Case law

Espinosa v. Astrue

953 F. Supp. 2d 25 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 2, 2013

The claimant must support his claim of impairment with “[o]bjective medical evidence” that is “established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(5)(A). … A remand solely for the award of benefits is appropriate “where the evidence on the record as a whole is clearly indicative of disability and additional hearings would serve no purpose other than to delay the inevitable

Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Mosbacher

773 F. Supp. 435 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 6, 1991

He also established a scientific research program to assess the health and future of the stock. … Finally, the regulations established a scientific program and a licensing scheme for the by-caught fish.

Lauderhill Housing Authority v. Donovan

818 F. Supp. 2d 185 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 14, 2011

LHA provided HUD with a copy of the City Council’s 2002 resolution establishing it as a public housing authority. … The complaint does not clearly set out the chronology of what happened in a way that makes it clear how long either party has been waiting for the other to do something.

Taylor v. Heckler

595 F. Supp. 489 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 5, 1984

Moreover, this Court explicitly ordered that the claimant’s assertions of pain be given serious consideration and clearly instructed the AU to indicate why any probative evidence introduced by plaintiff was not credited. … Yet it is also well-established that subjective pain may serve as the basis for establishing disability. Id.

INTERN. UNION, UNITED AUTO., AEROSPACE v. Donovan

554 F. Supp. 1172 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 17, 1983

The basic question before the Court is whether the Secretary of Labor, who clearly has the power to issue guidelines which conform to the statutory standard — and presumably some latitude with respect thereto — also has the … Both the language of section 2315 and its legislative history indicate that Congress intended to establish a system under which waiver of recoupment would be available where the payment was made without the fault of the recipient

Aston v. Johnson & Johnson

248 F. Supp. 3d 43 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2017

Because plaintiffs’ “allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to establish proximate causation,” their federal RICO counts “must be dismissed.” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6.5 2. … Hamburg’s argument that she is protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am.

United States v. Harmon

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 16, 2021

Cir. 2014) (finding the distinction between facial and as-applied immaterial in addressing an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the 28 U.S.C. § 2680 foreign country exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity from … Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (stating “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal

Credit Union National Ass'n v. National Credit Union Administration Board

573 F. Supp. 586 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 25, 1983

State-chartered credit unions may also qualify for insurance coverage. 12 U.S.C. § 1781 (a), (b). … Although the statute itself is silent on the matter of payout priorities, the Board relied on its own authority to “establish[ ]” priorities.

United States Student Ass'n v. Central Intelligence Agency

620 F. Supp. 565 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 25, 1985

Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure information, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of a person’s privacy. … It is well settled that section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act qualifies under Exemption 3. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d at 1103 ; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d at 736 -37 n. 39.

Thompson v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers

614 F. Supp. 1002 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 31, 1985

The plaintiff must carry an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. … The jury in this case had before it ample evidence to establish a prima facie case of both sex discrimination and retaliatory discrimination.

Whorton v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

924 F. Supp. 2d 334 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 21, 2013

But, because WMATA is part of an interstate compact agency, the compact jurisdictions have conferred their sovereign immunity upon it. See, e.g., Jones v. WMATA, 205 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2000). … Here, there is no qualifying language in the questionnaire and it is not disputed that the EEOC had access to it.

Madison v. District of Columbia

593 F. Supp. 2d 278 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 23, 2009

Madison qualified as a “permanent” employee and thus enjoyed the protections of the Juror Act. The Court holds that she did so qualify. I. FACTS Ms. … Clearly, employees in “at will” employment who can be terminated at any time and employees with similar non-permanent employment arrangements still qualify for the protections of the Juror Act. See, e.g., Hill v.

POWERS-BUNCE v. District of Columbia

659 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 5, 2009

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … Powers’ “clearly established Fifth Amendment rights is appropriate.” Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182, 189 (D.D.C.2009).

Ragsdale v. Holder

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 2, 2009

Although the same actor inference “is just that, an inference, which ‘cannot immunize [the defendant] from liability for subsequent discrimination,’” Isse, 540 F. … As such, they are inadmissible unless they 21 qualify for their own exclusion from the hearsay rule.” Barry v.

Citizens Coal Council v. Norton

193 F. Supp. 2d 159 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2002

In the context of SMCRA’s broader structure and purpose, the meaning of “surface coal mining operations” is clearly different from what the Secretary has found it to be. … The “most natural reading” also makes sense of the qualifier “subject to the requirements of section 1266,” for it is section 1266 that requires the development of *164 substantive standards for underground mining (§ 1266

Smart Approaches to Marijuana v. Kennedy

District Court, District of Columbia · May 22, 2026

In April 2026, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (“CMMI”) implemented a new, optional pathway for qualifying Medicare providers to furnish qualifying beneficiaries with hemp. … At the motion-to-dismiss stage, Plaintiffs must “clearly . . . allege . . . facts demonstrating” that injury. Spokeo, 578 U.S.

United States v. Hong Vo

978 F. Supp. 2d 49 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2013

As alleged in the superseding indictment, venue for the conspiracy count (Count 1) is established in D.C. under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237 and 3238, while venue for the bribery and visa fraud counts (Counts 2 to 27) is established … This alleged action, if proven, qualifies as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Leedom

174 F. Supp. 171 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 1959

The “Decision and Direction of Election” issued by the defendant does not indicate that the Board classified these men as employees for any other purpose than that, specifically, of qualifying them to vote in the particular … This case appears clearly distinguishable from the Kyne case in which the provisions of the section of the Act in question, § 9(b) (1) were rigid and mandatory.

Cox v. District of Columbia

821 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 21, 1993

Thereafter, the Court approved the parties’ agreement and established a briefing schedule. … The District of Columbia cannot expect, and does not deserve, immunity from the foreseeable injuries caused by its deliberate indifference. III.

Hoffa v. Fitzsimmons

499 F. Supp. 357 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 3, 1980

The IRS ruling was issued solely on the basis of facts submitted to that agency by defendants’ attorneys, and for that reason it clearly does not qualify as an independent factual investigation of the Plan or of the lump … The established rule in the District of Columbia is that the statute of limitations for breach of contract runs from the date of the breach. Zellan v.