Case law

Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard

39 Cal. 3d 256 · California Supreme Court · Aug 1, 1985

Rptr. 860 ].) (4) The standard of judicial review with respect to economic regulation has been clearly established: "[L]egislation regulating prices or otherwise restricting contractual or property rights is within the police … After today's decision, it should be clear that where protected [Fourteenth] Amendment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no such `talismanic immunity from constitutional challenge.'

In Re Podesto

15 Cal. 3d 921 · California Supreme Court · Jan 27, 1976

I, § 6) and recognized that the constitutional provision, by its own terms, was clearly intended to apply only to preconviction bail. … In 1872, this provision was incorporated into the newly established Penal Code as section 1272.

Mueller v. Elba Oil Co.

21 Cal. 2d 188 · California Supreme Court · Nov 2, 1942

(In due course trustee was regularly elected, appointed, and qualified.) April 4, 1938 Trustee filed petition for marshaling assets of partners. … Such offer clearly stated the conditions on which it was made.

County of Los Angeles v. Faus

48 Cal. 2d 672 · California Supreme Court · Jun 21, 1957

Under these circumstances, the prior sales here were clearly distinguishable from the prior sales in the Cole case. … The novelty of the judicial technique adopted by the majority is more clearly illustrated by the second portion of the majority opinion.

People v. Reed

45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353 · California Supreme Court · Jul 3, 2006

"To immunize" defendant from conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm simply because the felony conviction was alleged as to each of the weapons offenses "would be irrational and would frustrate the strong legislative … 607 , held that the defendant could not be convicted of both possessing heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11500) and transporting a narcotic (Health & Saf.Code, § 11501): "The possession and transportation in the instant case clearly

People v. Wilson

25 Cal. 2d 341 · California Supreme Court · Dec 1, 1944

If the verdict can legally be based on the testimony of the three witnesses, it is clearly supported by the evidence. Defendant contends, however, that the testimony of Mrs. … Fenno, 134 Mass. 217 ; see 1 C.J.S. 338), and it need not establish the precise facts testified to by the witness whose testimony it supports. (People v. Negra, supra; People v.

People v. Drew

22 Cal. 3d 333 · California Supreme Court · Sep 26, 1978

In response to two of the questions propounded the judges stated that “to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing the act, the parly accused was labouring … “[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to

Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.

28 Cal. 3d 807 · California Supreme Court · Feb 5, 1981

As the Cross & Brown case indicates, an entity or body which by its nature is incapable of “deciding” on the basis of what it has “heard”—as, in that case, one of the principal parties to the contract—does not qualify. … The answer to this question, we have concluded, must clearly be yes.

People v. Fierro

1 Cal. 4th 173 · California Supreme Court · Dec 26, 1991

Thus, the prosecutor’s reference to Detective Moore’s testimony was simply to establish that defendant frequented the area of the crime scene prior to the murder. … And the answer to that clearly in my mind is yes. We see a pattern of escalating violence.” These remarks were not improper.

Cummiskey v. Superior Court

3 Cal. 4th 1018 · California Supreme Court · Nov 23, 1992

Was [Dana Out-land] given immunity from a charge of being a principle or accessory? “Mr Steed: I think we have to do this. I think I am going to have to talk to you some more here about the law. … An indictment should not be set aside when, as here, it is based on sufficient evidence establishing probable cause.

Estate of Black

30 Cal. 3d 880 · California Supreme Court · Mar 1, 1982

In retrospect, that instrument was quite clearly valid under the precedents discussed herein. … As stated above, we are to read the decedent's will as he wrote it and not as we would write it in order to cause it to comply with established legal principles."

Sundance v. Municipal Court

42 Cal. 3d 1101 · California Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1986

When police reports are used to establish probable cause, the report must establish a factual basis for each element of the offense. … Therefore, they are unable to post bail or qualify for OR release.

Rodgers v. State Bar

48 Cal. 3d 300 · California Supreme Court · Mar 16, 1989

After finding these facts, the referee concluded that as a result of his conduct Rodgers violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Business and Professions Code by accepting employment for which he was not qualified … Moreover, he clearly benefited from these transactions: he received most of the proceeds of one loan to cover Panky’s legal expenses.

Swoap v. Superior Court

10 Cal. 3d 490 · California Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1973

Rather we concluded that under the particular facts of that case Boss, the adult son, had no duty under Civil Code section 206 to support his mother since although “in need” and therefore qualified for aid to the aged, she … established shall not exceed the amounts in the schedule specified in this section.

Estate of Horman

5 Cal. 3d 62 · California Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1971

At trial it was the state's position that the survivors had not sufficiently established their relationship to the decedent. … In so holding, the trial court was clearly correct.

People v. Turner

8 Cal. 4th 137 · California Supreme Court · Aug 15, 1994

As we delineate below, the record clearly established specific non-race-related reasons why a prosecutor might want to excuse the challenged prospective jurors. (People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1092 .) … In addition, defendant notes that the trial court stated that “[t]he evidence clearly and beyond any reasonable doubt established the defendant was not under duress nor was he under any domination of his crime partner or

Commercial Life Insurance v. Superior Court

47 Cal. 3d 473 · California Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1988

The act protects interstate commerce and the participants of employee benefit plans by requiring disclosure to participants, establishing standards of conduct and fiduciary duties, and providing for remedies, sanctions, and … The breadth of the preemption clause is qualified, however, by the “saving clause,” which provides in pertinent part: “[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State

In Re Barnett

3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108 · California Supreme Court · Aug 7, 2003

Nonetheless, the long-standing practice of this court is to appoint qualified counsel to work on behalf of an indigent inmate in the investigation and preparation of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that challenges … counsel—a principle we have recognized in the context of both capital trials and appeals, and in noncapital habeas corpus proceedings as well. 9 Restricting pro se submissions by represented inmates also is consistent with the established

People v. Avila

43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 · California Supreme Court · May 15, 2006

Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 5 P.3d 68 ] [the party seeking severance has the burden to clearly establish there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that charges be separately tried].) … The court clearly recognized its obligation to comply with section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. All Parties & Persons

47 Cal. 2d 597 · California Supreme Court · Jan 24, 1957

Moreover, section 22250 is a general provision governing the distribution of irrigation water by districts, and it is obviously qualified by the more recent provisions in sections 23197 and 23200 which relate specifically … The 160-acre water limitation is clearly part of a “system of regulation” for federal projects within the meaning of the language quoted above from Nebraska v.