Case law

Mezerhane De Schnapp v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

67 F. Supp. 3d 95 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2014

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989), Exemption 7(C) "establishes a lower bar for withholding 7 material." ACLU v. U.S. … Accordingly, that information—which clearly implicates the privacy interests of third parties—remains exempt. III.

Heggestad v. United States Department of Justice

182 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 30, 2000

The privacy interests of these individuals clearly outweighs any public interest in the information. Therefore, this material was properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C). IV. … The First Declaration of Ferrel clearly establishes that he was unable to segregate for release much of the factual material from the deliberative portions of these documents, because (1) the factual material was intertwined

Sanford v. United States

567 F. Supp. 2d 114 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 22, 2008

A military court’s judgment clearly will not suffer from a fundamental “defect if it satisfies Burns’s ‘fair consideration’ test.” Id. at 408. … Dowty, 60 M.J. 163, 169 (C.A.A.F.2004) (“Simply stated, this statute mandates the selection of members who are ‘best qualified.’ ”).

NEW LIFE EVANGELISTIC CENTER, INC. v. Sebelius

753 F. Supp. 2d 103 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 1, 2010

funds under Title IV, (ii) has no other source of funding, and (iii) is otherwise qualified to receive the property in all other respects. 9 b. … Read in its proper context, the first sentence clearly requires that the property be “placed into [its proposed] use” within the twelve-month period. Id.

Trustees of United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan v. Old Mill Mining Co.

847 F. Supp. 173 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 1994

The Court holds that because Harden qualifies as an employer under ERISA, the Court has jurisdiction and its entry of default judgment against Harden is valid. … The governing federal law and private agreements to which he consented clearly bind Harden to initiate arbitration for the dispute at hand.

Fiberlight, LLC v. National Railroad Passenger Corpration

81 F. Supp. 3d 93 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 2, 2015

By its plain terms, then, the ROW Agreement establishes the signing parties’ intent that third-party beneficiary status would be limited to the parties’ successors and assignees, which means that FiberLight must qualify … Thus, FiberLight has not established third-party standing.

Klute v. Shinseki

840 F. Supp. 2d 209 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 9, 2012

He states merely that he "was a qualified individual with a disability," Pl.' … The reasons for the rotation are insignificant as the e-mail clearly explains the eligibility requirements for transfer—attainment of a certain grade level. In his deposition, Mr.

United States v. Williams

825 F. Supp. 2d 128 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 17, 2011

. § 1512 were clearly incorrect.” Mot. at 1. Furthermore, Mr. Williams asserts that “appropriate jury instructions under Fowler would have resulted in an acquittal on Count Two.” Id. Consequently, Mr. … Williams argues that such agents do not qualify as federal law enforcement officers for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 . According to Mr.

Equal Rights Center v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 15, 2021

Code § 2- 1401.02(24), the DCHRA clearly contemplates that some places of public accommodation will not involve stationary, physical facilities. … In any event, a public conveyance that is operated on land clearly counts as a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of the DCHRA, D.C.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Devos

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2020

Although Plaintiffs have raised serious arguments about certain aspects of the Rule, they have not established a likelihood of success on their claims, nor have they established that they are likely to suffer substantial … In any event, Plaintiffs also have not established that they will suffer imminent irreparable injury.

Kurtz v. Baker

630 F. Supp. 850 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 11, 1986

Perhaps it does so because it would be unable to explain away the clearly sectarian content of some of the prayers given by Nebraska’s chaplain. … Defendants argue that the Chaplains are “Officers of Congress” as defined in 2 U.S.C. § 60 -l(b), and thus should be immune from suit.

Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Defense

355 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 8, 2004

The Department of Defense regulations specify that “a separate queue shall be established for requests meeting the test for expedited processing.” 32 C.F.R. § 286.4 (d)(3). … Another judge on this Court has held that EPIC qualifies as such. See ACLU, 321 F.Supp.2d at 29 n. 5 (D.D.C.2004). 3 .

Kondapally v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 16, 2021

According to plaintiff, USCIS lacked authority to take this action because a “job portability” provision of the relevant statute, combined with a change in employer in the intervening span of years, served to immunize the … As a result, the petition “did not establish that [plaintiff] met the minimum requirements” to be “considered ‘qualified’ for the position.” Id.

National Association of the Deaf v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2020

Opp. at 8–9 (explaining that President, Vice President, and components of Executive Office of President that are close advisors to President are immune from suit under APA). … This is enough for Plaintiffs to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their Rehabilitation Act count. B.

Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition

52 F. Supp. 2d 45 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 2, 1999

As others have acknowledged, results such as this appear unsatisfyingly formalistic, allowing precisely the sort of communications Congress sought to prohibit to remain immune from liability. … A prohibited "contribution or expenditure” does not include the establishment, administration, or solicitation of contributions to a "separate segregated find” (i.e., a PAC) established by a union or corporation.

Public Citizen Inc. v. Department of State

100 F. Supp. 2d 10 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 18, 2000

FCC, 742 F.2d 629 (D.C.Cir.1984), 4 the establishment by the FCC of an application filing “cut-off’ date in Ranger v. … George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C.1982) (holding an investigative report prepared in the ordinary course of business not immunized by work-product privilege.)

Carter v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 7, 2023

Here, the defendants have failed to establish the first prong: that the D.C. Superior Court’s decision was “on the merits.” Id. … But this argument fails for two reasons. 2 Since the claims against the individual defendants are dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, the Court need not address the defendants’ qualified immunity arguments.

Cheeks v. Fort Myer Construction Corporation

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 2010

Cheeks alleges that these defendants interfered with the contractual relationship established with WASA when Cheeks submitted low bids. See id. ¶¶ 178-81. … Generally, economic damages to the shareholder that result from losses to the corporation do not qualify as direct or independent harm giving rise to shareholder standing. Harpole Architects, 668 F.

Houseal v. McHugh

962 F. Supp. 2d 286 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 27, 2013

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (noting that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary … ABCMR clearly indicated that it would waive the limitations period of 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) if it found Ms. Houseal’s claim to have merit.

GasPlus, L.L.C. v. United States Department of the Interior

510 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 6, 2007

Circuit [has] recognized that a party can meet the prudential standing test by qualifying either as a regulated interest or a protected interest.”). … And GasPlus’s interests were clearly regulated by the BIA’s decision to void the Management Agreement.