Case law

American Council of Life Insurers v. District of Columbia Health Benefit Exchange Authority

73 F. Supp. 3d 65 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 13, 2014

Only those health insurance plans that meet certain minimum requirements established by federal law are eligible for sale as Qualified Health Plans (“QHPs”) on either State or Federal Exchanges. … Code § 31- 3171.03(e)(2), by charging “(A) User fees; (B) Licensing fees; and (C) Other assessments on health carriers selling qualified dental plans or qualified health plans in the District, including qualified health

Hassanali v. Attorney General

599 F. Supp. 189 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 1984

The ostensible owners decision to establish a new, similar business enterprise in the same area is not a basis for a finding of continuity for the purposes of this petition. … Clearly, the regulation appears to be more restrictive than the statute. As the Court has noted, the purpose of the labor certification procedure is to protect American workers.

Lee v. Government of the District of Columbia

19 F. Supp. 3d 281 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 20, 2014

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: 1) he has a “disability,” 2) he is “qualified” for the job, and 3) an adverse employment decision was made solely because of his disability. Weigert v. … Lee argues that this evidence not only establishes that he has diabetes, but that his diabetes is severe enough to qualify as a disability within the definition of the ADA.

Searcy v. Vilsack

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 14, 2026

While pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a pro se plaintiff still bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Newby v. … And even had Searcy alleged that his treatment was due to a protected characteristic, his treatment would nevertheless fail to qualify as sufficiently “severe” to make out a hostile work environment claim.

Zhang v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 30, 2018

Therefore, to qualify, a petition must establish that the alien investor “secured the loan using assets for which they own and are personally and primarily liable.” Id. … Evaluating the fourth factor, however, clearly suggests that USCIS’ interpretation is a legislative rule.

Perry-Anderson v. Howard University Hospital

192 F. Supp. 3d 136 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 29, 2016

9 or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . … In the plaintiff’s FMLA Application, which she submitted to the HUH HR department, her neurologist clearly stated that the plaintiff’s medical restriction is that she “needs [a] job with less stress,” and that her limitation

United States v. Cross

170 F. Supp. 303 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 17, 1959

Just as clearly, when the Select Committee propounded such questions for such purpose, it was a “competent tribunal” within the purview of the federal perjury statute. … I will say the same as I voluntarily told the grand jury in San Francisco, waiving immunity I was asleep in my room. I was not there. * * * * * * * * # “The Chairman. Let me ask you a question.

Young v. Ridley

309 F. Supp. 1308 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 11, 1970

judges * * 1 However, Section 2282 does not apply if the question of constitutionality raised is not “substantial,” A claim may lack substantiality “either because it is obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly … The statute found defective in Sniadach permitted the creditor to freeze his debtor’s wages, except for a small statutory immunity, merely by serving a summons on the debtor’s employer.

Bonieskie v. Mukasey

540 F. Supp. 2d 190 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2008

Prima Facie Case To establish a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate, Mr. … Bonie-skie's disability by virtue of his ‘problems at work' and his communications with EAP], and clearly should be permitted to do so.” Pl.’s Opp at 12.

Allina Health Services v. Sebelius

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 22, 2010

Cir. 2000) (“District Court decisions do not establish the law of the circuit, nor, indeed, do they even establish the law of the district.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). … Where a plaintiff cannot recover damages from an agency because the agency has sovereign immunity, any loss of income suffered by [the] plaintiff is irreparable per se.”)

Cherokee Nation v. United States Department of Interior

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 23, 2022

Chairman Woommavovah also argues that Plaintiffs’ illegal-competition injury is not even a “legally protected interest” the invasion of which can qualify as an injury-in-fact. … This is not enough to establish a “substantial risk” for standing purposes.

Johnson v. District of Columbia

572 F. Supp. 2d 94 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 21, 2008

Unlike Johnson, she did not have a degree in accounting, and was less or, at best, only equally qualified for the position in comparison to Johnson. Id. … Compliance with the statutory notice requirement is mandatory and a prerequisite to filing a suit against the District of Columbia “because it represents a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Winder v.

Downing v. Tapella

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2010

Eley’s perspective is clearly not germane to the decision to not select plaintiff and to the specific individual complaint that decision has prompted. … In sum, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden “to establish that the proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination” after defendant has articulated “a legitimate reason.”4 See Hussain v. Principi, 344 F.

Thorpe v. District of Columbia

894 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 14, 2012

the existence of an Olmstead Integration Plan is all that is required to establish compliance with the Integration Mandate. … With respect to the District’s claim to have a plan that demonstrates a measurable commitment to deinstitutionalization, the undisputed numbers clearly undercut any such contention.

Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.

348 F. Supp. 3d 99 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 3, 2018

On the other hand, one does not qualify as a joint inventor by merely assisting the actual inventor after conception of the claimed invention. … "It is settled that in establishing conception a party must show possession of every feature recited in the count, and that every limitation of the count must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception

Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Veneman

304 F. Supp. 2d 45 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 23, 2004

The Secretary has established regulations for holding these hearings. 7 C.F.R. §§ 900.1-900.18 (2004). … Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing entitlement to fees sought. Hensley v.

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce

90 F. Supp. 2d 9 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 25, 2000

As its basic premise, the Act establishes that government agency records should be accessible to the public. … More importantly, however, these lists, on their face, clearly demonstrate that they are “predecisional,” not final.

Saunders v. Davis

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 15, 2016

Saunders, who bears the burden of establishing the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, points to two bases for his claim against Secretary Perez. First, Mr. … Saunders has failed to meet his burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction and to establish a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Mr.

Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann

414 F. Supp. 215 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 28, 1976

Before turning to the merits, the Court notes that plaintiffs clearly have standing to maintain the instant action. … The exclusion in § 3(2)(iii) of the Advisory Committee Act is specifically limited to committees made up wholly of federal officials, and AASHTO clearly does not qualify. 11 .

Bayside Community Hospital v. Leavitt

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2009

Those provisions read as follows: 1886(d)(2)(D): For purposes of this subsection, the term “region” means one of the nine census divisions, comprising the fifty States and the District of Columbia, established … Cir. 1996) (“[A] regulation can not override a clearly stated statutory enactment.”).