Case law

National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board

717 F.3d 947 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 7, 2013

Our doubt stems, in part, from a comparison of § 8(c) with the law established under the First Amendment. We approach the question by considering some firmly established principles of First Amendment free-speech law. … Subpart A clearly is not severable. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., General Motors Corporation, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Intervenors. General Motors Corporation v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., Intervenors. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Intervenor. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Automobiles Peugeot, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Intervenors

655 F.2d 318 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 22, 1981

These provisions are supplemented and qualified by various specific provisions relating to particular classes of vehicles or pollutants. … We cannot agree with the NRDC's contention that the EPA's determination that the effect was de minimis was "clearly erroneous," Brief for Petitioner NRDC at 59 n.93 (hereinafter cited as NRDC Brief). 110 The EPA's public

United States v. J.C. Herbert Bryant, Jr.

117 F.3d 1464 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 15, 1997

He could not "remember clearly" how long he was outside before the police arrived, could not "recall exactly" what the placard said, could not "recall exactly" whether Bryant made statements about people he knew in law enforcement … Excerpt from 10/16/94 Trial Tr. 9 7 Bryant does not dispute that police forbearance from arresting him qualifies as a "thing of value" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 912 .

Boumediene, Lakhdar v. Bush, George

476 F.3d 981 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 20, 2007

These cases do not establish anything regarding the sort of de facto sovereignty the detainees say exists at Guantanamo. … Cyr, without comment, and omitting the qualifier “at the absolute minimum.” See Op. at 14.  12 1.

Gilbert v. Wilson

292 F. Supp. 3d 426 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 27, 2018

. § 1552(a)(1), and is authorized to establish procedures governing such corrections, id. § 1552(a)(3)(A). … The plaintiffs are correct that they did not qualify for the Berkley class and thus would not have received formal notice of their ability to join that class action. See Pls.'

Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

765 F.2d 1155 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 5, 1985

The Commission replies that a utility may ordinarily recover the costs of natural gas production projects only if the projects are “used and useful” in serving the public and the project costs consequently qualify for inclusion … Specifically, Natural argues that the Commission established its rate of return without considering this risk.

Federal Education Association v. Donald Trump

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 25, 2025

Because record evidence supports the district court’s presumption-of-regularity findings, they are unlikely to be clearly erroneous. See Gov’t of Guam v. … The Executive Order’s breadth makes it “hard to imagine a type of [agency or subdivision] that would not qualify.” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 425 (2015).

Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. United States

571 F.2d 1190 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 19, 1977

The Commission order here clearly did not so provide. … The facts regarding the Southern Control II decision which clearly distinguish it from this case have been dealt with already.

General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation v. William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation v. William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, General Motors Corporation, a Delaware Corporation v. William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency

724 F.2d 979 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 16, 1983

But, by the EPA's own admission, that manipulation would not remedy a nonconformity as the statutory language clearly contemplates. C. … The EPA's interpretative rule, both on its face and as subsequently qualified by the agency, is clearly inconsistent with the statute.

Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc v. Kathleen Sebelius

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 2, 2010

tentative approval), the date that is 75 days after the date as of which, as to each of the patents with respect to which the first applicant submitted and lawfully maintained a certification qualifying … In this instance, the latter two elements are clearly satisfied. Any imminent deprivation of Teva’s allegedly deserved exclusivity would be directly attributable to the FDA’s statutory interpretation.

Edison Electric Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

849 F.2d 611 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 7, 1988

Section 1926.432(a) provides that equipment that may deteriorate when used under certain conditions be “identified for use in such conditions.” 14 “Identified for use” means tested and approved for that use by a qualified … When the Preamble to the revised standard is read as a whole, this is clearly so.

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

671 F.2d 643 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 26, 1982

The House version of the Act, H.R. 19200, clearly limited the right to seek judicial review to employers and the Secretary. Legislative History, 1192. … It was established to settle disputes between employers and the Secretary of Labor over citations issued by the Secretary's inspectors.

Williams Natural Gas Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, Amoco Production Company, Southern California Gas Company, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company and Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Independent Oil and Gas Association of Pennsylvania, Union Pacific Resources Company, Arco Oil and Gas Company, Division of Atlantic Richfield Company, Texaco, Inc., Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company and Pennzoil Gas Marketing Company, Enserch Exploration, Inc., National Association of Gas Consumers, Intervenors. Arco Oil and Gas Company, Division of Atlantic Richfield Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Williams Natural Gas Company, Independent Oil and Gas Association of West Virginia and Pennsylvania Natural Gas Association, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company and Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Intervenors

943 F.2d 1320 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 6, 1991

Hence, our decision in Williams I established only--and could establish only--that the orders under review were not self-evidently justified. … Sparse guidelines incorporated in the statutory mandate established only the broad parameters of regulation.

Mary Kate Siegel, Personal Representative of the Estate of Steven Alan Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corporation. Mary Kate Siegel, Personal Representative of the Estate of Steven Alan Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corporation

878 F.2d 435 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 3, 1989

Richard Sanderson, a defense expert qualified as to both power steering and accident reconstruction, stated that these marks were consistent with either a sharp right turn or a sideways slide of the car. 17 George Barse, … There is no requirement that a single piece of evidence must establish by itself that a defect more likely than not caused the accident. See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C.1986).

