Case law

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2023

“Absent a pre-existing agreement with the United States affecting the scope of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign is generally immune, unless one of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions applies.” … If the Court were to allow plaintiffs to later argue that they are not stateless, that would clearly be inconsistent with their current position.

Singletary v. District of Columbia

225 F. Supp. 2d 43 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2002

Defendants clearly intended to relegate plaintiff to this sub-standard office. … Plaintiff argues in an entirely conclusory manner that defendants’ actions are a “violation of clearly established law” that should prompt this Court to impose liability under Section 1983.

Kennedy v. Andrus

459 F. Supp. 240 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 11, 1978

The Privacy Act Guidelines clearly forbid collateral attack in the case of final judicial or quasi-judicial actions and the same considerations would seem to apply to agency personnel actions, such as the reprimand here, … Although plaintiff argues to the contrary, the reference in this provision to civil suits and use of the terms “litigation costs” and “in any case” clearly suggests that court authority to award attorneys’ fees is limited

Hudson v. District of Columbia

517 F. Supp. 2d 40 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 2, 2007

Clayton did not violate a right that was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. Defs.’ Mem. at 23. … Such a right, they submit, was not clearly established at the time of Mr. Clayton’s 2001 arrest. This argument misses the point. The questions whether Officer Merritt could properly arrest Mr.

Washington v. Smith

893 F. Supp. 60 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 28, 1995

Statements are immunized even if a reasonable jury could find that the statements were mischaracterizations. Id. at 316 . C. … Matter of public concern Courts must exercise care in determining what qualifies as a public concern or controversy.

Savage v. Scales

310 F. Supp. 2d 122 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 16, 2004

Comm’n on Adult Entertainment, 12 F.3d 406 , 408 (3d Cir.1993) (“This is clearly a suit against a state agency, and the Commission was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity.”) … This is clearly insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Bason v. Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit

86 B.R. 744 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 5, 1988

Under the second law, a judge seeking reappointment was rated “exceptionally well qualified,” “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “unqualified.” … attained a certain level of performance — that reliance on it is clearly inappropriate.

Afanasieva v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 3, 2022

However, “a defendant claiming sovereign immunity in a motion to dismiss ‘bears the burden of proving’ they qualify for it.” Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, 12 F.4th 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Lewis v. … immunity, WMATA is immune from suit.

Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran

18 F. Supp. 2d 62 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 27, 1998

Iran was immune from suit by these plaintiffs under the FSIA until the enactment of § 1605(a)(7) in 1996. 9 VI. … Those acts of torture and hostage-taking, all clearly actionable as tortious conduct under U.S. law, 10 thus inflicted legally cognizable, profoundly serious, and largely permanent personal injury upon each of the hostages

Robinson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 13, 2023

Plaintiffs can- not sustain their claims for money damages because the government has not waived its sovereign immunity. … guidance, and create a plan to prevent further violative conduct; requesting a declaration that the multiplier is unlawful). 10 these forward-looking forms of relief, none qualifies

United States v. Philip Morris Inc.

304 F. Supp. 2d 60 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 24, 2004

Defendants argued that Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized their earlier litigation strategies. … "Defendants, having been hailed into court in the earlier litigations, were clearly not exercising their right to petition the government.”

Scott v. United States

608 F. Supp. 2d 73 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 17, 2009

As this Court has explained: It is a bedrock principle of American law that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless Congress has expressly waived that immunity. … Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” F.D.I.C. v.

Church of Gospel Ministry, Inc. v. United States

640 F. Supp. 96 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 30, 1986

In order to establish that it is qualified for tax-exempt status, CGM has the burden of proving three elements contested by the IRS: (1) that CGM is a corporation operated primarily for religious and/or charitable purposes … Moreover, the amendments clearly provide that improper IRS procedures cannot be advanced as grounds for relief in a declaratory judgment proceeding. 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (e) (setting forth exclusive remedy for violation of procedural

Pohle v. Supreme Court of the United States Bar

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 28, 2025

Finally, sovereign immunity bars Pohle’s claims in both actions. … Insofar as Pohle in 25- cv-808 seeks damages from the federal government, sovereign immunity forbids him from doing so as the United States has not waived sovereign immunity. See United States v.

Stoyanov v. Winter

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 6, 2009

Thompson’s declaration that plaintiff would not have been promoted even if he applied, since he was not qualified. (See Defs.’ SJ Mot., Ex. D.) … While plaintiff contests this by claiming that he was the most qualified (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5), it is important to note that plaintiff cannot establish pretext simply based on his own subjective assessment of his own performance

Viropharma Incorporated v. Hamburg

898 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 23, 2012

Therefore, labeling changes approved in an sNDA can qualify for exclusivity under § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv) as well. … As counsel acknowledged, however, “these are patent cases” (id.), where a party that “clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits ‘receives the benefit of a presumption on the [irreparable harm]’ factor,” and

Wiggins v. District Cablevision, Inc.

853 F. Supp. 484 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 13, 1994

Section 1681h(e) of the Act has been interpreted to provide a qualified immunity for consumer reporting agencies except as to false information furnished with malice or with willful intent to injure. Thornton v. … As previously noted, however, defendants are merely users of the information-contained within the consumer report in this case and do not receive the protection of this qualified immunity. 17 .

Cotton v. Adams

798 F. Supp. 22 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 1992

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE RECORDS AT ISSUE WERE COMPILED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES WITHIN THE MEANING OF FOIA EXEMPTION 7(C). … The Defendant has not established that the two documents at issue were compiled for “law enforcement” purposes and therefore cannot claim the broad protections of Exemption 7(C).

Doyle v. Brock

632 F. Supp. 256 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 1986

The Standard of Review Unlike many agency decisions relating to enforcement or prosecutorial action, the Secretary of Labor’s decision whether to file suit under section 402 of the LMRDA is not immune from judicial review … The complainant and other candidates who did not qualify to run for officer positions were in fact permitted to run for Delegate.

Hairston v. District of Columbia

638 F. Supp. 198 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 1986

Membership of the Board is established by the General Order. … Clearly, plaintiff cannot acquire any property interest thereunder.