Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Ingram Barge Co. v. United States

    691 F. Supp. 474 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 28, 1988

    CGB claims to qualify for Bowaters status because it is “primarily” engaged in “manufacturing.” … More than one month before issuing the Certificates to CGB, the Coast Guard clearly expressed an intention to investigate CGB's qualifications for Bowaters status. See Memorandum to File from T.L. Willis, U.S.

    Reversed on other grounds by Ingram Barge Company v. United States of America Consolidated Grain and Barge Company, Ingram Barge Company v. United States of America, 884 F.2d 1400 (1989)Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Ewan v. Islamic Republic of Iran

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 10, 2020

    While foreign states are presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, see Saudi Arabia v. … One such statutory exception, set forth in 28 U.S.C § 1605A, waives sovereign immunity in cases concerning a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mbia Insurance Corporation v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B.

    District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 6, 2011

    Prudential Mootness Favors Dismissal Having established that MBIA’s claims do not qualify as administrative expenses, the Court now considers whether those claims must be dismissed as moot. 20 Moreover, MBIA … exercising a function or power that is clearly authorized by statute on the other.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Daniel v. Johns Hopkins University

    118 F. Supp. 3d 312 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 31, 2015

    Specifically, plaintiff must show that he “(1) [is a] member [ ] [of] a protected group; (2) [is] qualifi[ed] for the job in question; (3) [was subjected to] an adverse employment action; and (4) [the existence of] circumstances … Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“If temporal proximity sufficed to rebut a legitimate proffer, then protected activities would effectively grant employees a period of immunity, during which no act, however egregious

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Lynom v. Widnall

    222 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 25, 2002

    Accordingly, Lieutenant Colonel Lynom’s success on her APA claim is sufficient to qualify her as a prevailing party. … Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of each element of her fee request. American Petroleum, 72 F.3d at 912.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • C.S. Lawn & Landscape, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 2026

    employers to recruit and hire temporary unskilled, non-agricultural workers from abroad to fill positions that no qualified U.S. worker will accept.” La. Forestry, 745 F.3d at 659; see 8 U.S.C. … instructs a reviewing court to set aside such action if it finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”; “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mason v. Rock Creek Plaza, Inc.

    164 F. Supp. 269 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 30, 1958

    Moreover, the Board of Zoning Adjustment is created and qualified to decide questions of fact and opinion as to zoning. … Unless the Board’s decision is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, courts should not substitute their judgment for the Board’s. Selden v.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools v. Devos

    District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 16, 2018

    To be sure, economic loss sustained due to a federal administrative action is typically “uncompensable” in the sense that federal agencies enjoy sovereign immunity, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA does not … Rather, an asserted “economic harm” must “be significant, even where it is irretrievable because a defendant has sovereign immunity.” Id. at 335.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Amduso v. Republic of Sudan

    61 F. Supp. 3d 42 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 25, 2014

    This Court has entered final judgment on liability under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in this civil action and several related cases — brought by victims of the bombings and their families — against the Republic … The reports extensively describe the key facts relevant to each of the plaintiffs and carefully analyze their' claims under the framework established in mass tort terrorism cases.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools v. Devos

    District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 16, 2018

    To be sure, economic loss sustained due to a federal administrative action is typically “uncompensable” in the sense that federal agencies enjoy sovereign immunity, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA does not … Rather, an asserted “economic harm” must “be significant, even where it is irretrievable because a defendant has sovereign immunity.” Id. at 335.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Plunkett v. Department of Justice

    924 F. Supp. 2d 289 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 20, 2013

    Exemption 6 protects information about individuals in “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6). … Cir. 2011) (finding “no need to consider Exemption 6 separately [where] all information that would fall within the scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C)”).

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. United States

    670 F. Supp. 2d 65 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 25, 2009

    Thus, the injury alleged by the CNMI is redressable, and the plaintiff clearly has standing. … But it declined the CNMI’s invitation to read Sections 103 and 105 as “carving out an area of ‘local affairs’ immune from federal legislation.” Id. at 755.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Loughlin v. United States

    286 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 10, 2003

    The statute leaves the establishment of a RAB firmly within the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. … The nature of the specific, mandatory constraint on its discretion must be clearly identified.” Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 2002 WL 27834 , at *9 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Pitt v. Duke

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 5, 2021

    And the panelists thought Plaintiff was “very nervous” and “struggled to clearly articulate her points.” ECF No. 17-13 at 7; ECF No. 17-4 at 9. … First, Pitt argues that the panel “violated well-established merit systems protection law in passing [her] over in favor of white male selectees who are not veterans” because she qualified for veterans’ preference.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sandpiper Residents Association v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development

    District Court, District of Columbia · May 21, 2022

    As a result, Plaintiffs seek an injunction compelling HUD to issue Tenant Protection Vouchers to any qualified Sandpiper Cove tenant who wishes to leave the complex. Dkt. 25 at 59–60 (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 212). … Although HUD is correct that the Fair Housing Act does not include a waiver of sovereign immunity, that observation is immaterial because Plaintiffs’ claim is covered by the general waiver of sovereign immunity contained

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Olsen v. Albright

    990 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 22, 1997

    If the policies are clearly valid, then the Board’s decision is quite reasonable, for Plaintiff appears rather insubordinate. … exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 1, 2020

    “Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Federal Government is immune from suit.” Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988). … Second, it must be “established by statute or reorganization plan,” “established or utilized by the President,” or “established or utilized by one or more agencies.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hornbostel v. United States Department of Interior

    305 F. Supp. 2d 21 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 18, 2004

    Further, the general purposes of an EA, as noted by defendant in its reply to plaintiffs opposition, are clearly policy related in nature. *34 3. … Certainly the names, phone numbers, and addresses of individuals included within these documents qualify as “personal” in nature.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • Public Citizen v. Barshefsky

    939 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 19, 1996

    In order for Exemption 3 to apply, the Trade Act must qualify as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(3). … The Trade Act clearly limits the closure discretion of the USTR and "refers to particular types of matters” on which to base a closure decision, and thus qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. See CIA v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

    811 F. Supp. 2d 53 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 2, 2011

    The ANO was established and led by Sabri al-Banna, a/k/a Abu Nidal. (Lang, T-2-141.) 46. … He was also deemed qualified to testify regarding the damage calculations for each of the killed or injured plaintiffs. (Markham, T-4-105).

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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