Case law

Smith v. Nixon

606 F.2d 1183 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 12, 1979

This question, like the immunity for the other federal officials sued by the Smiths, is controlled by our Halperin opinion, which outlines the qualified immunity that applies to Executive acts taken in the course of duty. … a qualified immunity defense.

Michael E. Hubbard v. Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Michael E. Hubbard v. Environmental Protection Agency

982 F.2d 531 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 27, 1992

The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it.”). … We do not dispute that § 702 waived sovereign immunity for specific monetary relief; rather, we find that back pay does not qualify as such. . In a few cases, back pay has been referred to as "specific relief.”

Malla Pollack v. Thomas Hogan

703 F.3d 117 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 14, 2012

Cir.  5 1984) (noting that it “is well-established that sovereign immunity does not bar suits for specific relief against government officials where the challenged actions of the officials … Larson also noted that “there can be no question that dismissal of a suit in which ‘the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be . . . made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction

United States v. Derrek Arrington

4 F.4th 162 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 13, 2021

It does not turn on the case’s precise holding or, as AEDPA does elsewhere, the content of “clearly established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). … established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” and whether a state court decision “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”

Cherry v. Dist. of Columbia

330 F. Supp. 3d 216 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 7, 2018

We believe the actions at issue were clearly ministerial and operational .... In the District of Columbia, both official and governmental immunity depend on the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy. … No doubt some of these duties should be regarded as discretionary for the purposes of official immunity, but others are clearly ministerial for that purpose.").

Thomas F. Donofrio v. William B. Camp

470 F.2d 428 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 18, 1972

Upon a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits, the opposing party cannot rest merely on his pleadings to establish a genuine issue of fact. … Finally, appellee’s affidavits establish a prima facie case that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Charles Turpin v. DC

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 1, 2025

Qualified immunity “immunizes government officials from damages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearly established right,” Tolan v. … Supp. 90, 92 (D.D.C. 1961), but a single district court decision does not itself set forth clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity, see Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 976 (D.C.

Maurice E. Baker v. Central Intelligence Agency

580 F.2d 664 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 24, 1978

by section 403g clearly encompasses the materials included in the appellants’ FOIA request. … Janney has clearly identified and itemized the documents withheld.

Vietnam Veterans of America v. McNamara

201 F. App'x 779 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 22, 2006

’ alleged misconduct so that it could decide whether the officials were entitled to qualified immunity for such conduct. … immunity.

Jackson v. Lynn

506 F.2d 233 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 17, 1974

District court jurisdiction over the damage claim, subject however to possible sovereign immunity bar, exists under 28 U.S. … So plaintiffs must establish that a private right to recover from the United States is properly implied. Appellants rely specifically on no more than brief comments of Mr.

Gavin v. Dep't of the Air Force

314 F. Supp. 3d 297 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 15, 2018

She did not clearly assert any particular cause of action, but did request relief under the Tucker Act. See id. at 3. … Similarly, while Congress can sometimes require a state to waive sovereign immunity as a condition tied to grants of federal *304 funds, Congress must express that condition clearly. See Barbour v.

Sierra Club v. Andrew Wheeler

956 F.3d 612 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 17, 2020

Initially, the CAA requires the Administrator to, inter alia, establish emission guidelines for existing incinerators. CAA § 129(b)(1). … Accordingly, it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the CAA because the duty in question failed to qualify for § 304's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity. Sierra Club, 330 F.

National Association of Counties v. James A. Baker, Iii, Secretary of the Treasury

842 F.2d 369 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 11, 1988

Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir.1987) (“in the ‘murky’ area of Tucker Act jurisprudence ... one of the few clearly established principles is that the substance of the pleadings must prevail over their form”), pet. for cert … If the APA were construed to preclude the local governments from invoking its waiver of sovereign immunity then the action of the Secretary would be immune from judicial review.

James E. Brown v. Secretary of the Army. Wellington Mitchell v. Secretary of Commerce

918 F.2d 214 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 9, 1990

The government principally argues in this court that successful Title VII claimants in the federal sector simply do not qualify for prejudgment interest because (1) Title VII itself does not contain the requisite sovereign … immunity waiver, and (2) the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 , which does contain an immunity waiver encompassing interest, does not complement Title VII relief.

Singletary v. District of Columbia

351 F.3d 519 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 16, 2003

The district court has yet to consider either the merits of Singletary’s claim or the individual defendants’ defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. … Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that ‘‘government officials per- forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

Horton v. Espindola

319 F. Supp. 3d 395 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 8, 2018

United qualifies as an "employer" under the WCA and is thus immune from suit. … United does qualify as a special employer, it must have contributed to the purchase of workers' compensation insurance to enjoy immunity. See D.C.

Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran

646 F.3d 56 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 15, 2011

In Roeder’s last action against Iran for damages, we held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. … With respect to whether Roeder’s current suit qualifies as a related action, § 1083(c)(3) is unclear. Section 1083(c)(3) refers to “an action” that “has been timely commenced” under the FSIA’s prior terrorism exception.

Stella Calomeris, Administratrix of the Estate of Harry Calomeris v. District of Columbia

226 F.2d 266 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 21, 1955

Care for the indigent sick is clearly a governmental function. … Thus the function of the Hospital is clearly established.

Beebe v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

129 F.3d 1283 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 28, 1997

The Compact confers broad powers on WMATA to "[c]reate and abolish offices, employments and positions ... provide for the qualifi- cation, appointment, [and] removal ... of its ... employees, [and][e]stablish, in its discretion … Although Westfall places the burden of establishing immu- nity on the official, Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299, Beebe has failed even to allege that Bearinger and Kumar acted outside the scope of their official duties, Westfall's

May v. United States

175 F.2d 994 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 24, 1949

It is established that the constitutional privilege must be asserted before an immunity is established. … So he had no immunity.