Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
6,967 results
0.48s
488 F.2d 1285 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 21, 1973
Block, Miller’s attorney, clearly manifests that after Melnick and Robinson defaulted on their notes, Block’s demands on Wolman and Ammerman were premised on their guaranty (the Consent Agreements). … It is our conclusion that pursuant to Maryland law, the defense of usury is available to Ammerman as a guarantor, and has been established.
Cited 13 timesPublishedCobell, Elouise v. Norton, Gale
392 F.3d 461 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 10, 2004
Section 5 of the Dawes Act nominally made the United States trustee of those lands, but did so solely in order to limit alienation by Indians and to assure immunity of the lands from state taxation. See United States v. … But the Court also said that an appellate court must apply any law enacted after the judgment under review and clearly intended to have retroactive effect. See id. at 226.
Cited 31 timesPublished843 F.2d 1473 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 12, 1988
the Executive Branch, we do not see how the incumbent President’s responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed can properly be transferred to the Judiciary. 8 The Archivist may well not be particularly qualified … Clearly in Freeman we saw no constitutional anomaly in the prospect of the Archivist rejecting a challenge by Mr. Nixon based on executive privilege. III.
Cited 17 timesPublished940 F.3d 1 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 1, 2019
In re Establishment of a Funding Mechanism for Interstate Operator Servs. for the Deaf, 11 FCC Rcd. 6808, 6816–6817 ¶ 16 (1996) (“Operator Services Order”). Which services qualify as adjunct-to-basic? … But those purposive qualifiers are nowhere to be found in the statutory text.
Cited 44 timesPublishedPetchem, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission
853 F.2d 958 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 9, 1988
The Act clearly contemplates the existence of permissible preferences or prejudices. The analogues in the 1984 Act contain similar modifying adjectives, see 46 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1709(b)(11)-(12) & (d)(1) (Supp. … As Petchem grows in experience, there is no reason to believe the company may not in time qualify to be among the bidders.
Cited 0 timesPublished481 F.2d 543 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 29, 1973
In light of these established principles it is clear that DNC was not entitled automatically to any right to reply. … At times the President speaks to crucial problems to which other groups are far more qualified to speak.
Cited 2 timesPublishedCtr Auto Sfty v. Natl Hwy Traf Sfty
452 F.3d 798 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 23, 2006
Cir. 1985) (“The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the Administrative Procedure Act itself, although it does not create subject-matter jurisdiction, Califano v. … But de facto compliance is not enough to establish that the guidelines have had legal consequences.
Cited 1 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 20, 2002
This argument fails, because the cited provisions do not establish what parties qualify as "attaching entities" for pur- poses of apportioning costs under s 224(e)(2). … In sum, the agency's interpretation of s 224(e)(2) is clearly a permissible interpretation of the stat- ute to which we must defer.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAmerican Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA
99 F.4th 585 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 23, 2024
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), we conclude that none of the errors asserted here qualifies.” 842 F.2d at 490. 11 By that, Griffith could not have meant that Kyne creates jurisdiction where … Kyne establishes district court jurisdiction to review FLRA arbitration decisions because § 7123 does not “expressly” preclude it.
Cited 0 timesPublished673 F.2d 486 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 9, 1982
We must begin by admitting that the plain language of section 3307(d) is not clearly inconsistent with the ADEA. … In order to qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification, it is generally established that a maximum age entry rule would have to meet a two pronged test: (1) that the rule is “reasonably necessary” to the essence of
Cited 0 timesPublishedDomtar Maine Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
347 F.3d 304 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 28, 2003
No. 64–234, 39 Stat. 534 (1916), and thus qualify for the exception to the FPA’s licensing requirement. … This is so because a party could almost never move to intervene, have the motion granted, and then petition for rehearing all within the thirty- day window established for the filing of rehearing petitions. See id.
Cited 9 timesPublishedEnvironmental Action, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
939 F.2d 1057 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 2, 1991
Put otherwise, the PURPA establishes a specific public interest in encouraging QFs by giving them certain rights. … transmission needs--tends only to corroborate the Commission's forecast of a competitive market in excess non-firm transmission capacity. 36 Even if the parties' predictions regarding the emergence of a non-firm market were more clearly
Cited 0 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 1, 2007
“Of the records plaintiff sought in the supplemental complaint, the FDIC has established that the 1991 [FDIC] Report of Apparent Crime in which Mr. … We therefore agree with the district court that the 1992 Memo qualified for protection in its entirety as attorney work-product because it contains facts “integral to the legal analyses and discussions of investigation strategy
Cited 0 timesPublishedVolkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission
371 F.2d 747 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 22, 1966
Petitioner argues that, giving the statutory language its plain meaning and a reasonable interpretation, the PMA agreements clearly serve to bring about all of these proscribed consequences. … Petitioner, however, is not able to point to any direct testimony establishing that such an agreement was made.
Cited 5 timesPublished79 F.3d 1187 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 29, 1996
But this language merely establishes electrical interference as the primary criterion to be considered — not the only criterion. … This provision clearly affects the FCC’s ABC 1972 holding that the presence of a domestic competitor willing to serve as a network affiliate weighs against granting a permit to a foreign station.
Cited 1 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 19, 2018
We also reject the ALJ and Board’s alternative finding that even if she did lie, it was within the context of an inquiry into protected activity, and therefore immune. I. … Since she had been clearly reminded at the outset of each interview of the provision in its Code of Conduct requiring honesty during investigations, Verizon decided, in mid-June, to terminate Eshareturi.
Cited 0 timesPublished275 F.2d 632 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 10, 1959
The Board said in that connection: '* * * it is necessary to establish a framework in which all major southern transcontinental service issues as a whole can be determined for the foreseeable future.' … The Board recited that there is no mutual exclusivity, but the quotations hardly qualify as 'findings'.
Cited 14 timesPublishedJane Doe 2 v. Patrick Shanahan
917 F.3d 694 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 8, 2019
The concurrence cites no case that has adopted the astounding rule that the government is immune from all discovery explaining the operation and purpose of its military policies. … (B) Gender dysphoria was clearly a bar to military service (at least as clearly as one can say, given changes in nomenclature).
Cited 12 timesPublishedAeronautical Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
642 F.2d 1221 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 24, 1980
A prime objective was to establish market rules for established and emerging carriers. 13 And the agency was at pains to avoid placing a “protective umbrella” over new carriers. 61 F.C.C.2d at 615-19. … This treatment cannot qualify as reasoned decisionmaking. AT&T has pointed to certain record evidence, none of which is mentioned or discussed by the Commission, which substantiates its position.
Cited 7 timesPublished
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