Case law

Federal Trade Commission v. Bisaro

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 2, 2010

Magistrate Judge Kay also concluded that Respondent’s status as the CEO and President of Watson does not immunize him from being deposed. … If this were a civil action, the FTC would clearly have authority to depose Respondent in order to determine whether or not he knows anything about this issue.

Rosell v. Wood

357 F. Supp. 2d 123 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 26, 2004

Standard of Review The United States and its agencies are immune from suit unless Congress has expressly provided consent to be sued. United States v. … In the current action, the leave restrictions and warning of subpar performance given to Rosell do not qualify as actions appeal-able to the MSPB.

Ransom v. Center for Nonprofit Advancement

514 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 25, 2007

She said in her deposition, “I’m presented with a document that is clearly a tool for establishing a track record of deficiency, and I knew that I had no deficiency and I understood what the tool was. … This is clearly insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 .

Bushireddy v. Lyons

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 18, 2026

To obtain an F-1 visa, an individual must “hav[e] residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning” and be a “bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study.” Wash. All. of Tech. … The Court finds that the Government has not met its high burden of establishing that the case is moot. And on the merits, it concludes that ICE’s termination of Ms.

City of Roseville v. Norton

219 F. Supp. 2d 130 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 11, 2002

As discussed above, Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes that the creation of an Indian reservation does not negate state sovereignty. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365 , 121 S.Ct. 2304 . … The UAIC clearly satisfies this criterion of the restored lands exception.

Pate v. Federal Highway Administration

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 17, 2020

In this context the agency’s July 14, 2020 suspensions do not fall clearly outside of its “wide discretion” in assessing the need for immediate action. … The Court cannot conclude, therefore, that complications with these contracts present a clearly imminent threat to the company’s viability. See Nat'l Ass’n of Mortg. Brokers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.

National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Blanck

938 F. Supp. 908 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 13, 1996

Since waivers of sovereign immunity are not to be implied and are to be strictly construed, Lehman v. … Plaintiffs are clearly correct that the Army’s noneompliance has caused real harm.

Bonaccorsy v. District of Columbia

685 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 12, 2010

“Couching [a] claim in constitutional terms will not immunize it from dismissal pursuant to the exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 228 (quoting Washington, 538 F.Supp.2d at 278). … Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C.Cir.1986), and the Court finds that the one incident of alleged retaliation against Sanders does not qualify as pervasive.

Garay v. Liriano

839 F. Supp. 2d 138 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 16, 2012

of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … To do so when accompanied by the police, who are threatening to break down the door, is clearly not the perpetration of a “tort of outrage.” Tulin, 994 A.2d at 800-01 (quoting Bettis v.

United States v. Foy

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 19, 2024

Clearly, Foy was not in BOP custody at the time he filed the motions and therefore could not have pursued administrative remedies. … Circuit considered, inter alia, whether judicial decisions that retroactively establish legal error at sentencing could support compassionate release.

United States v. Seven Miscellaneous Firearms

503 F. Supp. 565 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 4, 1980

A generally inclusive definition of firearms is established. Sporting rifles and shotguns are exempted. ( 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (f)). … Since the gyrojet pistols do not qualify either as a “destructive device” or as “any other weapon,” and do not qualify under any other definition, they are not “firearms” within the meaning of § 5845(a).

Hayes v. Bowen

701 F. Supp. 857 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 19, 1988

Such an interpretation clearly is inconsistent with the language used in Smith v. … Notwithstanding the qualifying language following that phrase (which indicates that plaintiff does not meet the requirements of being considered disabled without further inquiry), the Court interprets this statement as establishing

Natural Law Party of the United States v. Federal Election Commission

111 F. Supp. 2d 33 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 28, 2000

Finally, the FEC argues that governmental inaction does not qualify as an injury in fact. … In order to qualify under that exception, the debates must use pre-established objective selection criteria and may not rely solely upon party affiliation. 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 .

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack

79 F. Supp. 3d 174 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 9, 2015

Cir. 1996) (suggesting that, if the threatened injury is severe, “relatively modest increments in risk should qualify for standing”). Furthermore, under D.C. … This Court finds that this alleged injury is not the type of informational harm that qualifies as a cognizable injury-in-fact. See Competitive Enter.

Betesh v. United States

400 F. Supp. 238 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 19, 1974

The Government insists that its duty was limited to the hiring of qualified personnel and their non-negligent performance of the examination; plaintiffs argue that the duty extended to warning Mr. … If such a standard of care is established, the facts clearly indicate that it was breached and that the breach led proximately to Mr. Betesh’s death. Plaintiffs maintain that the Government’s duty to inform Mr.

Johnson v. United States Government

174 F. Supp. 3d 500 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2016

Johnson’s supervisory duties, but without clearly specifying whether Ms. Johnson views the action as one of discrimination or retaliation). From the retaliation perspective, Ms. … Supp. 2d 192, 200 (D.D.C. 2013) (“If sovereign immunity has not been waived, a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Burnett v. American Federation of Government Employees

102 F. Supp. 3d 183 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 22, 2015

As part of this project, Status arranged for a pringle switch1 expert to perform certain maintenance tasks that Status was not qualified to perform. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. … In the work place, isolated incidents of race discrimination generally will not qualify as “extreme and outrageous” conduct. See, e.g., Paul v.

Singh v. Carter

168 F. Supp. 3d 216 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 3, 2016

Opp’n at 4, by pursuing his “clearly defined right enforceable in a proceeding other than a court-martial,” id. at 5, under RFRA. … Mere inconveniences, inconsequential or de minimis government actions that burden religious exercise do not suffice to qualify as a “substantial burden.”

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int.

385 F. Supp. 634 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 21, 1974

The award concluded that the letter of June 19 indicated a commitment by the company to hire instructor pilots only from those pilots on active status unless they were not qualified. … The court can find no such blatant disregard on the part of the neutral for the contract or for his duty, and is of the opinion that the arbitrator’s award of out-of-seniority pay was clearly contemplated by the contract

BENNETT-BEY v. Shulman

688 F. Supp. 2d 7 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 3, 2010

Bennett-Bey states that “[a]s a wakeful beneficiary, Sovereign people, Sovereign immunity and Sovereign rights I am confident, my rights and interest are constitutionally protected.” Compl. at 6-7. … DISCUSSION Bennett-Bey’s Complaint, which he filed pro se, does not clearly delineate the various claims upon which he seeks relief.