Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
811 F. Supp. 2d 53 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 2, 2011
The ANO was established and led by Sabri al-Banna, a/k/a Abu Nidal. (Lang, T-2-141.) 46. … He was also deemed qualified to testify regarding the damage calculations for each of the killed or injured plaintiffs. (Markham, T-4-105).
Cited 4 timesPublishedThompson v. Capitol Police Board
120 F. Supp. 2d 78 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 26, 2000
You are probably not qualified, but we’ll do this interview.” See Def.’s Statement at 1. Second, the plaintiff claims that in the mid to late 1970s, he took an exam to become a crime-scene search officer. … In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court is sometimes required to look to matters outside of the pleadings. *82 See Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab.
Cited 34 timesPublishedUrban Health Care Coalition v. Sebelius
853 F. Supp. 2d 101 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2012
“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). … Unlike this case, Abbott Labs was a challenge to an agency’s regulations, raising claims which clearly were redressable in a suit against the agency head.
Cited 6 timesPublished279 F. Supp. 2d 36 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 4, 2003
Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 518 (D.C.Cir.2000)(“For purposes of the prima facie case, however, it is sufficient that Cones has established that he was substantively qualified and that HHS selected a white person.”). … When government counsel insisted that the threshold of relevance couldn’t be established unless the witness was qualified to say that a violation had occurred, I responded: My point is these plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries
Cited 6 timesPublished10 F. Supp. 2d 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 6, 1998
Myles also fails to establish prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland standard. … The court clearly stated that in certain instances, such evidence may not lead to unfair prejudice. Id.
Cited 4 timesPublished31 F. Supp. 2d 143 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 21, 1998
The list of qualified candidates for these positions was reduced to six including the plaintiff. Mr. … As to the first point, the plaintiff has clearly shown that she engaged in a protected activity (filing an EEO complaint) and that the defendant was aware of this activity.
Cited 31 timesPublishedAllen-Brown v. District of Columbia
54 F. Supp. 3d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 7, 2014
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments are not immune from liability under section 1983, but it explained that a “municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other … Instead, an individual must “speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor” as established by state law to qualify as a policy maker. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Cited 12 timesPublishedMbia Insurance Corporation v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B.
District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 6, 2011
Prudential Mootness Favors Dismissal Having established that MBIA’s claims do not qualify as administrative expenses, the Court now considers whether those claims must be dismissed as moot. 20 Moreover, MBIA … exercising a function or power that is clearly authorized by statute on the other.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedLambrakis v. Jones (In Re Jones)
49 B.R. 431 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 30, 1985
In any case, Defendant’s application demonstrated an annual income of $47,000, more than enough to qualify. … Therefore, it was found to be “clearly inequitable” to award attorney’s fees in this case. 12.
Cited 3 timesPublishedSan Antonio General Maintenance, Inc. v. Abnor
691 F. Supp. 1462 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 16, 1987
Injunctive relief remains, however, an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be routinely granted and to only lie when the right to relief is clearly established. See, e.g., Ced’s Inc. v. … There is no dispute that SAGM would qualify as an SDB if the Air Force had chosen to go that route. 21 .
Cited 6 timesPublishedLewis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.
370 F. Supp. 3d 267 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2019
Since 2015, however, three district courts and more than 40 ALJs have disagreed with the Secretary's position that CGMs do not qualify as DME. … with plaintiff's counsel to narrow issues throughout the litigation and 2) the inference that the Secretary raised the issue of mootness (which was later overruled by this Court on a motion to reconsider) when plaintiff clearly
Cited 0 timesPublishedYazdan Pouri v. United States Department of Homeland Security
District Court, District of Columbia · May 30, 2026
Dec. 18, 2020) (noting that federal law “clearly envisions that USCIS will adjudicate all covered applications for immigration benefits, including . . . … These medical associations have explained that denying work authorization to highly qualified doctors results in “severe and immediate” “consequences” including disruptions to patient care—consequences that “are particularly
Cited 0 timesPublished576 F. Supp. 559 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 22, 1983
,” 6 it does not follow that such a degree of hardship would not be established by a totality of the circumstances. … This factor clearly tips the balance — if further weight is needed — on favor of a finding of exceptional hardship and abuse of discretion.
Cited 5 timesPublishedMcKinney v. United States Postal Service
District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 16, 2013
As our Circuit has explained, “[g]iven that statutes of limitations against the government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it seems unlikely Congress intended such an anomaly.” … Of course, McKinney bears the burden of establishing that her claims are typical of the putative class members she seeks to represent.
Cited 0 timesPublishedShapiro v. United States Department of Justice
969 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 18, 2013
Whether its immunity from discovery is absolute or qualified, a protected document cannot be said to be subject to ‘routine’ disclosure.” Id. … A Brief Bank that “would likely remain inviolate in the bosom of the” EOUSA would hardly qualify as a “resource” for attorneys. Id.
Cited 32 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2018
“If sovereign immunity has not been waived, a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Clayton v. … It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Cited 0 timesPublished151 F. Supp. 378 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 14, 1957
The Court there clearly indicated that it was not considering a case involving the use of force. … Justice Douglas, dissenting, equally clearly pointed out that force was not involved.
Cited 10 timesPublishedSherwin v. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
955 F. Supp. 140 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 27, 1997
It also found that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Sherwin v. Billmyer, 978 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir.1992). … It is established that “there is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between
Cited 5 timesPublished227 F. Supp. 2d 25 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 8, 2002
Thus, the FSGB determined that the plaintiff did not qualify to receive an immediate annuity, but that he did qualify to receive a lump-sum refund of his retirement contributions. Id. … The plaintiff argues that courts consistently find property rights when an employer’s pension system clearly gives its employees a vested right in retirement annuities if they qualify for them. Id. (citing Mallette v.
Cited 116 timesPublished939 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 19, 1996
In order for Exemption 3 to apply, the Trade Act must qualify as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(3). … The Trade Act clearly limits the closure discretion of the USTR and "refers to particular types of matters” on which to base a closure decision, and thus qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. See CIA v.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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