Case law
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1.74s
297 F. Supp. 2d 178 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 31, 2003
That document is clearly a confidential memo concerning the performance review of a high-ranking official and is clearly covered by the Privacy Act. … The EDMS is clearly a Privacy Act system of records and has been so declared by VA in a Federal Register notice found at 65 Federal Register 25534 (2000).
Reversed in part, on other grounds by McCready, Sheila v. Nicholson, R. James, 465 F.3d 1 (2006)Cited 10 timesPublishedCommercial Telegraphers' Union, A. F. L. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
53 F. Supp. 90 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 29, 1943
The distribution was upon a basis of the worth of the properties as established by the Commission. … If any such former employee is disabled and because of such disability is no longer qualified to perform the duties of his former position but otherwise meets the requirements for employment, he shall be given such avaliable
Cited 7 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Mar 24, 2009
Also, to the extent that Paragraph 36 deals with DCCA proceedings, judicial immunity applies. See, e.g., Forrester v. … This clearly pertains to the 1987 Injunction and is barred by the Penn Injunction.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDuberry v. District of Columbia
106 F. Supp. 3d 245 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 28, 2015
Legal Framework Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States, by a person acting under color of any State … In places, the complaint asserts that Plaintiffs are “qualified RLEOs” and asks for a “declaratory judgment . . . stating Plaintiffs were qualified RLEOs for purposes of LEOSA.” Id. ¶¶ 82, 95.
Cited 5 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Mar 16, 2010
Mot. to Remand. 4 “it is well established that removal generally requires unanimity among the defendants”) (quoting Balazik v. … Westphal, 78 F.3d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that a litigant’s pro se status “does not give a party unbridled license to disregard clearly communicated court orders”); United States v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2025
ERISA also guarantees the pension funds of qualifying plan participants through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), which protects pensioners in the event of a plan’s failure. Id. ¶ 32. … § 1113(1)(A), if “Athene defaults six years and a day after the last PRT, Plaintiffs’ only judicial remedy would be against an insolvent party, while Defendants would be immunized,” ECF No. 39, at 15.
Cited 0 timesPublished495 F. Supp. 2d 2 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 2007
Rather, “[t]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not … “The mere assertion [by the plaintiff] that [the plaintiff] was more qualified is insufficient to establish pretext.” Van Slyke v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 17 Fed.Appx. 154, 157 (4th Cir.2001).
Cited 14 timesPublishedSobin v. Washington Dc Board of Elections
District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 20, 2026
“If there is only one person qualified to fill the vacancy . . ., the vacancy shall 2 be deemed filled by the qualified person.” Id. at § 1-309.06(d)(6)(D). … Code clearly distinguishes between the process of filling a vacancy where there is only one qualified candidate, on one hand, and a special election in which residents “vote to elect a Commissioner,” on the other.
Cited 0 timesPublishedBenoit v. United States Department of Agriculture
577 F. Supp. 2d 12 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 8, 2008
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. … The mere docketing of a Section 741 Complaint Request does not establish that the underlying complaint is itself an “eligible complaint” within the meaning of Section 741. See Defs.’
Cited 12 timesPublishedAkridge v. Gallaudet University
729 F. Supp. 2d 172 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 3, 2010
Id. at 12 (noting that a mere assertion of failure to exhaust administrative remedies without more is “clearly inadequate under prevailing regulations to establish a failure to exhaust administrative remedies”). … Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext based on her self-serving affidavit and own subjective assessment that she was qualified for the position).
Cited 33 timesPublishedFeirson v. District of Columbia
315 F. Supp. 2d 52 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2004
It is well established that, under § 1983, municipalities are immune from punitive damages. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 , 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); Butera v. … The Court need not resolve whether the New Injury Questionnaire qualifies as a police report, however, because it concludes that Sgt.
Cited 16 timesPublished881 F. Supp. 2d 89 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 7, 2012
Standard of Review To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. … Plaintiff clearly fails to meet those conditions.
Cited 1 timesPublishedWright v. District of Columbia
District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 29, 2011
She never alleges a search or seizure as required to establish the former, see U.S. CONST. amend. … Qualified Immunity Defendant Sa’adah has also put forth a qualified immunity defense.
Cited 0 timesPublished657 F. Supp. 2d 180 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2009
Peavey does not expressly invoke any waiver of sovereign immunity. … The United States has waived its immunity from suit for certain torts under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). The FTCA’s waiver of sover *192 eign immunity, however, does not apply to constitutional tort claims.
Cited 75 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Aug 1, 2018
ANALYSIS The CAA waives congressional immunity from suit and is, therefore, strictly construed. See 2 U.S.C. § 1408(a); Lane v. … Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed). Its terms, acknowledged by Mr.
Cited 0 timesPublished605 F. Supp. 2d 210 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2009
ULLICO also established the ULLICO Inc. Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Deferred Compensation Plan”). Countercl. ¶8. … The benefits are paid out of a trust established by ULLICO. Countercl. Def. Facts ¶ 14. 1.
Cited 3 timesPublished846 F. Supp. 2d 130 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 6, 2012
This is clearly not the “unusual case” where the plaintiff’s claims are “totally unrelated” to her termination so as to provide the Court with jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s constitutional claims. … “The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to some, but not all, torts. Those torts for which the United States retains immunity are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).” Peter B., 579 F.
Cited 2 timesPublishedStultz v. Hp Enterprise Services, LLC
270 F. Supp. 3d 10 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 1, 2017
The Navy Yard is the Navy’s oldest shore establishment, originating in 1799. … The Navy Yard therefore qualifies as a federal enclave.
Cited 13 timesPublishedWestern Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc.
139 F.R.D. 4 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 3, 1991
immunity provided by this section”). … Conclusory statements asserting the elements of the privilege, however, are not sufficient to establish the privilege. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1990).
Cited 15 timesPublished616 F. Supp. 1259 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 19, 1985
On October 31, 1983, HHS Secretary Heckler established the Federal Inter-Agency Task Force on the Homeless. … Although plaintiffs’ third and eighth causes of action are clearly based on an alleged breach of contract, and, as previously discussed, are thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, these APA claims are not so clearly
Cited 5 timesPublished
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