Case law

Freedom Watch, Inc. v. McAleenan

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 26, 2020

To establish subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff ‘must clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating each element’” of standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. … Defendant rejects these claims, arguing that Freedom Watch has not established that it is a membership organization that can qualify for associational standing. 8 Def.’s Reply 6–8.

M.J. Ex Rel. Jarvis v. Georgetown University Medical Center

962 F. Supp. 2d 3 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 22, 2013

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: ( 1) that [ s] he has … As the Seventh Circuit observed in Sexton, any statute of limitations that puts inquiry burdens on a plaintiff, as this one clearly does, entails a degree of ghoulish behavior.

Brookens v. Chao

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 22, 2009

Cir. 1996), plaintiff has failed to establish any grounds 2 Defendant filed his notice of appeal of the Court’s judgment on July 16, 2009, after having filed the instant motion. … However, that is clearly not the case. See, e.g., Brookens v. Solis, No. 08-5527, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10048, *1-*2 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2009) (per curiam) (“Brookens I”); Dunning v. Quander, 508 F.3d 8, 10-11 (D.C.

Ross v. United States

460 F. Supp. 2d 139 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 10, 2006

Plaintiffs clearly have alternative remedies available, including an action for a refund of any taxes wrongfully collected and an action for damages based on any IRS negligent, reckless or intentional disregard of the law … To begin with, the law is well-established that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to suits for monetary damages. Holt v. Davidson, 441 F.Supp.2d 92, 96 (D.D.C.2006); Larsen v.

Wood v. Herman

104 F. Supp. 2d 43 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 23, 2000

Based on these policy concerns, 3 the Court found *46 that an agency’s decision to refuse to bring an enforcement action is unsuitable for review, and therefore, it “should be presumed immune from judicial review under § … In particular, the LMRDA sets forth a specific standard; ie., probable cause, which the Chaney Court considered to be a clearly defined test that was not “ ‘beyond the judicial capacity to supervise.’ ” Id. at 834 , 105 S.Ct

United States Ex Rel. Scollick v. Narula

215 F. Supp. 3d 26 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2016

It alleges that OST never qualified for SDVOSB or HUBZone status and was not a small business enterprise. Id. at ¶ 45–47. … It states that Parekh, Narula, and Madan established CSG as a front company for the purpose of allowing them to bid on and obtain SDVOSB set-aside contracts, that they established CSG with the intent to falsely identify

United States v. Wiggins

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 10, 2020

That is, the Court agrees with Wiggins (see Def.’s Reply at 2–3) that the plain text of section 3145(c) establishes that a district judge who has jurisdiction over a defendant’s criminal case qualifies as the “judicial … It is well established that the statute of conviction alone does not establish the seriousness of an offense.

Ortman v. Clark

594 F. Supp. 377 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 12, 1984

The Bureau subsequently rejected his application, finding that he was not qualified for the lease. That decision was upheld on administrative appeal on October 6, 1983. … The fact that it does not specify “applicant’s last name” hardly establishes any ambiguity as to whose name the card calls for.

State National Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner

958 F. Supp. 2d 127 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 1, 2013

Authority (“OLA”), see 12 U.S.C. § 5384; and Title X, which established the CFPB. … substantially more difficult to establish.”

Singh v. George Washington University

368 F. Supp. 2d 58 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 22, 2005

To establish a violation of this provision, plaintiff must prove: “(1) that she has a disability; (2) that she is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that she was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination … Otherwise qualified “A handicapped or disabled person is ‘otherwise qualified’ to participate in a program if she can meet its necessary requirements with reasonable accommodation.” Kaltenberger v.

Swedish American Hospital v. Leavitt

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2011

A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. … The defendant further argues that even if Congress intended to impose a national cap, the text of the BBA clearly imposes a facility-level cap as well. Id.

Mpoy v. Fenty

870 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 2, 2012

In moving to dismiss, the District Defendants are correct when they say that, to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “Plaintiff must establish that the deprivation of his constitutional rights was caused … May 21, 2012) (“Even where there is a showing of a clearly identifiable policy, the D.C.

Fuchs v. Johns Hopkins University

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2025

The first element, falsity, requires an “objective falsehood,” and “imprecise statements,” “differences in interpretation,” or “subjective” statements do not qualify. United States ex rel. Wilson v. … Aug. 17, 2017) (“[T]he allegation that Defendants fraudulently concealed their original false claim . . . and thereby prevented the government from discovering that fraud is not by itself enough to establish an ‘obligation

Razzak v. Excalibur Associates, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 17, 2024

And only two kinds of disputes qualify as a grievance: (1) “a claimed violation, misinterpretation[,] or misapplication of any provision of” the CBA, or (2) “the challenge of any disciplinary action taken against a Union … That is, a collective-bar- gaining agreement may use phrases such as “in violation of any federal or state law” to establish the contours of a contractual right to be free from discrimination. Ibarra, 695 F.3d at 357.

Affinity Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Sebelius

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 25, 2010

Supp. 2d 431, 435 n.4 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the provider did not qualify for an EJR because it failed to submit a claim for benefits to the PRRB); Alexandria Hosp. v. Bowen, 631 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (W.D. … See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiving the government’s sovereign immunity to suits by individuals suffering a legal wrong because of agency action and “seeking relief other than money damages”).

Young v. Watson

168 F. Supp. 856 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 1, 1958

The witness was sufficiently qualified, in the Court’s opinion, as schooled in the art involving sink strainers. … The Court recognizes the Board as a group of highly qualified experts whose decisions should not be reversed without conviction on the Court’s part that the Board is clearly in error.

Omega Equipment Corp. v. John C. Louis Co. (In Re Omega Equipment Corp.)

51 B.R. 569 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 19, 1985

These consolidated bankruptcy appeals present the question whether a United States bankruptcy court, established by Congress under Art. … Moreover, if the “clearly erroneous” standard were to apply, a bankruptcy court would be possessed of the power to enforce all of its own determinations immune from any meaningful review by an Art. Ill court.

Anzueto v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

357 F. Supp. 2d 27 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2004

Moreover, it is well established that a person has a duty to read a contract before he signs it. … Although Anzueto may have been mistaken as to what he was signing, this does not qualify as a unilateral mistake' capable of voiding the agreement.

Garcia v. Spaulding

324 F. Supp. 3d 228 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 24, 2018

Garcia's civil commitment clearly qualifies as "custody" under the meaning of § 2241. Cf. Duncan v. … Thus, the language used in his amended petition does not definitively establish the proper vehicle for his claim. Ultimately, I must look to the thrust of Mr.

Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD

596 F. Supp. 2d 128 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 10, 2009

Clearly, there is a total absence of subject-matter jurisdiction in this Court as revealed on the face of the complaint. Sinclair offers no convincing argument to the contrary. … And the contention that jurisdiction can be established later through discovery is unpersuasive.