Case law

Budik v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center

937 F. Supp. 2d 5 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 5, 2013

The FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . libel [or] slander.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). … Cir. 1991)). 9 Here, the plaintiff’s own allegations establish that no government action deprived her of potential employment with Dartmouth-Hitchcock.

Temme v. Esper

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 19, 2020

It then found that the records failed to establish that “the elbow ailment for which he was [ ] treated was proximately related to the injury he received two months earlier.” J.A. at 10 ¶ 2.c. … And, third, he maintains that the Board “ignored specific language within AR 600-8-22 2-8 . . . , which states that injuries caused by enemy placed mines or traps ‘clearly justify award of the Purple Heart.’” Id.

Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

794 F. Supp. 2d 151 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 5, 2011

The Act itself does not define or qualify the term “notice.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 . … EPA, 549 U.S. 497 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 , establishes EPA’s non-discretionary duty to undertake endangerment findings.

Rawlings v. Hall

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 28, 2011

The defendants cite these decisions in support of their argument that because Clay and Haskel are both MPD officers, they are immune from civil conspiracy claims. … The shooting cannot have simultaneously established a special relationship with Rawlings and violated that relationship.

Porter v. Leavitt

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 13, 2009

regarded as having such an impairment.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (referring to ADA definition); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (ADA definition of disabled individual).7 Plaintiff states that she has neurological and immune … When a qualified individual with a disability is in need of an accommodation, the individual’s employer should engage in an “informal, interactive process [with the individual] . . .

Badwal v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia

139 F. Supp. 3d 295 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2015

The first element of the prima facie case is clearly satisfied here. Dr. Badwal was aged 77 and 78 during the time period relevant to the complaint. See Complaint at ¶ 4. … The Court finds that the relevant actions by both parties in this case fall close enough together to establish the requisite temporal proximity.

In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation

467 F. Supp. 2d 74 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 20, 2006

As a result, Watson was not able to get Lorazepam API until 1999 when Technochemie finally got qualified. … Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not establish at trial that their damages were in any way related to My-lan’s action — that Plaintiffs could not establish any nexus between their damages and Mylan’s prices.

Luhrs v. NEWDAY, LLC

326 F. Supp. 2d 30 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 9, 2004

Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. … Luhrs has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. See United Mine Workers of Am. v.

American Federation of Government Employees v. Hawley

543 F. Supp. 2d 44 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2008

See Albright, 732 F.2d at 186 (declining to consider “whether non-economic injuries or damages other than out-of-pocket expenses could qualify as ‘actual damages’ under Section 552a(g)(4)).” … Defendants argue that the court should interpret “actual damages” narrowly, as is required in construing a waiver of sovereign immunity, to mean only out of pocket expenses, not emotional damages.

Campbell v. Citigroup

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 30, 2026

Because Campbell’s claims “clearly fall within the scope” of the mandatory arbitration agreement, Citibank says, the Court must stay all proceedings pending arbitration. Def.’s Mot. at 8–12. … (“I believe that continuing to apply interest charges on purchases to a closed account is not only unfair but may also qualify as allegedly deceptive business practice.”); Compl., Continuation of Questions ¶ 2 (asserting

United States v. Freeman

360 F. Supp. 2d 43 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 19, 2003

Because displaying fraudulent tags is unlawful and the tags were clearly visible, the Court finds that there was sufficient reason for Officer Straughn to stop Pondexter’s vehicle and investigate further. … Section 5-619 outlines factors to be taken into consideration when determining whether an object qualifies as drug paraphernalia under the circumstances.

Capel v. Capel

272 F. Supp. 3d 33 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 27, 2017

The government contacts exception thus clearly applies to preclude personal jurisdiction based on these contacts. … Capel contacted an unidentified agency, see Compl. ¶¶ 106-07, the record clearly establishes that any delay or denial of life insurance benefits is a result of the preliminary injunction entered in North Carolina state court

Penello v. International Union, United Mine Workers

88 F. Supp. 935 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 9, 1950

Section 10(j) clearly vests this court with the right to hear and determine controversies such as the one here involved. … Without pushing the analogy too far, the agreement may be likened to the tariffs established by a carrier, to standard provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates

Hawkins v. Lanier

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 1, 2009

It is the plaintiff’s “burden to establish that a municipality has a custom or practice abridging [his] constitutional or statutory rights.” B.R. v. District of Columbia, 524 F. … The use of excessive force as demonstrated by the police officers clearly deprived [Plaintiff] of his right to due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; b.)

Petty v. Colvin

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 5, 2018

Indeed, it remains unclear whether Plaintiff’s moderate mental impairments, in combination with other physical limitations, would qualify him as disabled. … Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1947) (stating that “the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted b[e] clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.

Renewable Fuels Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 4, 2021

And the agency clearly cannot use different information to satisfy different prongs of the Exemption 4 test. In the Court’s view, however, EPA does not make that obvious mistake. … Absent a Supreme Court holding squarely abrogating Circuit precedent — which Food Marketing clearly is not — this Court has no power to depart from the result mandated by that precedent. See United States v.

Waldo v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 1, 2024

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. … But, when using voluntary guidelines as a reference for standard of care, the court must exercise “caution” to “ensure that they are clearly relevant and applicable to the circumstances presented.” Id.

California Dredging Co. v. Sanders

657 F. Supp. 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 3, 1986

In the Southeast region and the Pacific region, the fourth-largest firms were small. 9 SBA clearly assumes that the four largest firms in any region must be considered dominant and thus appropriately classified as “large. … standard would be desirable in the Gulf Coast and Northeast regions, it stated that it “would be cautious not to raise the size standard to a level at which any of the four dominant firms in that particular region would qualify

Hudson v. Children's National Medical Center

645 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 21, 2009

Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C.Cir.1985) (noting that a mere assertion of failure to exhaust administrative remedies without more is “clearly inadequate under prevailing regulations to establish a failure to exhaust administrative … I was qualified for the position, but was denied an equal opportunity to be fully considered.

In Re: Dirisu Ojo Momoh

564 B.R. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 6, 2017

Indeed, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574; accord Moore, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 94. … Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321–22 (2009) (explaining that documents such as “police reports generated by law enforcement officials . . . do not qualify as business or public records” because, although kept in the regular