.M., thereby commencing the 120-day period in which K.M. was required to be evaluated. R. 8.
Cited 3 timesPublishedHelomics Corporation v. Burwell
District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 8, 2016
Exhaustion of the administrative process is a statutory requirement imposed by Congress in the Medicare statute as a condition of the waiver of sovereign immunity. See Weinberger v. … Helomics engages in straight-line reasoning: since Novitas “retired” the 2015 LCD, it clearly follows that the 2016 LCD was a new LCD.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAlexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
186 F.R.D. 66 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 15, 1998
The language in 5 U.S.C. § 301 and subsequent case law clearly provide that federal agencies are not authorized to withhold documents or testimony from a federal court. See Houston Business Jour *70 nal v. … Dept. of Treasury, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“In federal court, the federal gwernment has waived its sovereign immunity, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 , and neither the Federal Housekeeping Statute nor the Touhy decision authorizes
Cited 14 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 2021
-1 visa is not dependent on an actual offer of employment in the United States; and it is exempt from a time-consuming labor certification process, which requires that employers first test the marketplace for existing qualified … Ill. 2002) (finding that “arguably one of the most famous baseball players in Korean history” did not qualify for visa as a baseball coach)).
Cited 0 timesPublishedJames Madison Project v. Department of Justice
District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 15, 2020
All three of the Vaughn Index entries that plaintiffs point to clearly involve instances wherein OGC attorneys communicated in confidence with their client regarding the Kiriakou investigation or prosecution. … The fact that the file would provide insight into how the FBI went about investigating the case is clearly insufficient to override the privacy interests at play here.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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