Case law

United States v. Philip Morris Inc.

304 F. Supp. 2d 60 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 24, 2004

Defendants argued that Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized their earlier litigation strategies. … "Defendants, having been hailed into court in the earlier litigations, were clearly not exercising their right to petition the government.”

Scott v. United States

608 F. Supp. 2d 73 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 17, 2009

As this Court has explained: It is a bedrock principle of American law that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless Congress has expressly waived that immunity. … Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” F.D.I.C. v.

Doyle v. Brock

632 F. Supp. 256 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 1986

The Standard of Review Unlike many agency decisions relating to enforcement or prosecutorial action, the Secretary of Labor’s decision whether to file suit under section 402 of the LMRDA is not immune from judicial review … The complainant and other candidates who did not qualify to run for officer positions were in fact permitted to run for Delegate.

National Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Schweiker

550 F. Supp. 357 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 21, 1982

This duty is clearly owed to plaintiffs here, who claim to be eligible for CORF services and payments or qualified as CORFs. … More importantly, by passing section 933, Congress clearly established the right of qualified Medicare subscribers to receive rehabilitative services rendered by qualified CORFs of their own choosing; defendants cannot defeat

Puerto Rico Ex Rel. Secretary of Justice v. Rumsfeld

180 F. Supp. 2d 145 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 2, 2002

the Noise Control Act waives sovereign immunity, the Court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs action. … The subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of law.

Church of Gospel Ministry, Inc. v. United States

640 F. Supp. 96 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 30, 1986

In order to establish that it is qualified for tax-exempt status, CGM has the burden of proving three elements contested by the IRS: (1) that CGM is a corporation operated primarily for religious and/or charitable purposes … Moreover, the amendments clearly provide that improper IRS procedures cannot be advanced as grounds for relief in a declaratory judgment proceeding. 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (e) (setting forth exclusive remedy for violation of procedural

Stoyanov v. Winter

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 6, 2009

Thompson’s declaration that plaintiff would not have been promoted even if he applied, since he was not qualified. (See Defs.’ SJ Mot., Ex. D.) … While plaintiff contests this by claiming that he was the most qualified (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5), it is important to note that plaintiff cannot establish pretext simply based on his own subjective assessment of his own performance

Viropharma Incorporated v. Hamburg

898 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 23, 2012

Therefore, labeling changes approved in an sNDA can qualify for exclusivity under § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv) as well. … As counsel acknowledged, however, “these are patent cases” (id.), where a party that “clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits ‘receives the benefit of a presumption on the [irreparable harm]’ factor,” and

Wiggins v. District Cablevision, Inc.

853 F. Supp. 484 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 13, 1994

Section 1681h(e) of the Act has been interpreted to provide a qualified immunity for consumer reporting agencies except as to false information furnished with malice or with willful intent to injure. Thornton v. … As previously noted, however, defendants are merely users of the information-contained within the consumer report in this case and do not receive the protection of this qualified immunity. 17 .

Cotton v. Adams

798 F. Supp. 22 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 1992

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE RECORDS AT ISSUE WERE COMPILED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES WITHIN THE MEANING OF FOIA EXEMPTION 7(C). … The Defendant has not established that the two documents at issue were compiled for “law enforcement” purposes and therefore cannot claim the broad protections of Exemption 7(C).

Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci

358 F. Supp. 973 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 25, 1973

The President of the United States is not completely immune from judicial process for the sole reason that he is President. Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F.Supp. 790 (E.D.Pa.1972), (dictum); cited with approval in Meyers v. … The National Advisory Council clearly was intended to play a key role in administration of the Act.

Hairston v. District of Columbia

638 F. Supp. 198 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 1986

Membership of the Board is established by the General Order. … Clearly, plaintiff cannot acquire any property interest thereunder.

Boyd v. Browner

897 F. Supp. 590 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 9, 1995

There is nothing in the record indicating that appeals would have been “clearly useless”. See Communications Workers of Amer. v. AT & T, 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C.Cir.1994). … But there is no need to decide that question, because sovereign immunity bars the relief plaintiffs seek.

Hill v. Wilson Smoot

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2018

Therefore, the Privacy Act “inhibits the availability of a Bivens remedy” for the alleged misconduct forming the basis of this action, id., which, in turn, renders consideration of CSO Cecala’s qualified immunity defense … See Liff, 881 F.3d at 924 (“Because we have determined that Liff has no viable Bivens action . . . , we need not consider their qualified-immunity defenses.”) (citation omitted)); see also Armstrong v.

Plummer v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 20, 2018

Defendants argue that Plummer has failed to show a constitutional violation or, alternatively, that the officers enjoy qualified immunity. See Defs.’ Br. at 16-26. … Additionally, Plummer asserts a claim for municipal liability in Count V based on the same underlying constitutional violations, and municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242-43.

Ramirez v. United States Park Police

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 1, 2023

Section 1983 establishes a cause of action against persons who act under the color of state law to deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. … Still, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that venue is proper, see, e.g., Williams v.

Evans v. District of Columbia

391 F. Supp. 2d 160 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 27, 2005

Damron, 457 F.2d 1182, 1184-1186 (10th Cir.1972) (immunity against intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). … The scope of this immunity, however, extends only to conduct "within the legislative sphere.” Id. Councilman Fenty’s public statements during Council meetings clearly are protected by this provision.

Corwyn W. HATTER, Plaintiff, v. WMATA, Defendant

244 F. Supp. 3d 132 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 27, 2017

, he was “otherwise qualified,” and his non-selection gives rise to an inference of discrimination. … and cannot establish a discrimination claim.

Klayman v. Porter

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 29, 2022

Bar has unconstitutionally “‘legislat[ed]’ absolute immunity for itself[,]” Pl.’s 12(b)(1) Opp’n at 13; and (2) the conduct at issue is “clearly outside the scope of any of [the d]efendants’ duties as [ ] ODC prosecutors … City Council[,]” Pl.’s 12(b)(1) Opp’n at 13, by “promulgat[ing] the Bar Rules[, including the granting of absolute immunity,] itself[,]” id. at 12, it is well-established that “the D.C.

Jones v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

946 F. Supp. 1023 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 15, 1996

The burden of establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII can be satisfied by showing that (1) the plaintiff applied for the job, (2) she was qualified for it, (3) she was not selected, … She secured the recommendation of her supervisor and passed the qualifying examination. Another supervisor, Daniel Epps, passed the qualifying examination at the same time. Epps was selected.