Case law

Estate of Yonadav Hirshfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 30, 2018

The question of Defendants’ immunity is more complicated. … Some of these elements are clearly satisfied and require little discussion.

Minney v. United States Office of Personnel Management

130 F. Supp. 3d 225 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 15, 2015

Furthermore, sovereign immunity is not, as OPM contends, a bar to this Court's jurisdiction over the instant action. See Def.'s Mot. at 10-12. … OPM attempts to dimmish this harm by arguing that plaintiff "receives a navy pension” and “qualifies for health coverage from the VA.” See Def's Suppl. Mem. at 13.

Suzan Tantleff Trusts v. Federal Deposit Insurance

938 F. Supp. 14 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 12, 1996

First, qualified beneficiaries are limited to spouses, children and grandchildren. Id. … Thus, *19 § 2.2 is clearly inconsistent with an intent to part with ownership of the trust assets, and makes the trusts revocable. C. Beneficiary vs.

Doak v. Napolitano

19 F. Supp. 3d 259 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 10, 2014

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on the failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could find that (1) she had a qualifying … See also Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530 (“If temporal proximity sufficed to rebut a legitimate proffer, then protected activities would effectively grant employees a period of immunity, during which no act, however egregious,

Calhoun v. Prouty

643 F. Supp. 2d 87 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2009

GSA argues the selectees’ “real property experience” made them more qualified than Calhoun. … Even if she had established a prima facie case, GSA would be entitled to summary judgment. 8 .

Benjamin v. Spellings

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 17, 2010

Benjamin was more qualified for the GS-14 position than the selectee.” Opp. at 22. … plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job.”

Iglesias v. Central Intelligence Agency

525 F. Supp. 547 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 21, 1981

Second, it must be established that a “clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy” would result if the information were disclosed. See, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. … The standard for withholding is less exacting than that which exists under Exemption 6 (the word “clearly” is deleted), and therefore the plaintiffs must establish an even greater public interest in disclosure to obtain the

Tataranowicz v. Sullivan

753 F. Supp. 978 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 21, 1990

. §§ 1395 et seq., establishes a federally subsidized health insurance program for the elderly and disabled which is administered by the Secretary. … This is clearly not what Congress intended, and the Secretary’s policy literally makes no sense.

Smith v. District of Columbia

249 F. Supp. 3d 106 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 6, 2017

In this case, by contrast, the District identifies no such .submarket, instead acquiescing in the notion that the litigation at issue qualifies as complex federal litigation (as to which the Laffey Matrices apply). … And therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s decision to apply the LSI Laffey Matrix was clearly erroneous and contrary to law.

Porter-Moore v. Volpe

177 F. Supp. 3d 409 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 1, 2016

Defendant does not raise a qualified immunity defense in his motion for summary judgment, but instead argues that his encounter with Plaintiff was a “classic example of a Terry stop,” and therefore lawful. … Supp. 2d at 98 (citation omitted) (when a stop is lawful, “unless the threatened use of force is clearly excessive, an officer is protected against liability for assault.”).

Banzhaf v. Smith

588 F. Supp. 1498 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 14, 1984

Here again, the answer is in the affirmative, for it is clearly supported by the case precedents and the practice referred to above. … Mootness is a possibility in many, if not most, injunction cases, yet such cases to not automatically qualify for stays pending appeal on that basis. See also, Cole v.

Mitchell v. Yellen

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 24, 2018

,’ ‘substantially more qualified,’ or ‘significantly better qualified’ than the successful candidate.” … Daher’s experience was clearly in a related field. Indeed, Plaintiff herself admitted that “reasonable minds [could] disagree about whether [Plaintiff]… or Phil Daher [was] the most qualified for the position.”

Brookens v. Solis

635 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 22, 2009

Plaintiff alleges that the Court erroneously (1) required him to establish a prima facie case in his complaint and weighed the evidence regarding his claims of denial of details and desk audits (see Pl.’s Mot. to Alter or … However, that is clearly not the case. See, e.g., Brookens v. Solis, No. 08-5527, 2009 WL 2414420 , *1, 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 10048, *l-*2 (D.C.Cir. May 8, 2009) (per curiam) (“Brookens I ”); Dunning v.

Mustafa Chohan v. U.S. Department of State

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 5, 2023

If the same information is shown to be immune from disclosure under multiple exemptions, the Court need not consider each exemption separately. Roth v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011). … An Exemption 3 statute must either (i) require that the relevant “matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue;” or (ii) establish “particular criteria for withholding or refer

Thompson v. Shinseki

169 F. Supp. 3d 170 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2016

qualified’ than the successful candidate.” … Circuit has noted that “[a]n inability to clearly articulate the reasoning behind the specific allocation of numerical scores” may speak “less to any effort to mask an alternative unlawful purpose behind [a] decision and

Cooperative Services, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development

410 F. Supp. 865 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 16, 1976

Under the Section 202 program, a qualified sponsor submitted an application to HUD for funding. … Nor does the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in Edelman v.

Azam v. District of Columbia Taxicab Commission

46 F. Supp. 3d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 2, 2014

improvements, including installation of meter systems that would accept non-cash payment of fares and electronically collect trip-sheet data through the use of GPS technology” and installation of “[u]niform cruising lights that clearly … First, neither the District itself nor the Taxicab Commission qualifies as plaintiffs’ “employer” under the ADEA. See, e.g., Bonaby v.

DeVito v. Shultz

300 F. Supp. 381 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 29, 1969

While this remedy is exclusive it does not follow that the Federal Courts are necessarily without power or jurisdiction to protect aggrieved parties such as plaintiffs here if it should clearly appear that the Secretary has … very exclusivity of the remedy serves to emphasize the necessity of some degree of Court supervision To rule otherwise would enable the Secretary to frustrate the will of Congress; it would leave the Secretary’s conduct immune

United States v. Quinn

537 F. Supp. 2d 99 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 28, 2008

The government declined to give immunity, and Quinn thereafter unsuccessfully requested this Court to compel the government to immunize Tatum. See Def.’s Ex. B at 748:2-13. … The government had clearly and consistently confirmed that it would call Tatum in its case-in-ehief.

Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 25, 2022

Cir. 2018) (Hemerich II) (because a plaintiff is required to allege facts establishing an actual (not merely possible) violation of international law, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that their supposed rule was clearly … Plaintiff must also demonstrate that the “claimed exception is clearly established customary international law.” Id. at 32-33. 1. Who are the Consortium members?