Singletary v. District of Columbia

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2003 Decided December 16, 2003

No. 02-7138

WILLIE TROY SINGLETARY,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00419)

Barbara Kraft argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Corporation Coun-

sel, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief

was Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel at the

time the brief was filed. Edward E. Schwab, Assistant

Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

2

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: At issue on this appeal are plain-

tiff Willie Troy Singletary’s allegations of employment dis-

crimination and retaliation by the Rehabilitation Services

Administration (RSA), a District of Columbia agency, and two

of its officials. We conclude that the district court erred in

rejecting three of Singletary’s claims, and therefore affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I

Plaintiff Singletary, an albino African–American male who

is legally blind, was hired by RSA on October 4, 1971.

Singletary v. District of Columbia, 225 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50–55

(D.D.C. 2002).1 RSA is an agency within the District of

Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) that pro-

vides job training and placement for persons with disabilities.

From 1972 to December 1987, Singletary worked as a voca-

tional rehabilitation specialist, a job that required him to

place disabled individuals — particularly blind and visually

impaired persons — in jobs with local employers. Id. at 50.

In March 1986, Singletary applied for a supervisor position

in RSA’s Visual Impairment Section, a job for which he was

rated as highly qualified and that paid a higher salary. After

RSA failed to select him for the position, Singletary filed an

internal discrimination complaint with DHS. DHS rejected

Singletary’s complaint on March 5, 1987. Singletary then

filed a discrimination complaint with the D.C. Office of Hu-

man Rights (OHR); OHR denied Singletary’s complaint as

well. On October 28, 1987, however, the plaintiff filed an

appeal with the Office of the City Administrator that led to a

partial victory: Two months later, the City Administrator

concluded that DHS had discriminated against Singletary in

denying him an opportunity to serve as an acting supervisor,

1 The facts described in this Part are taken primarily from the

findings of fact made by the district court.

3

ordered DHS to ‘‘cease and desist from further discriminato-

ry conduct against the Complainant,’’ and remanded Single-

tary’s complaint to OHR for additional investigation regard-

ing his March 1986 non-selection for the supervisor position.

Id. at 51.

On November 17, 1987, three weeks after Singletary filed

his appeal with the City Administrator, defendant Katherine

Williams transferred the plaintiff and sixteen other employees

to RSA’s Vending Facility Program. Unlike the other trans-

ferees, who were given regular offices, Singletary was as-

signed to work in a storage room. The district court de-

scribed the plaintiff’s workspace as follows:

The storage room was dirty, dusty and without heat,

ventilation or adequate lighting. Access to the storage

room was through a clinic to which plaintiff did not have

keys. As a result, he could not enter the room at will,

and he and colleagues visiting him in the room risked

being locked in the room. The phone in the room often

did not work, and plaintiff’s colleagues often could not

get hold of him. No other employee used the storage

room as an office space before defendants assigned the

room to plaintiff. None of the other employees assigned

to the Vending Facility Program at that time were placed

in workplaces similar to plaintiff’s officeTTTT RSA had

vacant offices available in the same buildingTTTT

Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted). Singletary was not given a

regular office until 1990. Id. at 51.

Despite his repeated requests, during the six years he

worked in the Vending Facility Program ‘‘plaintiff had no

position description and no official job duties.’’ Id. at 54.

Without an official job description, ‘‘it was possible that in the

event of on-the-job injury or death, compensation from the

D.C. Government might not be available.’’ Id. During the

same period, the ‘‘plaintiff received no annual reviews except

for a ‘non-review’ in 1992 and a ‘satisfactory’ in 1993.’’ Id.

The non-review stated that, ‘‘because there is no job descrip-

tion, there is nothing to evaluate this employee on.’’ Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

4

In October 1989, the position of acting supervisor in the

Visual Impairment Section again became available. Single-

tary applied for, and was again denied, the position. On May

15, 1990, he filed a second discrimination complaint with

OHR, alleging that this most recent non-promotion was in

retaliation for his 1987 OHR complaint. Nine days later —

on a separate appeal from the remand of the 1987 com-

plaint — the City Administrator found there was probable

cause to believe that RSA’s failure to select Singletary for the

supervisor position in 1986 was discriminatory. The Adminis-

trator ordered RSA to give Singletary priority consideration

for the next available position for which he was qualified. Id.

at 52.

