Case law

Gellert v. District of Columbia Public Schools

435 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 18, 2006

Background 1 Jesse Gellert is a fifteen year-old 2 resident of the District of Columbia who qualifies for free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA. … DCPS Failed to Establish at the Due Process Hearing that Jesse’s IEP and Placement at Wilson Were Adequate DCPS had the burden at the due process hearing to establish that Jesse’s *23 IEP and placement at Wilson were adequate

Moghaddam v. Pompeo

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 22, 2020

withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise,” as matters of “policy toward aliens are . . . so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune … Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that the challenged decisions do not qualify for the committed to agency discretion exception under the APA.

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. National Institutes of Health

326 F. Supp. 2d 19 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 29, 2004

Podell’s research design as detailed in his grant application clearly substantiates that it is the end product of both innovation and substantial effort.” Id. at 11. Moreover, the defendant points out that “[Dr. … In the defendant’s supplemental filing, the defendant offers *22 an additional argument, stating that “all of the information which qualifies as confidential information under Exemption 4 also qualifies as trade secret under

ARMENIAN ASSEMBLY OF AMERICA, INC. v. Cafesjian

746 F. Supp. 2d 55 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 22, 2010

Defendants argue that the record clearly will show that it was Plaintiffs, not Defendants, who failed to respond to the D.C. government’s inquiries regarding a tax exemption, and this is the reason that there was no tax exemption … To the extent that Plaintiffs failed to disclose this theory of damages during discovery, that failure is harmless because Defendants were clearly aware of Ms.

Buzzfeed, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

District Court, District of Columbia · May 7, 2020

Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993) (noting that “[t]he Government bears the burden of establishing that the exemption applies”). … Opp’n at 3–5; (2) the FBI has not established that portions of the file were ever received by the White House Counsel’s Office, those portions do not qualify for the privilege, Pls.’

United States v. Thurston

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 23, 2013

To qualify for release pending appeal, then, the defendants must show that the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) are met and that there are “exceptional reasons” for release.5 See United States v. … FLIGHT RISK AND DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY For the defendants to qualify for release under the Bail Reform Act, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger

Lilley v. Stout

384 F. Supp. 2d 83 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 19, 2005

Absent this waiver, a court must consider whether the artistic work qualifies as a “work of visual art.” … Thus, VARA established a new and distinct genus of art: “work[s] of visual art,” which differs in many respects from the pre-existing categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.

Graves v. United States

517 F. Supp. 95 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 12, 1981

Defendant’s own expert conceded that for this reason it did not qualify as an exit within the meaning of the building and safety regulations. … IV The final issue in connection with relief is the application of the rule established in the case of Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C.

Konarski v. Brown

293 F. Supp. 2d 70 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 26, 2003

. § 2679 provides federal employees absolute immunity from tort liability for acts done within the scope of their employment); 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d). … Independent of the Government’s certification, the facts, as alleged by the plaintiff, clearly demonstrate that the employees of the CPSC were acting within the scope of their employment.

Blue v. District of Columbia Public Schools

850 F. Supp. 2d 16 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 8, 2012

Because filing suit against the District of Columbia represents a waiver of the District’s sovereign immunity, “section 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants.” … Courts have thus previously found that neither complaints made to District of Columbia agencies other than the Mayor’s office nor reports of investigations prepared by agencies other than the Metropolitan Police Department qualify

UNIVERSITY MED. CTR. OF SOUTHERN NEV. v. Shalala

5 F. Supp. 2d 4 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 13, 1998

in § 340(a)(5). 2 Section 340B defined twelve different' types of facilities that could qualify as covered entities. … Congress clearly expressed its intent that the 340B program prohibit “double-dipping” into two drug price-reducing mechanisms.

Fox v. Kingsland

81 F. Supp. 433 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 14, 1948

The War Department, Signal Corps Radar Laboratory, on February 14, 1942, advised the plaintiff by letter that they were in urgent need of qualified radio engineers and would be anxious to secure his services provided a release … This interest, it appears, is clearly in an invention and not in a patent.

Taylor v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 11, 2026

They point out that the only waiver of sovereign immunity Plaintiffs identify is in the APA, which waives sovereign immunity for “action[s] in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C … Sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of State

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2018

entities defined as agencies under FOIA to qualify as “inter-agency.” … FOIA exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

Hartke v. McKelway

526 F. Supp. 97 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 8, 1981

Goswami was not a qualified expert on the standard of care for laproscopic cauterization procedures. … While expert testimony is required to establish what the risks are — id.—Dr. McKelway himself provided that information. The Court is satisfied that Dr.

Routier v. Ross

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 22, 2018

As Defendant notes, Plaintiff does not clearly specify which actions he believes were discriminatory and which were retaliatory. … Supp. 2d 78, 92 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Occasional instances of less favorable treatment involving ordinary daily workplace decisions are not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment.”).

Byrd v. Vilsack

931 F. Supp. 2d 27 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 18, 2013

Because this is a non-selection claim, one of the ways Byrd can attempt to prove pretext is by establishing that she was “significantly better qualified for the job” than the ultimate selectee. … ,’ ‘substantially more qualified,’ or ‘significantly better qualified’ than the successful candidate.”)

Schoen v. Consumers United Group, Inc.

670 F. Supp. 367 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 6, 1986

Al *371 though well established in the case law, we set it forth again. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. … Schoen’s success in proving he was qualified depends on what position he is considered to have held at the time of his demotion.

Vuegen Technologies Inc v. Cissna

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 10, 2020

CIS stressed that “H-1B petitions do not establish a worker’s eligibility for H-1B classification if they are based on speculative employment or do not establish the actual work.” Id. at 4. … The INS 1991 Regulation clearly allows petitions to be granted for “up to three years,” which necessarily allows for lesser periods as well.

United States of America v. Google LLC

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 2, 2025

Such “favoritism” was clearly antithetical to both the purpose of the antitrust laws and binding precedent. … And that objective is clearly authorized under Massachusetts.