Case law

Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 17, 2009

To the contrary, as stated above, Quest has clearly explained that the Project Manager’s job was to “coordinate and maintain a new upgrade” to the LIS system. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). … Accordingly, the Court cannot agree with Quest that Pollard has not established a materially adverse action.

Ramer v. United States

620 F. Supp. 2d 90 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 2, 2009

The defendant argues that by not exhausting the required administrative remedies, the plaintiffs cannot prove that the defendant has unequivocally waived its sovereignty immunity and, thus, the Court lacks subject-matter … Indeed, the plaintiffs contend "that defendant should be estopped from 'converting' the damages claim (clearly intended) into a refund claim (clearly unintended).” Id.

Smalls v. Bilden

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 28, 2021

Smalls identifies several documents as purportedly new but fails to establish that any of them meet the relevant standard. … And at any rate, Smalls has not explained how the result of a process different, separate from, and not binding on the one here could qualify as new evidence or a materially new circumstance. See Fulbright v.

United States v. Brewster

154 F. Supp. 126 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 1957

This Court finds that the pertinency of the questions contained in the indictment has been established. … If subpoenas like these are to fail, the unions will be cloaked with absolute immunity and Congress must wait in the darkness until suspected union officers get around to volunteering confirmatory data.

Soon Y. Park v. Howard University

881 F. Supp. 653 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 23, 1995

Eggleston was more qualified or what his qualifications were. Memorandum-Opinion at 6, ¶ 18. All of Dr. … Talang testified that plaintiff was well qualified for the position of Assistant Dean. Transcript of Trial at 425. She was a successful professor and had established an impressive relationship with her students.

Roseboro v. Billington

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2009

If these prerequisites are met, substance abuse qualifies as a serious health condition. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(d). … Nonetheless, the letter states clearly that the final straw was Roseboro’s continued, unexcused absence even after those disciplinary actions: You were previously suspended for 10 workdays (June 21, 2004, through

United States v. McDonald

238 F. Supp. 2d 182 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 16, 2002

The actual amounts sold are functions of the evidence against each defendant but generally the government charges that the wholesale amounts were substantial and clearly not intended for personal use by the purchaser. … It is therefore no answer to say, for example, that if the defendant were before the court charged only with the individual count or counts in which he is named, he would qualify for release.

Walker v. Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 10, 2009

Finally, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 510 claim for failing to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 16. … Although the court has stated on several occasions that the plaintiff’s amended complaint is difficult to parse, the court cannot avoid its plain language which clearly alleges that she is “entitled to . . . statutory .

Gamson v. British Airways, PLC

46 F. Supp. 3d 86 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 5, 2014

§ 1441(a) “if it qualifies as a ‘civil action . . . of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,’ unless Congress expressly provides otherwise.” Rivet v. … Considering that it is well established that laypersons acting as pro se litigants are not to be held to the same stringent standards for drafting pleadings as legal counsel, see Hughes v.

Venigalla v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Administrative Appeals Office

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 20, 2026

to reopen of the need to also qualify for a discretionary excusal of untimeliness by the Service under § 103.5(a)(1). … Assuming the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to USCIS’s appeal deadline, Plaintiff has still failed to show that she is clearly and indisputably entitled to that relief.

Braun v. United States Post Office

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 30, 2018

Castorina avers that “ACE IDs and URLs used to enable access to [Postal Service] information resources by authorized individuals qualify as commercial information under Section 410(c)(2)” because this technology is used … Accordingly, both are qualifying statutes under FOIA Exemption 3.

DL v. District of Columbia

251 F.R.D. 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 27, 2008

If a document is not in the possession, custody or control of a party, then it clearly cannot be turned over. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a). … If a document is not in the possession, custody or control of a party, then it clearly cannot be turned over. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a).

United States v. Burwell

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 7, 2024

Burwell argues that he no longer qualifies for an enhanced sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson because his offense of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence … July 27, 2016) (“[E]xtorting money from a bank . . . clearly constitutes a separate crime that is not ‘armed bank robbery.’”) Govt.

Williams v. Glickman

936 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 21, 1996

The Secretary’s Motion for Judgment, in Part, on the Pleadings asserts that all of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages (except those brought under ECOA) are barred by sovereign immunity and should be dismissed; and that plaintiffs … However, the “strong presumption” that a statute’s plain language expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in “rare and exceptional circumstances,” where a contrary legislative intent is “clearly expressed.”

Eddington v. U.S. Department of State

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 27, 2025

First, the analysis “requires . . . a determination of whether the document in question qualifies as a ‘personnel, medical, or similar file.’” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 25 F. … Comm., 489 U.S. at 756 (explaining that “whereas Exemption 6 requires that the invasion of privacy be ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the adverb ‘clearly’ is omitted from Exemption 7(C),” creating a comparatively higher bar for

Cevallos v. U.S. Department of State

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 26, 2023

Neither of these provisions evince a clearly enforceable requirement that the consular officer’s decision be independent of the State Department. … The first citation does not clearly establish that the consular officer must accept any supplemental documentation, such as the DHS memorandum, or what they must do with it.

Udugampola v. Jacobs

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 8, 2011

Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“[T]he power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); Adams v. … Courts have therefore long-held that “[s]uch matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Id.

Friendship Edison Public Charter School Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt

704 F. Supp. 2d 50 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 10, 2010

The court simply acknowledged that a lessor likelihood of success might suffice if each of the other three factors clearly favors granting the injunction.”). … Plaintiff cannot establish a strong likelihood of success. B.

Kingman Park Civic Association v. Gray

27 F. Supp. 3d 171 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 29, 2014

This provision no more establishes a right to judicial review of an EIS than it precludes review of an agency’s failure to 7 prepare an EIS. … Most importantly, it is well-established law that policy manuals and agency guidelines do not have force of law over statutes such as the D.C. EPA. See Christensen v.

Caul v. United States Capitol Police Board

District Court, District of Columbia · May 19, 2016

Supp. 2d 48 at 55 (dismissing the plaintiff’s retaliation claim for failure to establish jurisdiction under the CAA where the only evidence submitted were the plaintiff’s three requests for counseling, none of which clearly … The plaintiff, however, was clearly on notice of the defendant’s position that he “has not alleged that he suffered any adverse employment action.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.