In January 1991, RSA posted five supervisory vacancies,

including one in the Visual Impairment Section. The selec-

tion process for these positions took place during April–May

1991. Although he interviewed for all of the positions, Single-

tary was not chosen for any. Id. at 53, 63.

OHR closed Singletary’s discrimination case in August

1991. A few weeks later, Singletary appealed the closure to

the City Administrator. On March 5, 1993, Singletary’s

counsel wrote a letter to the City Administrator to inquire

about the status of his appeal. The Administrator responded

that Singletary did not have grounds for appeal because

OHR’s closing of the case was not a final decision. Single-

tary’s counsel sent a second letter seeking reconsideration,

which the City Administrator denied on April 21, 1993. In

the denial letter, the City Administrator erroneously advised

that Singletary had a right to appeal to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 54. On May 21, 1993,

Singletary filed an appeal with that court. Pl.’s Ex. 133.2

In June 1993, Singletary applied for another acting supervi-

sor position, this time within RSA’s Client Services Division.

Again, he was not selected. Then, in August 1993, defendant

Ruth Royal Hill transferred Singletary out of the Vending

Facility Program and into the Marketing and Placement Unit,

2 Singletary later withdrew that appeal after being advised that

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over

his claim. See Appellant’s Br. at 13.

5

where he returned to the placement work that he had per-

formed at the beginning of his tenure at RSA. Shortly after

returning to the Placement Unit, Singletary requested cleri-

cal help, a computer, and computer training as an accommo-

dation for his disability. Singletary’s supervisor initially told

him that he was asking for too much, and that he would have

to wait until the National Rehabilitation Hospital evaluated

his job and his need for accommodation. Singletary, 225 F.

Supp. 2d at 54–55.3

On September 17, 1993, Singletary filed a charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleg-

ing discrimination and retaliation. On March 3, 1994, Single-

tary filed suit in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, alleging that the District, DHS, and two

RSA officials had discriminated against him on the basis of

his skin color and disability, and had retaliated against him

for complaining of that discrimination, in violation of: Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq.; and Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At trial, Singletary’s case was

based on five theories: ‘‘(1) retaliation in violation of Title

VII; (2) hostile work environment in violation of Title VII;

(3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) failure to accommodate

plaintiff’s disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabili-

tation Act; and (5) intentional disability discrimination in

violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.’’ Singletary,

225 F. Supp. 2d at 55. After a nine-day bench trial, the court

entered judgment against Singletary on all of his claims.

With respect to the plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the court

held that Singletary had proven that three of RSA’s employ-

ment actions constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of

Title VII: the 1987 transfer of Singletary to the Vending

Facility Program; the 1987 failure to give Singletary an

3Singletary ultimately received clerical help in March 1994 and a

computer with the proper software in December of that year.

Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 55.

6

official job description; and the 1991 failure to grant Single-

tary priority consideration and to select him for a supervisory

position. Id. at 57–60. Nonetheless, the court concluded that

Title VII’s 300–day statute of limitations for filing an EEOC

complaint barred recovery for any of those violations. Id. at

61.4 The plaintiff does not challenge the denial of those three

claims on appeal. He does, however, challenge the denial of a

fourth Title VII retaliation claim — that the defendants

retaliated against him in 1993 by failing to promote him to a

supervisory position and transferring him back to the Place-

ment Unit. The district court denied that claim, not because

of the statute of limitations, but because it concluded that

Singletary had failed to show a causal connection between the

defendants’ 1993 actions and the protected activity for which

the plaintiff claimed those actions constituted retaliation. Id.

at 57.

The district court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the

defendants intentionally created a hostile work environment

in violation of Title VII. That claim was denied on statute of

limitations grounds, and is a subject of this appeal. Id. at 62.

