Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersdcd

8,912 results

3.94s

  • United States v. Thurston

    District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 23, 2013

    To qualify for release pending appeal, then, the defendants must show that the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) are met and that there are “exceptional reasons” for release.5 See United States v. … FLIGHT RISK AND DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY For the defendants to qualify for release under the Bail Reform Act, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Routier v. Ross

    District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 22, 2018

    As Defendant notes, Plaintiff does not clearly specify which actions he believes were discriminatory and which were retaliatory. … Supp. 2d 78, 92 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Occasional instances of less favorable treatment involving ordinary daily workplace decisions are not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment.”).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Smith v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 23, 2025

    Amtrak clearly stated in its letter that because 1 See, e.g., White v. Nucor Corp., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (D. … Supp. 2d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that “[t]his Court has often followed a three-month rule to establish causation on the basis of temporal proximity alone” when considering a summary judgment motion).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States Ex Rel. Green v. Service Contract Education & Training Trust Fund

    843 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 13, 2012

    SCETTF was established by LIUNA in 1978 to provide training and educational opportunities for LIUNA’s members. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) … Connerton) establishing SCETTF’s communication with DOL and the U.S.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • City of New York v. Clinton

    985 F. Supp. 168 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 12, 1998

    It established that New York State expenditures derived from certain health care provider taxes qualified for FFP under the Medicaid program. Id. at ¶ 9 . … Clearly, this is an indication that the canceled law no longer exists.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Competitive Enterprise Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

    232 F. Supp. 3d 172 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 8, 2017

    EPA clearly received the Institute’s appeal on January 8 and thus failed to respond on a timely basis. … Most of the listed records qualified for multiple privileges under Exemption 5.

    Cited 65 timesPublished
  • Schoen v. Consumers United Group, Inc.

    670 F. Supp. 367 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 6, 1986

    Al *371 though well established in the case law, we set it forth again. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. … Schoen’s success in proving he was qualified depends on what position he is considered to have held at the time of his demotion.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Washington Post Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture

    943 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 18, 1996

    The Public Interest in Disclosure As the Supreme Court has established, “unless the invasion of privacy is ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the public interest in disclosure must prevail.... … United States Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885, 894-95 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“[T]he mere fact that records pertain to an individual’s activities does not necessarily qualify them for exemption.

    Cited 35 timesPublished
  • Faulk v. Medeiros

    321 F. Supp. 3d 189 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2018

    This is not enough to qualify for extraordinary relief...."). … that this holding is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • National Treasury Employees Union v. Donald J. Trump

    District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 20, 2025

    The Statute further “establishes a scheme of administrative and judicial review.” Id. … The government represents that whether the firing of probationary employees qualifies as a RIF, for instance, “are the types of claims that the FLRA hears all the time.” Tr. 40:12–13.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ramsey v. Moniz

    75 F. Supp. 3d 29 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 6, 2014

    Thus, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” cannot qualify as materially adverse actions. Id. … analysis but instead comprise “those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience” and to which “[a]n employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior [will not] immunize

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • VoteHemp, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Administration

    567 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 15, 2004

    “To establish that the release of information contained in government files would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, the court first asks whether disclosure ‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to … The description of document 452 clearly establishes that this document promotes these objectives. Accordingly, this document is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 5. D.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Konarski v. Brown

    293 F. Supp. 2d 70 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 26, 2003

    . § 2679 provides federal employees absolute immunity from tort liability for acts done within the scope of their employment); 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d). … Independent of the Government’s certification, the facts, as alleged by the plaintiff, clearly demonstrate that the employees of the CPSC were acting within the scope of their employment.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Jones and Associates, Inc. v. District of Columbia

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 18, 2011

    And it is well-established that when the government "makes ordinary judicial process available to [an entity] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process." Lujan v. … Ervin, decided before the Supreme Court clearly held that due process only requires that a state "make[] ordinary judicial process available to [an entity] for resolving . . . contractual dispute[s]," G & G Fire Sprinklers

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Shume v. Pearson Education Inc.

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2018

    her as qualified. … Shume therefore cannot establish a “clear and indisputable right to relief” as required to justify an entitlement to mandamus.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States Department of the Interior

    District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 16, 2021

    limiting the lands that may qualify. … The phrase “provide[s] a specific geographic area for the restoration of lands” is essentially question begging — the whole point of the regulation is to establish what areas qualify as “part of . . . the restoration of

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • American Academy of Pediatrics v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 11, 2026

    AAP has established irreparable injury here. C. … As to the remaining factor, HHS cannot establish irreparable injury.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Robinson v. Dalton

    919 F. Supp. 484 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 1996

    Here, while the plaintiff may have made out a prima facie ease, the defendant has established that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual reasons for the selection — that „he selectees were better qualified … Instead, the only qualification requirement is practical experience, which Powell clearly possessed. Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • National Ass'n of Counties v. Baker

    669 F. Supp. 518 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 28, 1987

    Absent a “clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,” that language is conclusive. … It is well established that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the federal government in the absence of express waiver, by contract or statute, or sovereign immunity from an award of interest.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • District of Columbia v. Nahass

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2010

    Furthermore, where a defendant is seeking to establish “prevailing party” status, that party need not establish a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties. Id. … The District, having satisfied all three prongs of the Thomas test, therefore qualifies as a “prevailing party” under the Act.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.