Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
8,912 results
1.03s
United States v. Microsoft Corp.
87 F. Supp. 2d 30 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 3, 2000
Whether this zone of commercial activity actually qualifies as a market, “monopolization of which may be illegal,” depends on whether it includes all products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes … Clearly, this is not a desirable outcome. Similar concerns have motivated other courts, as well as the D.C.
Reversed in part, on other grounds by United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001)Cited 44 timesPublishedBanneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham
253 F. Supp. 3d 64 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 16, 2017
Work-product immunity is held by the lawyer, not the client, although either may assert the doctrine during discovery. … “The party invoking the privilege, however, has the burden of proving that the memoranda qualify as work product.” Hager v. Bluefield Regional Medical Center, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 70, 76 (D.D.C. 1997).
Cited 8 timesPublishedPetties v. District of Columbia
268 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 2003
The Transportation Administrator shall inform the Court whenever an established contract, agreement or provision(s) thereof clearly prevent the Transportation Administrator from carrying out the duties and responsibilities … The Transportation Administrator shall have the same immunity provided to District of Columbia public officials; and 13.
Cited 4 timesPublishedMardirosian v. American Institute of Architects
474 F. Supp. 628 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 1979
can a true scope of services and the resulting compensation be fairly established. ... … Moreover, there is no question that even “state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity.” Cantor v.
Cited 10 timesPublished139 F. Supp. 3d 120 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 9, 2015
for Chevron deference but indicating that it might qualify for a lesser degree of deference pursuant to Skidmore). … Even if, contrary to Circuit law, Dr. ’Doe could establish that an Adverse Action Report in the National ■ Practitioner Data Bank qualified as a stigma for the purpose of the substantive due process analysis, the fact of
Cited 29 timesPublishedHorizon Lines, LLC v. United States
429 F. Supp. 2d 92 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 14, 2006
The statutory exemption at issue in this case, known as the Third Proviso, permits non-qualified vessels to transport *95 46 U.S.C. app. § 883. Another non-qualified shipper, Sunmar Shipping, Inc. … ASC contends that the Court clearly erred when it held that the Jones Act did not constitute an “embargo” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1) and Kmart Corp. v.
Cited 2 timesPublished192 F. Supp. 3d 151 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 29, 2016
The first three elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case clearly are present—(1) Plaintiff is older than 40; (2) he was qualified for the position at CISA; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action. … Nor must a court permit clearly deficient statistical evidence to go to a jury.
Cited 16 timesPublishedVaskas v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 2, 2023
But Defendants’ declaration establishes that some of their records related to his child pornography conviction—and therefore within the scope of his request—included statutorily protected information about children, regardless … Plaintiff objects that “some records cannot qualify as intra-or-inter-agency memoranda” and suggests that they may be “communications with a nonagency third party.” Opp’n to MSJ at 8.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Jan 7, 2009
Opp’n at 8-14, arguing that their “allegations are sufficient to establish state action under a ‘public function’ test or a ‘joint action’ test,” id. at 13. … And as to the latter, while the defendants concede that the state officials performed a state function by enforcing the states’ ballot access laws, they submit that these officials’ actions are protected by qualified immunity
Cited 0 timesPublishedAmerican Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler
561 F. Supp. 395 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 14, 1983
The instant regulation offends these established precepts to a remarkable extent. … The record tendered in support of the Secretary’s action here clearly establishes that many highly relevant factors central to any application of section 504 to medical care of newborn infants were not considered prior to
Cited 10 timesPublishedNational Ass'n of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children v. Mendez
857 F. Supp. 85 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 6, 1994
Defendants’ unrebutted affidavits establish, however, that OCHAM-PUS has not delegated such authority. … The referenced sections states that a qualified mental health provider must “practic[e] within the scope of his or her license.”
Cited 2 timesPublished980 F. Supp. 28 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 8, 1997
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 , 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481-82 , 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (holding that prisoner must establish both subjective and objective component to establish claim of deliberate indifference). … If true, these facts establish malicious and sadistic intent.
Cited 39 timesPublishedLudlam v. United States Peace Corps
934 F. Supp. 2d 174 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2013
“Under [the] public-domain doctrine, materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.” Cottone v. … Cir. 1975) (finding an agency’s efforts to evaluate and change its personnel policies, rules and standards too amorphous to qualify as a process for the purposes of the deliberative process privilege).
Cited 5 timesPublishedGoodman v. Perpetual Building Association
320 F. Supp. 20 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 10, 1970
Clearly the evidence in this case does not establish that commissions to Perpetual for writing or placing of insurance on property on which it has loaned money is a rebate contemplated by the above-mentioned language. … Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143 , 53 A.2d 143 ), fair play clearly calls for the imposition of a trust in favor of the corporation.
Cited 10 timesPublished763 F. Supp. 645 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 24, 1991
The Government argued that the fact that Davis only “steered” Graves to the taller male does not immunize her from criminal responsibility. In support of this contention, the Government cited United States v. … Thus, while Copeland establishes that a steerer paid in kind may be responsible for the drugs found on the drug dealer that he or she helped, it does not establish that steerers are necessarily responsible for such drugs.
Cited 1 timesPublished103 F. Supp. 588 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 2, 1952
The intervening defendant contends that they cannot qualify as devisees under the will of the testatrix. It is its contention that, when Clara Elizabeth Constantine, Ada Amelia Hadel -and William K. … Clearly the wife of Cristodulo Constantine was not seized in deed or in law of the property here involved, and, therefore, he has no estate of curtesy therein.
Reversed on other grounds by Noreen v. Sparks Mercantile Trust Co. Of Baltimore v. Sparks, 204 F.2d 56 (1953)Cited 2 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Jan 6, 2011
An individual is entitled to the protections of the Rehabilitation Act if he can establish that he is a qualified person with a disability; that he can perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable … Generally, to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory or retaliatory non-selection or failure to promote, plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for
Cited 0 timesPublishedPete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950
352 F. Supp. 1294 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 8, 1973
. *1296 The Trust Fund in question here was established by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c) (5) (1970). … Trustees have clearly been on notice that the signatory last employment requirement as applied by them might be arbitrary and capricious since the date of the first Roark decision, Roark v.
Cited 6 timesPublishedAssociated Dog Clubs of New York State, Inc. v. Vilsack
44 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 16, 2014
An organization “‘may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.’” … The motion is clearly timely, which the breeding clubs do not dispute.
Cited 1 timesPublished191 F. Supp. 2d 154 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 12, 2002
These defendants move to dismiss the complaint, invoking the qualified immunity defense. … This issue, then, is clearly in dispute.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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