Also rejected on limitations grounds were certain of Single-

tary’s section 1983 claims against the individual defendants in

their personal capacities. Id. at 63. Singletary has appealed

only one of those — his claim that the 1991 failure to promote

was unlawfully discriminatory. Finally, the district court

denied the balance of Singletary’s claims, including additional

4 Where, as here, an aggrieved person ‘‘initially instituted pro-

ceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or

seek relief from such practice,’’ Title VII requires such person to

file a charge with the EEOC ‘‘within three hundred days after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.’’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–5(e)(1). This requirement is one of ‘‘the prerequisites that

a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.’’ National R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); see Currier v. Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1366 & n.2 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). Singletary filed his EEOC charge on September 17,

1993. Accordingly, the district court found that only claims based

on events that occurred within 300 days of that date were timely.

Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 60.

7

section 1983 claims against both individual defendants and the

District of Columbia, and failure-to-accommodate and disabili-

ty discrimination claims under the ADA and the Rehabilita-

tion Act. See id. at 63–66. Singletary does not challenge the

denial of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims here. See

Appellant’s Br. at 15 n.14.

II

We review a district court’s factual findings following a

bench trial, including findings regarding intentional discrimi-

nation, for clear error only. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a);

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). We

review the court’s legal analysis, however, de novo. While we

may not set aside the court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous, we owe no such deference to ‘‘findings

[that] rest on an erroneous view of the law.’’ Pullman-

Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); see Barnes v.

Small, 840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

In the following sections, we consider Singletary’s chal-

lenges to the district court’s denial of three of his claims: (1)

the Title VII retaliation claim regarding the 1993 failure to

promote and subsequent transfer; (2) the Title VII hostile

work environment claim; and (3) the section 1983 claim

regarding the 1991 failure to promote. The remaining deter-

minations from which Singletary appeals are affirmed for the

reasons stated by the district court.

A

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it ‘‘an

unlawful employment practice for an employer TTT to discrim-

inate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual’s race [or] color.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

Although this provision applies only to private employers,

Title VII contains a separate provision that applies to federal

agencies and the District of Columbia. See id. § 2000e–16(a)

(‘‘All personnel actions affecting employees TTT in executive

agencies TTT [and] the Government of the District of Colum-

8

bia TTT shall be made free from any discrimination based on

race [or] colorTTTT’’). ‘‘ ‘Despite the differences in language

TTT we have held that Title VII places the same restrictions

on federal and District of Columbia agencies as it does on

private employers, and so we may construe the latter provi-

sion in terms of the former.’ ’’ Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251,

255 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d

934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

It is also unlawful under Title VII ‘‘for an employer to

discriminate against any of [its] employees TTT because he

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge

TTT or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-

ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation, the plaintiff must show: ‘‘ ‘1) that [he] engaged in

a statutorily protected activity; 2) that the employer took an

adverse personnel action; and 3) that a causal connection

existed between the two.’ ’’ Morgan v. Federal Home Loan

Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting

Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).5 In

this Part, we are concerned with the first and third require-

ments.

Singletary contends that the district court erred in denying

his claim that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against

him when they failed to promote him to an acting supervisor

position in June 1993 and then transferred him back to the

Placement Unit. The court based that finding solely on the

conclusion that the ‘‘plaintiff has failed to show a causal

5 Where the alleged retaliation took the form of a failure to

promote, as it did here, the plaintiff must also show that he applied

for an available job and that he was qualified for that position. See

Morgan, 328 F.3d at 651. Once the plaintiff has established a

prima facie case, ‘‘the employer must articulate a legitimate non-

retaliatory reason for its action; finally, the plaintiff has the ulti-

mate burden of establishing that the reason asserted by the em-

ployer is pretext for retaliation.’’ Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512,

520 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

9

connection with respect to defendants’ 1993 conduct.’’ Sin-

gletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 57. And it based that conclusion,

in turn, on the fact that ‘‘a significant period of time elapsed

between’’ the 1993 employment actions ‘‘and the original

protected activity in 1987 and 1990.’’ Id. The ‘‘original

protected activity’’ to which the court referred was Single-

tary’s filing of complaints of discrimination and retaliation

with OHR in 1987 and 1990, as well as his immediate pursuit

of those complaints before OHR and the City Administrator.

Id. at 56.

