Case law

Edwards v. Superior Court

16 Cal. 3d 905 · California Supreme Court · May 20, 1976

Shoor was an independent qualified psychiatrist who, in the past, had been appointed by the court to render opinions on psychiatric matters; and that Dr. … Shoor is an independent qualified psychiatrist who has conducted numerous psychiatric examinations by court appointment.

Brown v. Superior Court

33 Cal. 3d 242 · California Supreme Court · Nov 1, 1982

Yet clearly those sections and like laws are valid. … As real party observes, chapter 959 purported to create a new Sixth District of the Court of Appeal having no preexisting justices qualified to perform such representation.

Ramirez v. Brown

9 Cal. 3d 199 · California Supreme Court · Mar 30, 1973

Our alternative writ of mandate directed that respondents “register to vote all ex-felons whose term[s] of incarceration and parole have expired and who upon application demonstrate that they are otherwise fully qualified … At the time of Otsuka , however, the contours of that requirement had not been clearly delineated by the United States Supreme Court. The most recent authority then was Harper v.

In Re Hayes

70 Cal. 2d 604 · California Supreme Court · Mar 17, 1969

That test was not designed to permit multiple sentencing that section 654 clearly forbids but to preclude improper multiplication of sentences when there is at least some arguable question as to the factual divisibility of … Thus if a greater violation is concealed in order to gain "immunity" by prosecution for a lesser crime, section 654 will not apply. (Kellett v.

Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court

3 Cal. 4th 1118 · California Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1992

Clearly, two parties cannot by contract deprive a third party of statutory rights. … The Legislature clearly intended to prevent this.

Jordache Enterprises Inc. v. Brobeck

18 Cal. 4th 739 · California Supreme Court · Jul 30, 1998

The import of the change from “significant” to “actual” injury also is reasonably clear: The Legislature used the term “actual” to focus inquiry on the fact of damage; it omitted other qualifiers, to preclude digressions … With respect to the plaintiff’s proposed date of damage, the court said, “If plaintiff’s action in tort had not earlier accrued, it at least matured on entry of judgment because he clearly then became obligated to pay a considerable

Perdue v. Crocker National Bank

38 Cal. 3d 913 · California Supreme Court · Jul 18, 1985

Plains Cotton Cooperative Assn. (10th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 1249, 1255 [cotton futures]), the market price set by an oligopoly should not be immune from scrutiny. … Thus, Congress clearly anticipated that banks would be able to charge fees for depositor services sufficient to recover the cost of such *943 services.

People v. Aranda

55 Cal. 4th 342 · California Supreme Court · Aug 27, 2012

Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , established that federal constitutional errors are properly subject to review for harmlessness. … By their terms, sections 1096 and 1096a clearly contemplate that a trial court will provide a definition of the term “reasonable doubt” for the jury.

ALFREDO A. v. Superior Court

6 Cal. 4th 1212 · California Supreme Court · Jan 24, 1994

For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from systemic challenges.” (County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 56 [ 114 L.Ed.2d at p. 63 , 111 S.Ct. at p. 1670 ].) … In a word, when the state detains a person for criminal activity, it must establish probable cause.

Pulliam v. HNL Automotive, Inc.

California Supreme Court · May 26, 2022

This “holder in due course rule” meant a creditor could seek payment from a buyer on goods never delivered or not delivered as promised while remaining immune from the buyer’s claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or breach … The FTC clearly anticipated that states implementing NCCF recommendations could and would take actions more protective than the Holder Rule.

People v. Gutierrez

California Supreme Court · Jun 1, 2017

The court did not determine whether defendants established a prima facie case based on gender discrimination. (See People v. … This is important, Your Honor, Gabriel Trevino is going to testify under the immunity agreement in this case.

People v. George T.

16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 · California Supreme Court · Jul 22, 2004

Bose held that a federal appellate court should conduct an independent review of a trier of fact’s determination that a defendant acted with “actual malice” in the context of a defamation suit, rather than rely on the clearly-erroneous … Ambiguity, however, is not necessarily sufficient to immunize the poem from being deemed a criminal threat because the surrounding circumstances may clarify facial ambiguity.

McLane v. Placerville & Sacramento Valley R.R.

66 Cal. 606 · California Supreme Court · Apr 23, 1885

This is so clearly within the province of a court of equity, that we can see no reason to doubt its power, or the regularity of the proceeding. … The law on this subject is so clearly laid down in Renssalaer & Saratoga R. Co. v.

Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck

76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 · California Supreme Court · Jul 30, 1998

The import of the change from “significant” to “actual” injury also is reasonably clear: The Legislature used the term “actual” to focus inquiry on the fact of damage; it omitted other qualifiers, to preclude digressions … With respect to the plaintiff’s proposed date of damage, the court said, “If plaintiff’s action in tort had not earlier accrued, it at least matured on entry of judgment because he clearly then became obligated to pay a considerable

Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc.

California Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2021

In this action, Pollock alleges that Tri-Modal and Kelso denied her a series of promotions even though she was the most qualified candidate, and that her refusal to have sex with Kelso was a substantial factor motivating … Code of Civil Procedure section 1034, subdivision (b) charges the Judicial Council with establishing “allowable costs on appeal and the procedure for claiming those costs.”

People v. Yates

34 Cal. 3d 644 · California Supreme Court · Sep 8, 1983

The statutory purpose was and is to permit more peremptory challenges in more serious cases, and the goal in construing the statute was to find a suitable line to distinguish the cases qualifying for such additional protection … Clearly, no individual who waived his right to trial will have preserved for appeal the issue of the right to 26 peremptory challenges.

People v. Martinez

11 Cal. 4th 434 · California Supreme Court · Nov 2, 1995

The courts have established in a long unbroken line of cases that the crime occurs whenever the trier of fact determines, based on all the circumstances, that an underage child was “touched” with the requisite sexual intent … In particular, other felony sex offenses prohibit the commission of certain clearly specified acts against nonconsenting victims of any age.

People v. Duong

267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 · California Supreme Court · Aug 10, 2020

Chen testified under a grant of use immunity. Defendant told Chen he supported himself through gambling and armed 6  PEOPLE v. … ‘A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.’ (Evid.

County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold

3 Cal. 2d 192 · California Supreme Court · Apr 17, 1935

Childs, supra, to compare the two statutes in order that it may clearly appear wherein the 1933 act purports to eliminate the infirmities of the 1931 act. … An election is *198 then called and the vote of a majority of qualified electors of the district is sufficient to authorize the refunding.

In re Vicks

56 Cal. 4th 274 · California Supreme Court · Mar 4, 2013

With respect to the concern that discretion would not be exercised during the longer period between hearings, the court noted that “[t]he law changing the frequency of parole reviews is qualified in two important respects … Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 46 [ 111 L.Ed.2d 30 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 ] [“by simply labeling a law ‘procedural,’ a legislature does not thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause”]; Rosenkrantz, supra,