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission

671 F.2d 643 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 26, 1982

The House version of the Act, H.R. 19200, clearly limited the right to seek judicial review to employers and the Secretary. Legislative History, 1192. … It was established to settle disputes between employers and the Secretary of Labor over citations issued by the Secretary’s inspectors.

Baker & Hostetler LLP v. United States Department of Commerce

473 F.3d 312 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 22, 2006

We must accept the District Court’s factual descriptions of the contents of the letters unless the descriptions are clearly erroneous. See Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 275, 277 (D.C.Cir. 2005). … And it is not at all clear whether any portion of meeting notes would qualify as a “summary of the matters discussed” as contemplated by the Tariff Act.

Household Goods Carriers' Bureau and Movers' & Warehousemen's Association of America, Inc., on Behalf of Their Members v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, National Industrial Traffic League, Intervenor. Movers Round Table v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, National Industrial Traffic League, Intervenor

584 F.2d 437 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 27, 1978

This is clearly wrong and beyond the 83 authority of the Commission. I. … broad common law responsibilities and supplanting them with contractual responsibilities of a more limited scope. 87 Thus, a limitation on liability was a stipulation which became part of the carriage contract and which qualified

City of Willcox and Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, San Diego Gas & Electric Co., American Smelting and Refining Co., Southern Union Gas Co., General Motors Corporation, El Paso Natural Gas Co., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, Department of Water and Power, Etc., the People of the State of California, Etc., Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Nevada Power Company, Southwest Gas Corporation, Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Arizona Fuel Users Association, Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors. Arizona Public Service Company v. Federal Power Commission, San Diego Gas & Electric Co., City of Willcox, Arizona and Arizona Electric Power Coop., Inc., American Smelting and Refining Co., Southern Union Gas Co., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, General Motors Corporation, Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Southern California Edison Co., El Paso Natural Gas Co., People of the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Nevada Power Company, Southern California Gas Co., Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Southwest Gas Corporation, Arizona Fuel Users Asso., Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors. Nevada Power Company v. Federal Power Commission, American Smelting & Refining Co, General Motors Corp., Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Southern California Gas Co., San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Pacific Gas & Electric Co., City of Willcox Arizona and Arizona Electric Power Coop., Inc., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, People of the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, El Paso Natural Gas Co., Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southwest Gas Corp., Southern Union Gas Co., Southern California Edison Co., Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Arizona Fuel Users Asso., Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors. Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Federal Power Commission, Southern Union Gas Co., City of Willcox Arizona, Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, American Smelting and Refining Co., Southwest Gas Corp., the People of the State of California, El Paso Natural Gas Co., General Motors Corporation, Southern California Edison Company, Arizona Public Service Co., Nevada Power Co., Tucson Gas and Electric Co., Intervenors. San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. Federal Power Commission, Southern Union Gas Co., City of Willcox, Etc., People of the State of California, General Motors Corporation, Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, El Paso Natural Gas Co., Southwest Gas Corp., Southern California Edison Co., Nevada Power Company, American Smelting and Refining Co., Arizona Public Service Co., Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Arizona Fuel Users Association, Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors. Southern California Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, San Diego Gas, Southern Union Gas Co., City of Willcox, Etc., Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, the People of the State of California, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, El Paso Natural Gas Co., General Motors Corporation, Southern California Edison Co., American Smelting and Refining Co., Arizona Public Service Co., Southwest Gas Corp., Nevada Power Company, Tucson Gas & Electric Co., Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Arizona Fuel Users Asso., Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors. Southern California Edison Company v. Federal Power Commission, Nevada Power Co., El Paso Natural Gas Co., the People of the State of California, San Diego Gas and Electric Co., American Smelting and Refining Co., Navajo Tribal Utility Authority, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Tucson Gas and Electric Co., Southwest Natural Gas Consumers, Arizona Fuel Users Association, Pioneer Natural Gas Co., Intervenors

567 F.2d 394 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 9, 1978

Solutions to both of these causal factors are clearly outside the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction." … To all this we add a qualifying note. Any reasonable person will recognize that a meaningful and final EIS cannot be prepared on all aspects of any plan until the full details of that plan are known.

United States v. Ricardo Epps

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 12, 2013

At least two courts of appeals clearly regard the enhanced prospects for a reduced term of supervised release under § 3583 as adequate to hold non-moot a released prisoner’s claim to a lesser period of incarceration: the … between the reasoning of the plurality and concurring opinions in the Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman to discern a narrower opinion that constitutes binding precedent, see King, 950 F.2d at 771 (interpreting Marks), Epps qualifies

Center For Auto Safety v. Lee M. Thomas

847 F.2d 843 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 17, 1988

MHDC would still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject to some extent to similar uncertainties. … There, indigents and organizations representing indigents challenged an IRS ruling that relaxed the requirement that hospitals serve persons unable to pay in order to qualify as charitable organizations.