In concluding that there was insufficient temporal proximi-

ty between the defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions and

Singletary’s protected activity, the district court failed to take

account of protected activity that Singletary undertook long

after ‘‘the original protected activity in 1987 and 1990’’ and

well into 1993. There was, for example, the letter that

Singletary’s counsel submitted to the City Administrator on

March 4, 1993, asking about the status of his appeal of OHR’s

dismissal of his discrimination complaint and proposing a

meeting to discuss a remedy that would ‘‘achieve closure.’’

J.A. 51. There was also the letter his counsel sent to the

Administrator on March 9, 1993, requesting ‘‘reconsideration

of [the] decision not to entertain Mr. Singletary’s appeal.’’

J.A. 53–55. That letter provided a detailed account of RSA’s

failure to comply with the Administrator’s May 1990 order

that Singletary be given priority consideration for the next

available supervisor position and that the discrimination

against him cease. And it made plain Singletary’s ongoing

pursuit of his discrimination claims and continued opposition

to RSA’s conduct:

The May 24, 1990 order required that all discrimination

against Mr. Singletary cease immediately. Contrary to

that order, DHS/RSA has continued to retaliate against

Mr. Singletary. The Department has retaliated in a way

designed to most effectively humiliate and quiet Mr.

Singletary and to rob him of his dignity—that is, by not

assigning him a positionTTTT DHS’ failure to place Mr.

Singletary in a real job is insidious retaliation of the

10

worst sortTTTT It is undisputed that Mr. Singletary

continues to be retaliated againstTTTT We ask that you

reconsider your conclusions TTT and order DHS/RSA to

assign Mr. Singletary to a bona fide position consistent

with his qualifications [and] otherwise cease retaliating

against him.

J.A. 55. Finally, there was Singletary’s attempt to litigate his

claim by filing an appeal in the D.C. Court of Appeals on May

21, 1993. Pl.’s Ex. 133.

There is no doubt that the 1993 letters from Singletary’s

attorney constituted protected conduct under Title VII. See

Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also

Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 31

(D.C. Cir. 1997). So, too, did the appeal that Singletary filed

with the D.C. Court of Appeals that same year. See Clark

County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271–73 (2001);

Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001). We do not

know what conclusion the district court, as factfinder, would

have reached regarding causation had it taken this protected

1993 activity into account. Although the court found that

there was no other evidence of causation that could make up

for the temporal proximity that it thought was absent, Single-

tary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 57, this circuit has held that a close

temporal relationship may alone establish the required causal

connection.6 And here the temporal proximity was quite

close: Singletary was denied promotion to the acting supervi-

sor position in June 1993, the month after he filed his appeal

with the D.C. Court of Appeals. Whether such proximity was

enough in this case is, in the first instance, a question for the

6 See Cones, 199 F.3d at 521 (‘‘[G]iven the circumstances of this

case, the close temporal proximity of [the plaintiff’s] discrimination

complaints to the refusal to consider him for the TTT position is

sufficient to establish a causal connection.’’); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at

86 (‘‘The causal connection component of the prima facie case may

be established by showing that the employer had knowledge of the

employee’s protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action

took place shortly after that activity.’’); accord O’Neal v. Ferguson

Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2001).

11

finder of fact rather than the appellate court. We therefore

remand for the district court to determine whether the close

temporal relationship between the 1993 protected activity and

the 1993 adverse employment action, in the context of other

evidence offered by both the plaintiff and the defendants,

persuades the court that the defendants unlawfully retaliated

against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII.7

B

We turn next to Singletary’s claim that the defendants

intentionally subjected him to a hostile work environment, on

account of his skin color and in retaliation for his filing of

discrimination complaints, in violation of Title VII. Under

Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to ‘‘requir[e]

people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive envi-

ronment.’’ Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. at 21 (1993).

As the Supreme Court has explained: ‘‘When the workplace

is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment,’ Title VII is violated.’’ Id. (quoting

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67

(1986)) (citations omitted). Singletary’s hostile work environ-

ment claim charged that:

Defendants have subjected plaintiff to demeaning and

humiliating working conditions, including an uncomforta-

ble physical environment, no professional work assign-

ments and an absence of professional colleagues, training

7 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (remanding a Title VII action because the

district court’s factual findings in favor of the defendant may have

been ‘‘influenced by its mistaken view of the law’’); Pullman-

Standard, 456 U.S. at 291 (‘‘When an appellate court discerns that a

district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous

view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for

further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing

findings.’’).

