Case law

Southern California Edison Co. v. United States Postal Service

134 F. Supp. 3d 311 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 29, 2015

To nonetheless issue a revenue deficiency for the entirety of Plaintiff’s discounted-workshare rate for eighteen months is so disproportionate that it can hardly qualify as reasoned decisionmaking. … It neither clearly identified the exception to the Management Instruction’s plain twelve-month limitation nor established how SCE’s noncompliance was “ongoing.”

Ballantine v. Dominican Republic

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 11, 2020

§ 12, and the Ballantines failed to complete service under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), until several weeks after the FAA deadline lapsed. … Supp. 3d 166, 171–73 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that service on arbitration counsel that no longer represented a foreign sovereign “pursuant to the FAA did not qualify as effective service”); Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A. v

Monleone v. Sullivan

735 F. Supp. 5 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 19, 1990

A rational reason clearly supports the Congressional decision not to include overseas work for foreign affiliates of American companies within the definition of “employment” where, as recognized by Congress at the time it … We suggest that you write to ... the Internal Revenue Service ... for information whether the American corporation qualifies.

Gee v. Boorstin

500 F. Supp. 1025 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 28, 1980

Gee was not qualified for the supervisory position. … The qualifications and requirements for the GS-10 position were not clearly demonstrated to be job-related. In any event, Mrs. Gee by competent testimony was regarded as minimally qualified.

Truckers United for Safety v. Mead

86 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 2000

Nor does sovereign immunity bar this Court’s review of the Inspector General’s authority to conduct investigations. See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1328-29. … Nor does the Inspector General provide any examples of what types of OMC responsibilities would be program operating responsibilities if the present conduct does not qualify.

Williams v. Johnson

701 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 18, 2010

Council does not qualify as a protected disclosure under the WPA. 2. … Although Court’s have a "mandatory” obligation to exclude “clearly inadmissible" evidence in resolving motions for summary judgment, see Bush v.

Hunter v. District of Columbia

824 F. Supp. 2d 125 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 15, 2011

Establishing a policy or custom is once again a two-part inquiry: first, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a policy or custom, and second, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the identified policy or … City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir.2010) (granting officer qualified immunity despite having instructed his fellow officer to arrest the plaintiff, because the defendant lacked authority to order the other

Carolina Medical Sales, Inc. v. Leavitt

559 F. Supp. 2d 69 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 19, 2008

. §§ 1395 et seq., establishes a national program of health insurance for the elderly and disabled. … On April 10, 2007, CMS issued a final rule establishing bidding programs in ten metropolitan areas. 72 Fed. Reg. 17992 .

Alridge v. Rite Aid of Washington, D.C., Inc.

146 F. Supp. 3d 242 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 2015

Compl. at 9. 4  On August 15, 2013, the EEOC notified the plaintiff that “the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained established violations … XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

Hagan v. United States

275 F. Supp. 3d 252 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 15, 2017

In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 880 F.2d 1439, 1443 (D.C. … Also, while the November 1 discharge note says that Plaintiff was “at risk of neuromotor dysfunction,” what to make of the “at risk” qualifier requires a weighing of the evidence and surrounding testimony. Id.

Young v. Covington & Burling LLP

736 F. Supp. 2d 151 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2010

Although not articulated with precision, this administrative complaint was clearly sufficient to put both the EEOC and Covington on notice that a disparate-impact charge was being asserted. … (emphasis in original), and also that she would have actually been qualified for a higher position, id. at 9.

Detroit International Bridge Company v. Government of Canada

53 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 30, 2014

the National Military Establishment. … Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.

Wrenn v. District of Columbia

107 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 18, 2015

Second Amendment to the United States Constitution on their face and as applied to the individual Plaintiffs and other law-abiding, responsible members of Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation (“SAF”), who otherwise would qualify … “proper reason” requirement violates that right because it impermissibly burdens their Second Amendment right to bear arms; that is, it unreasonably denies otherwise qualified individuals the right to carry a handgun for

Fitzgerald v. Tillerson

District Court, District of Columbia · May 31, 2024

Whether the Plaintiff has Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination for the Failure to Accommodate his Disability. … This evidence clearly provides a “legitimate[,]” and facially credible non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s non-selection for the position as required under Figueroa. 932 F.3d at 1087.

Carter v. Rubin

14 F. Supp. 2d 22 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 28, 1998

As clearly stated, this letter constituted final agency action with respect to the rejected portions of Carter’s complaint. … In the instant case, Carter is a member of a protected class as a female and was qualified for her position at the time of her termination.

United States v. Peace Information Center

97 F. Supp. 255 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 8, 1951

It is clearly within the ambit of the powers relating to national defense to legislate concerning propaganda carried on in this country by foreign agents. … That this was the decision of the Court is clearly demonstrated by the following statement in the concurring opinion of Mr.

Bonnette v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 13, 2011

establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability. ... … However, § 12189 clearly applies to “any person” that offers examinations, not just public accommodations.

American Legion v. Derwinski

827 F. Supp. 805 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 19, 1993

The CDC had qualified the study’s potential within the protocol, noting that “[sjince many of the proposed procedures are untested, modifications, indeed even a recommendation not to proceed with the Agent Orange study, may … Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 , 103 S.Ct. 2246, 2255 , 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983); see also Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 36 (“We must look at the [agency’s] decision not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we are qualified

Rodriguez v. District of Columbia

118 F. Supp. 3d 132 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2015

Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts III, V, and VI for failure to state a claim, and they also contend that the individual defendants do not qualify as supervisors under the DCHRA and that Counts I through IV should … Compl. ¶¶ 29–30, in order to establish a property interest in her job at DHS, plaintiff “must show more than a unilateral expectation that her employment would not be terminated.” Piroglu v.

McGrady v. Mabus

635 F. Supp. 2d 6 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 25, 2009

withhold information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes … Therefore Defendants have not carried their “heavy” burden to show that disclosure would cause a “clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy.