Case law

Banker v. Wormuth

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2026

First, the Court did not clearly err in finding that Banker’s amended complaint failed to allege discriminatory pretext. … Thus, Banker has failed to show that the Court clearly erred. Second, denying Banker’s motion will not cause manifest injustice.

Peoples v. Schultz

806 F. Supp. 2d 174 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 29, 2011

Section 2254, moreover, is available only when the judgment of the state court resulted in a decision that was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or (2) “based … Respondent maintains that by filing a § 2241 petition before the Court, Petitioner has attempted to access the habeas review process without having to qualify for § 2254. Mot. at 11.

Wise v. Ferriero

842 F. Supp. 2d 120 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 3, 2012

Analysis At first glance, this case appears to pose numerous questions relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and whether certain incidents qualify as actionable adverse employment actions. … In addition, his exhaustion argument clearly concerns only the hostile-work-environment theory. See id. at 25-29.

Carr v. District of Columbia

561 F. Supp. 2d 7 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 17, 2008

These kinds of generalized statements are legally insufficient to establish probable cause. See Barham, 434 F.3d at 574 . … In determining whether Assistant Chief Newsham was entitled to qualified immunity for ordering the arrests, the D.C.

United States v. Crews

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 7, 2021

The record establishes that trial counsel specifically preserved an objection to the career offender classification for appeal, arguing “that either one or both of the prior convictions are not qualifying offenses such … Crews must establish “a reasonable probability” that at least one of his three convictions would not qualify as a crime of violence under any of the three available definitions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

King v. Georgetown University Hospital

9 F. Supp. 2d 4 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 16, 1998

Analysis Summarizing the relevant case law, this Court finds that Plaintiff must establish four facts in order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination: 1) that she belongs to a racial minority,, 2) that she … Plaintiffs claim clearly survives the first two criteria: she is black, and her qualifications for the job are unquestioned.

Fulbright v. McHugh

67 F. Supp. 3d 81 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2014

Qualifying for disability retirement, however, is no small task. Military regulations establish a complex web of procedures for obtaining disability benefits after leaving active service. … It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

St. Louis Post-Dispatch v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

447 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 7, 1977

qualified pursuant to such Executive Order”. 6 . … Exemption (b)(6) involves “. . . files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 1 .

Miller v. Rosenker

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 4, 2011

Cir. 2009) (“Congress clearly indicated the statute would apply only from January 1, 2009 forward.”); Marshall v. Potter, 634 F.Supp.2d 66, 70 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009). Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s argument. … Whether Miller Is a Qualified Employee Presents a Genuine Issue of Material Fact in Dispute Next, Defendant argues that Miller is not a “qualified” employee under the Rehabilitation Act.

Johnson v. District of Columbia

947 F. Supp. 2d 123 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 5, 2013

Hence, Johnson must show not merely that he was more qualified than Reyes, but that he was significantly better qualified. He has not done so. … To establish a prima face violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he: (1) is disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) was qualified for the position

EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER v. District of Columbia

741 F. Supp. 2d 273 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 5, 2010

Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs are qualified individuals with disabilities. … Since Tyler was decided on standing grounds, it clearly cannot establish a percent-compliance threshold based on Title III standards.

American Meat Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture

968 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 11, 2013

In the absence of any statutory prohibition limiting the agency’s power to dictate the disclosure of production step information, Plaintiffs maintain that the statute’s text nevertheless clearly establishes Congress’s intent … Also, the record clearly establishes that there was no other way for the agency to implement a production-step labeling scheme without banning commingling; indeed, at oral argument Plaintiffs all but conceded this point

Barnes v. District of Columbia

611 F. Supp. 130 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 15, 1985

who would consider “all qualified candidates” without regard to a number of factors including “source of income.” … General is “an equal opportunity employer — all qualified candidates will receive consideration without regard” to a number of factors, including “source of income.” Appendix A. A description of the factors D.C.

Buckner v. Consol Energy Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · May 23, 2024

Specifically, they argue that Defendants are obligated to (1) establish an IEP for the qualifying beneficiaries; (2) provide security to the Plan as set forth in Section 9712(d)(1)(B); and (3) pay the monthly per beneficiary … Plaintiffs Allege an Injury-In-Fact To show standing at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs must “clearly allege facts demonstrating” they have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged

Goldstein v. Internal Revenue Service

174 F. Supp. 3d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 2016

IRM 11.3.2.4.7 (Aug. 29, 2008). 13 concerning an estate must establish both a qualifying relationship to the estate and a “material interest” in the estate’s tax … The Eighth Amendment to the Living Trust clearly provides that, “[u]pon the [death] of Grantor, if Grantor’s son, Richard H.

Bobb v. Andrus

430 F. Supp. 522 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 1977

This Court finds that the evidence and testimony clearly support that judgment. … On August 15, 1974, he was advised that retention registers had been established and that he could not be assigned to a position at his present grade.

Morgan v. Katzenbach

247 F. Supp. 196 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 24, 1966

The plaintiffs clearly have a standing to sue. … If suffrage was one of these privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to prevent its being denied on account of race, &c.?

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. National Reo Management, Inc.

205 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 26, 2000

For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for the injury alleged in the underlying lawsuit. … Moreover, a number of courts that have recognized the danger of construing the pollution exclusion clause too expansively still have found that gas leaks inside of a structure qualify as a pollution event.

Rowe v. Kidd

731 F. Supp. 534 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 16, 1990

To state a prima facie case the record facts must show that: (1) Plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) he was qualified for continued employment and was satisfying the normal requirements of his job; (3) he was … The caselaw in this circuit clearly establishes that “when state and federal claims are joined and the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should ordinarily be dismissed as well.” *541 Network Project

Psychotherapy & Counseling Center, Inc. v. Shalala (In Re Psychotherapy & Counseling Center, Inc.)

195 B.R. 536 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 15, 1996

The court concludes that Morrison’s contingent contribution claim arose when Morrison co-signed the note with the debtor prepetition and is sufficient to qualify as a claim under § 101(5)(A) in order to qualify her as a creditor … Under § 101(5)(A), a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes when the contingent liability is established, which in this case was when the note was first entered into.