12

and development for almost six years, from December

1987 through August 1993. No other employee is or has

been so treated.

Am. Compl. ¶ 27 (J.A. 34).

The district court rejected Singletary’s hostile work envi-

ronment claim on the ground that it was barred by the

statute of limitations. The claim was barred, the court said,

because Singletary had failed to prove that any discrete

‘‘retaliatory act occurred within 300 days of September 17,

1993, the date he filed his EEOC complaint.’’ Singletary, 225

F. Supp. 2d at 62; see supra note 4. In so holding, the

district court rejected the application of what it described as

the ‘‘continuing violation theory’’ to a hostile work environ-

ment claim. Under that rejected theory, ‘‘if the alleged acts

constitute one similar pattern or practice and at least one

illegal act took place within the filing period, then the com-

plaint of discrimination is not time-barred and acts outside

the statutory period may be considered for purposes of

liability.’’ 225 F. Supp. 2d at 61; see id. at 62. See generally

2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-

INATION LAW 1351–1362 (3d ed. 1996).

The district court’s analysis of Title VII’s limitations peri-

od, as applied to hostile work environment claims, was wrong

as a matter of law. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court clarified the

appropriate limitations analysis as follows. The Court first

set out the rule for ‘‘discrete discriminatory acts,’’ such as

terminations and failures to promote: They ‘‘are not action-

able if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged

in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act

starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.’’ Id. at

113. But ‘‘[h]ostile environment claims,’’ the Court continued,

‘‘are different in kind from discrete acts’’ because ‘‘[t]heir

very nature involves repeated conduct.’’ Id. at 115. Such a

claim, the Court said, ‘‘is comprised of a series of separate

acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment

practice.’’ Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, hostile work environment claims are subject to a

different limitations rule and, indeed, to the very rule rejected

13

by the district court here: ‘‘Provided that an act contributing

to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time

period of the hostile environment may be considered by a

court for the purposes of determining liabilityTTTT In order

for the charge to be timely, the employee need only file a

charge within TTT 300 days of any act that is part of the

hostile work environment.’’ Id. at 117–18 (emphasis added).8

As part of his hostile work environment claim, Singletary

plainly did allege acts that took place within 300 days of the

filing of his EEOC charge — that is, after November 21,

1992. Those acts included the defendants’ intentional and

persistent failure to provide him with an official job descrip-

tion, which continued through at least August 1993. Single-

tary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 54. They also included Singletary’s

claim that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against him

when they failed to promote him to a supervisory position in

June 1993 and then transferred him back to the Placement

Unit—the claim that we remanded for further consideration

in Part II.A. And they further included the plaintiff’s claim

that, after his 1993 transfer, the defendants refused for over a

year to provide him with the clerical assistance, computer,

and computer training that he needed to accomplish his

assignments. Id. at 64.9

8 See also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122 (‘‘A charge alleging a hostile

work environment claim TTT will not be time barred so long as all

acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful

employment practice and at least one act falls within the time

period.’’). In a footnote, the district court appeared to recognize

the applicability of this rule, citing Morgan as holding that, al-

though ‘‘not appropriate for claims of discrete discriminatory or

retaliatory acts,’’ the ‘‘continuing violation theory’’ remains ‘‘applica-

ble to charges alleging a hostile work environment.’’ Singletary,

225 F. Supp. 2d at 61 n.2. The contrary conclusion in the body of

the district court’s opinion may be due to the fact that the Supreme

Court did not decide Morgan until shortly before the district court

issued its opinion.

9 The district court addressed those refusals as part of Single-

tary’s failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, and declined to

consider them on the ground that Singletary had failed to exhaust

14

In rejecting the timeliness of Singletary’s hostile work

environment claim, the district court emphasized its finding

that no discrete, unlawful retaliatory act occurred within the

statutory period. Id. at 62. But whether or not the court

reaffirms that finding on remand, see supra Part II.A, the

timeliness of Singletary’s hostile work environment claim

does not depend on whether the acts that he alleged were

discriminatory are actionable standing alone. As the Court

said in Morgan, ‘‘in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single

act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.’’ 536

U.S. at 115 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Rather, all

Singletary need demonstrate is that ‘‘the acts about which

[he] complains are part of the same actionable hostile work

environment practice.’’ Id. at 120.

