Case law

Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp., Inc.

976 F. Supp. 40 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 10, 1997

For a subsidiary employee to be eligible for the RAMP, he or she, among other things, must be “currently rated ‘Exceeds Requirements’ or ‘Meets All Requirements’ in job performance” and be “qualified on the Universal Test … Moreover, Judge Richey clearly contemplated that the plaintiffs were entitled to at least 30 days of pre-class certification discovery before moving for class certification.

Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Society v. United States

510 F. Supp. 374 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 27, 1981

The content of the series is dictated by general guidelines established by the Society and such guidelines are given to the outside contributors. … Plaintiff has not sufficiently established a connection between the accumulation of profits and some religious purpose so as to overcome that finding. 15 .

Overdevest Nurseries, L.P. v. Acosta

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 15, 2020

In support of this position, the plaintiff argues that, in 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1), Congress clearly defined the terms “able, willing, and qualified” and “similarly employed” “consistent with [the] [p]laintiff’s arguments … “Section 1188(a)(1) establishes the INA’s general mission; Congress left it to the Department . . . to implement that mission through the creation of specific substantive provisions . . . .

Herman v. Acheson

108 F. Supp. 723 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 17, 1952

Court went on to say, quoting Judge Cooley, who in turn quoted Webster in the Dartmouth College case, 4 Wheat 518, 17 U.S. 518 , 4 L.Ed. 629 , in his famous allusion to the law of the land: “ ‘By the law of the land is most clearly … The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.’ ” The plaintiff has been afforded that and is. entitled to nothing

Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc.

139 F.R.D. 4 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 3, 1991

immunity provided by this section”). … Conclusory statements asserting the elements of the privilege, however, are not sufficient to establish the privilege. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1990).

United States v. Perkins

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 7, 2023

establishes prejudice”); Charles Booker, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (same). In this case, Mr. … July 27, 2016) (“[E]xtorting money from a bank . . . clearly constitutes a separate crime that is not ‘armed bank robbery.’”) Govt.

Peevy v. Donahue

846 F. Supp. 2d 130 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 6, 2012

This is clearly not the “unusual case” where the plaintiff’s claims are “totally unrelated” to her termination so as to provide the Court with jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s constitutional claims. … “The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to some, but not all, torts. Those torts for which the United States retains immunity are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).” Peter B., 579 F.

Ham v. Ayers

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 1, 2018

ANALYSIS The CAA waives congressional immunity from suit and is, therefore, strictly construed. See 2 U.S.C. § 1408(a); Lane v. … Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed). Its terms, acknowledged by Mr.

Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A.

278 F. Supp. 3d 210 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2017

Thus, SEI qualifies as a prevailing party within the meaning of Section 505. See id. 2. … Although the court decided in favor of SEI, TVP’s defenses were not so clearly devoid of legal or factual basis as to render unreasonable any possibility that a court would decide for TVP.

Erby v. United States

424 F. Supp. 2d 180 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2006

Such a waiver of sovereign immunity must be “strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. … This appears, however, to be a typographical error, as the parties agree that the evidence clearly shows the accident to have taken place in Southeast Washington. See Ex. G to Motion to Dismiss Amended ‘ Complaint. 2 .

Bcb Holdings Limited v. Government of Belize

110 F. Supp. 3d 233 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 24, 2015

concluded that the GOB had promised to provide certain tax treatment to petitioners and that “[i]n refusing to accept [petitioners’] tax returns based on this treatment, Respondent [GOB] breached its contractual warranty and clearly … “[T]he burden of establishing the requisite factual predicate to deny confirmation of an arbitral award rests with the party resisting confirmation,” and “the showing required to avoid summary confirmation is high.”

Sheikh v. Republic of the Sudan

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 31, 2020

Although foreign states are presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, see Saudi Arabia v. … One such statutory exception, set forth in 28 U.S.C § 1605A, waives sovereign immunity in cases concerning a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

American District Telegraph v. Department of Energy

555 F. Supp. 1244 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 26, 1983

In performing the technical evaluation, the SEB decided to establish a ten point scale. … Each of the qualified bidders made a lengthy and detailed presentation to the Board. In addition, the Board *1251 visited the sites of systems installed by the qualified bidders.

Vasser v. Shinseki

72 F. Supp. 3d 269 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 4, 2014

When Vasser was not selected, that clearly was not due to any discriminatory act by Walker, but rather by Dr. Batres in the District of Columbia. … Finally, the District of Columbia clearly has a compelling interest in deciding disputes that involve management and supervisors working within its jurisdiction.

United States v. Zabavsky

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 23, 2022

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (explaining that the “‘clearly established’ immunity standard [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] is not different from that of ‘fair warning’ . . . for the purpose of validly applying § 242”). … And with the exception of 18 U.S.C. § 242, qualified immunity does not apply to criminal cases.

El Paso Natural Gas Company v. United States of America

847 F. Supp. 2d 111 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 21, 2012

EPA and BIA's response actions at the Landfill here, conducted according to their Administrative Settlement, easily qualify as a removal action under § 104 of CERCLA. … See id. 16 Clearly any such injunctive order by this Court would intrude upon the EPA's CERCLA process even if the plaintiffs are unwilling to concede the same.

Phillips v. Mabus

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 4, 2016

immunity (relevant to Count II of the amended complaint). … Miller argue that in its October 23, 2012 order, the Court mandated that the parties would have until March 5, 2013 to conduct limited discovery on the issues of scope of employment and qualified immunity.

Buhovecky v. Department of Justice

700 F. Supp. 566 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 5, 1988

Witnesses’s names are clearly covered, as are documents subpoenaed as exhibits. … Prior case law clearly supports this position. In Keys v. U.S.

In Re Ullico Inc. Litigation

605 F. Supp. 2d 210 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2009

ULLICO also established the ULLICO Inc. Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Deferred Compensation Plan”). Countercl. ¶8. … The benefits are paid out of a trust established by ULLICO. Countercl. Def. Facts ¶ 14. 1.

Cunningham v. Rodgers

267 F. 609 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 1920

The legal claimant is clearly the personal representative and such has been the construction placed upon this section by 1he Treasury Department. 11 Comptroller’s Dec. 713; 12 Comptroller’s Dec. 439. … As to the disposition of the real estate, it is sufficient to say that no action of the defendant can prevent the plaintiff from establishing his just rights in the proper forum, as the land cannot have been dissipated by