Case law

Silva v. Superior Court

83 Cal. App. 2d 521 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 7, 1948

Davids, supra, in the first of which it was said that a judgment rendered against an administrator “ ‘upon any claim for money against the estate, ’ only establishes the claim in the same manner as if it had been allowed … Clearly it was the duty of the administratrix of the estate of Manuel Silva, deceased, under section 579 of the Probate Code, since there was a deficiency of assets in her hands with which to pay the claims of the judgment

Neeley v. Board of Retirement

36 Cal. App. 3d 815 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 21, 1974

be put back into patrol cars on a permanent basis absent a complete reclassification, they are required to take the same physical examination as safety members, and they are subject to 24-hour emergency call and have to qualify … “I compare and give confirmation on positive print comparison of latents to original sets of fingerprints, to establish identity on both criminal and non-criminal subjects.

San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Roger S.

198 Cal. App. 4th 974 · California Court of Appeal · Aug 29, 2011

D The evidence here is undisputed that Roger qualified as P.A.’s presumed father. Alvaro does not and cannot claim to be P.A.’s presumed father. … The Legislature clearly intended to provide biological fathers with “far [fewer] rights than both mothers and presumed fathers have under California’s statutory system.”

P. W. Stephens, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund

21 Cal. App. 4th 1833 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 28, 1994

(a)), the Legislature has also established it as a state agency with “unique characteristics” and one which is exempt from many of the immunities, requirements, restrictions and procedures applicable generally to state agencies … If applied, they shall clearly be shown separately from the basic Manual rates and the experience modification.” (Italics added.)

Estate of Smith

61 Cal. App. 4th 259 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 3, 1998

“If living” and “if not living” are clearly alternative conditions, not sequential ones. … Nor could the decedent have thought she was creating a trust for the benefit of her spouse by employing language establishing “. . .

Bank of America v. State Board of Equalization

209 Cal. App. 2d 780 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 20, 1962

It also seeks to reach such property where the taxable event of a sales tax, i.e., the sale, occurs outside of this state or where such property is immune from the sales tax because of the commerce clause. … Clearly, the acceptance of this order by the Bank would constitute an acceptance of the depositor’s order, and hence the consummation of a contract of sale.

Clay v. Tryk

177 Cal. App. 3d 119 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 3, 1986

“Shared housing” does not include situations where an established or proven landlord-tenant relationship exists. … This latitude in administering relief was qualified in Mooney v.

Burke v. Superior Court

128 Cal. App. 3d 661 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 9, 1982

Standing is clearly not limited to persons discriminated against. … Having alleged “injury in his business” by reason of discrimination in violation of Business and Professions Code section 16721, petitioners have established standing. 6 General Motors also contends that the existence of

People v. Jones

172 Cal. App. 4th 815 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 25, 2009

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must also establish counsel's performance prejudiced his defense. ( Id. at p. 687.) … First, `"[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.]

Woodall v. Wayne Steffner Productions, Inc.

201 Cal. App. 2d 800 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 27, 1962

Brucato, 122 Cal.App.2d 264 [ 264 P.2d 978 ], cited in Yinnell, supra, develops the point clearly. Speaking through Mr. … In other words, these cases hold, based on the presumed intent of the parties, that such general clauses were never intended to immunize the landlord from responsibility for his acts of affirmative negligence. . . .

Wong v. Dong

California Court of Appeal · Jun 20, 2025

It is also consistent with the one final judgment rule, which requires exceptions to be “ ‘clearly mandated.’ ” (See Doe, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) … Finally, we reject Dong’s argument that, even if the action would otherwise qualify as a SLAPPback, this case is not a SLAPPback because two of the defendants (Zou and Vincit Law) were not parties to the earlier litigation

Genger v. Delsol

56 Cal. App. 4th 1410 · California Court of Appeal · Aug 11, 1997

797 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 908 ] [separate complaint to establish community interest].) … It would similarly result in the nullification of Frank’s clearly stated intent that Marlene be put to an election of her independent rights to all property transferred to the trust.

CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission

43 Cal. App. 3d 306 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 19, 1974

As heretofore noted the Coastal Initiative was patterned closely after the McAteer-Petris Act establishing the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission. … It established a permit system to control the placing of fills or the extraction of submerged materials pending adoption of a comprehensive plan. (Gov. Code, §§ 66601-66604.)

In Re Tricia M.

74 Cal. App. 3d 125 · California Court of Appeal · Oct 18, 1977

They are clearly "persons" within the meaning of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. … Thus the judgment may provide the opportunity for the alleged natural father to qualify as the presumed father under section 7004, subdivision (a)(4).

People v. Godlewski

17 Cal. App. 4th 940 · California Court of Appeal · Aug 5, 1993

Essentially, he argued that the People’s circumstantial evidence case against him did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury disagreed and found him guilty of first degree murder. … The defense sought to cross-examine the accomplice about discussions he had with his attorney prior to the grant of immunity.

In re Moore

California Court of Appeal · Aug 31, 2021

The prosecutor did not provide Packard with immunity for the robbery-homicide and indicated that if the evidence showed Packard “was involved in the actual robbery/homicide” then the “deal . . . would be off.” … Thus, a defendant who was merely the “getaway driver in an armed robbery” that resulted in death did not qualify for the death penalty.

Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank

53 Cal. App. 4th 43 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 27, 1997

“Sham” suits enjoy no constitutional immunity. (See McDonald v. Smith (1985) 472 U.S. 479, 484 [ 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2790-2791 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384, 389 ] [libel case].) … Real Estate Investors clarified earlier cases and set out a two-part test for “shamness”: In order for a suit to qualify as “sham” for antitrust purposes, “First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that

Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc.

209 Cal. App. 4th 62 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 5, 2012

It found that all of Cox’s drivers and all of its trucks were qualified for interstate hauls and that some drivers had been randomly assigned to interstate routes. … The court noted that, in requesting volunteers, Cox made it clear that no driver was immune from being assigned to drive an interstate route.

People v. Arbaugh

82 Cal. App. 2d 971 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 19, 1947

That defendant stated that he had been accused of a lot of things and that “he wanted to get everything straightened out and he couldn’t think clearly in that jail. … The objection referred to in the third instance was properly sustainéd on the ground that the question clearly called for hearsay answers.

People v. Ross

92 Cal. App. 3d 391 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 28, 1979

Defendant’s participation in the brutal beating inflicted by Atkins during the course of the burglary and robbery clearly established his equal culpability for the resulting death due to combined causes. … The prosecution is under no obligation to grant immunity to a particular witness. (People v. Sipress (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 98, 102, fn. 1 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 884 ]; People v.