Case law

Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.

782 F. Supp. 125 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 1991

In the letter, Donlan concluded that “[f]or implementation purposes, the [developmental squad] issue is clearly at an impasse.” Id. … Such a provision is immunized only by the union’s consent.” Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption, 1989 Duke L.J. at 376.

Newspaper Guild v. Saxbe

381 F. Supp. 48 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 23, 1974

“A court may qualify the plain meaning of a statute when its consequences— plainly absurd, inequitable, or in conflict with legislative history — permit the court to discern a clear legislative intention to the contrary.” … To understand clearly the defendant’s position and this court’s rejection thereof, it is important to relate briefly the background of the Newspaper Preservation Act.

Doe v. Rumsfeld

297 F. Supp. 2d 119 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 22, 2003

Circuit when it comes to establishing justiciability. … Twenty-one had received no vaccines, four had incomplete immunization and one had complete immunization.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice

516 F. Supp. 233 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 1981

Disclosure of such information from these files would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy- In order for an agency to justify nondisclosure under Exemption 6, it .must first establish that the requested … Moreover, the decisions of this Court have established that information connected with professional relationships does not qualify for the exemption. Id.

Wilson-Millan v. US Bureau of Prisons

District Court, District of Columbia · May 18, 2022

. . . in favor of immunity.” … Because Congress has clearly foreclosed review of the decision at issue, Plaintiff can establish no clear right to the requested relief.

Stephenson v. Powell

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 24, 2018

The Board is a government body that enjoys sovereign immunity. Albrecht v. Comm. on Emp. Benefits, 357 F.3d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2004). … Fourth, all of Relators’ claims—both the FCA claims and any claims that Relators bring as plaintiffs on their own behalf—must be dismissed because they are clearly frivolous.

Khalid v. Bush

355 F. Supp. 2d 311 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 19, 2005

Mem., p. 44, and because the APA, despite their contention, does not operate to provide a waiver of sovereign immunity for the petitioners’ ATS claims. … [The U.S.] has not ratified the [ACHR], and so that document does not yet qualify as one of the 'treaties’ of the United States that creates binding obligations.”). 21 .

Miller v. Department of the Navy

383 F. Supp. 2d 5 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 8, 2005

It is defendant’s claim that this information qualifies under Exemption 5 to FOIA, as clearly *18 constituting a “recommendation[ ] comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. … reviewing court shall compel agency action when that action is deemed (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASS'N v. Pena

862 F. Supp. 470 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 1, 1993

Circuit dismissed the petition as not qualifying for initial consideration by a court of appeals under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 . … Drivers of commercial vehicles are presently required to make routine stops at established weigh stations and other established check points to face investigations by state troopers.

Arizona v. Shalala

121 F. Supp. 2d 40 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 23, 2000

First, it is well established that an interpretative guidance issued without formal notice and comment rulemaking can qualify as final agency action. See Appalachian Power Co. v. … In establishing the MOE requirement section 609 also states what expenditures qualify as MOE.

United States v. Zabavsky

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 16, 2022

To start, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 give government officials qualified immunity if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have … A plaintiff in a Section 1983 suit therefore must show that a right is “clearly established” by a federal court and cannot prove their case merely by eliciting testimony about “well established law enforcement standards.”

Athridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

184 F.R.D. 181 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 29, 1998

But, discovery to date has established that Aetna “hedged its bets.” … There is also no parent-child immunity recognized under District of Columbia law. See 4A D.

Cherry-El v. Blount

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 13, 2025

In particular, Defendants assert that “they are entitled to government[al] immunity . . . pursuant to D.C. Code 22-4013(a).” Dkt. 18 at 1. … This difficulty, moreover, is only exacerbated by the fact that many of these potential readings of Plaintiff’s pleadings would clearly fail to state a claim.

Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 3, 2012

FINDINGS OF FACT Under the FSIA, a court cannot simply enter default judgment; rather, out of respect for the principle of sovereign immunity, it must ensure that the plaintiffs have established their claim or right … Here, the only remaining defendants are Iran, MOIS, and IRG—none of which qualify under the Flatow Amendment as an official, employee or agent, and none of which are sued in an individual capacity.

Adena Regional Medical Center v. Leavitt

524 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 11, 2007

Congress also established a specific formula for calculating the Adjustment; whether a hospital qualifies for the Adjustment, and how large an adjustment it receives, depends on the hospital’s “disproportionate patient percentage … He seems to assert that the statute is ambiguous, or at least not “clearly unambiguous.”

Hartman v. Duffey

973 F. Supp. 189 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 24, 1997

That “clear and convincing” standard, when it was issued, rested on well-established law. See Trout v. … Holland would have found her qualified.” Finding 32. That finding was based upon Mr.

Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

64 F. Supp. 3d 128 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 18, 2014

and the Intervenor arguing that the undisputed facts unquestionably establish the opposite. … This Court explained in detail in the PI Opinion why Plaintiffs would be unlikely to establish that the Corps’s verifications were permits for construction of the FS Pipeline such that they would qualify as a major federal

American Bankers Ass'n v. National Credit Union Administration

93 F. Supp. 2d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2000

This policy entails three fundamental requirements for the chartering of community credit unions: (1) clearly defined boundaries circumscribing the geographic area; (2) establishment by the charter applicant that the area … Irondequoit has presented no reasons why this case presents an exception to this presumption of immunity, and therefore its claim must be dismissed. III.

Hammond v. Chao

383 F. Supp. 2d 47 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 10, 2005

Plaintiffs evidence of pretext is that she is so clearly more qualified for the Lead Manpower Specialist position than the selectee that an inference of discrimination arises from the mere fact that she was not selected. … The record is clear that plaintiff was not vastly more qualified than Mr. Praeger, and therefore the Court must respect the employer’s unfettered discretion to choose among qualified candidates.

Alta Bates Summit Medical Center v. Sebelius

660 F. Supp. 2d 73 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 8, 2009

Alta Bates further contends that the Board’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence because the record clearly establishes that the “old” unit and “new” unit are factually distinct entities … Although paragraph Of) does not explicitly define the term "newly established unit,” it states that "[a] newly established unit that is excluded from [PPS] ... does not qualify for the [new provider] exemption ... unless