Recognizing that the district court erred in its application

of the limitations bar to Singletary’s hostile work environment

claim, the defendants ask us to uphold the denial of Single-

tary’s claim on the alternative ground that the district court

ruled that Singletary had not been subject to a hostile work

environment. But the district court did not so rule. To be

sure, the court did state that it had ‘‘serious doubts that the

defendants’ conduct was sufficient to create an abusive work-

ing environment.’’ Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). In the very next sentence, however, it concluded that

‘‘any doubts this Court holds TTT are moot’’ in light of its

holding that Singletary ‘‘failed to timely file a complaint with

the EEOC.’’ Id.

his administrative remedies. According to the court, the refusals

were not charged in and ‘‘could not have been expected to grow out

of’’ Singletary’s EEOC complaint. Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d. at

64 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Singletary raised the

same allegations as part of his hostile work environment claim. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 29 (J.A. 34). And in Morgan, the Supreme Court

held that ‘‘an unlawful employment practice has ‘occurred,’ even if it

is still occurring,’’ that ‘‘[s]ubsequent events TTT may still be part of

the one hostile work environment claim,’’ and that the ‘‘entire time

period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for

the purposes of determining liability.’’ 536 U.S. at 117, 120.

15

Nor can we accept the defendants’ further suggestion that

no reasonable factfinder could find a hostile work environ-

ment here. In addition to the alleged 1993 discriminatory

failure to promote and 1993–94 failure to provide him with the

tools necessary to accomplish his assignments — the merits

of which claims the district court must address on remand —

Singletary made a host of allegations that the court ruled did

have merit but that it erroneously thought were untimely for

a hostile work environment claim. Most significantly, the

district court determined that, notwithstanding the availabili-

ty of appropriate office space, the defendants intentionally

assigned Singletary to work in an unheated storage room for

over a year and a half as ‘‘retaliatory discrimination’’ for the

filing of a discrimination complaint. Id. at 58. As the court

found:

The room to which plaintiff was assigned was not previ-

ously used as an office space, but rather was used as a

general storage room. The storage room was without

heat or ventilation. It was poorly lit, which posed prob-

lems for plaintiff, who is visually challenged. The only

entrance to plaintiff’s office was through a clinic to which

plaintiff did not have keys. The phone in the room often

did not work. The office space contained TTT brooms

[and] boxes of debrisTTTT Defendants clearly intended

to relegate plaintiff to this sub-standard officeTTTT

[T]he record shows that there were other, more suitable,

places in which plaintiff’s office could have been located.

Id. at 58–59. The court also determined that, as another act

of intentional discrimination, the defendants failed for six

years to give Singletary an official job description — which

left him both unable ‘‘to receive performance evaluations,

thereby precluding any advancement opportunities,’’ and po-

tentially ineligible to receive unemployment compensation if

he were injured on the job. Id. at 59. And the court further

found that at least two adverse employment actions — the

1987 decision to transfer Singletary to the Vending Facility

Program and the 1991 failure to select him for a supervisory

16

position — were yet additional acts of intentional, unlawful

retaliation for the plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination.

Although ‘‘many of [the] acts upon which [the plaintiff’s]

claim depends occurred outside the 300 day filing period, we

cannot say that they are not part of the same actionable

hostile environment claim.’’ Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120–21.

That is a determination that the district court must make in

the first instance. See id. at 120 (holding that the court’s

‘‘task is to determine whether the acts about which [the

plaintiff] complains are part of the same actionable hostile

work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls

within the statutory time period’’). Similarly, we cannot

determine whether, if timely, Singletary’s allegations demon-

strate that his workplace was permeated with a pattern of

ongoing harassment that was so ‘‘severe or pervasive [as] to

alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive

working environment.’’ Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal

quotation marks omitted). That, too, is for the district court

as factfinder to decide. We therefore remand for a determi-

nation of both the timeliness and the merits of Singletary’s

hostile work environment claim under Title VII.

C

Finally, we consider the district court’s denial of Single-

tary’s charge that the failure of RSA officials to promote him

to a supervisory position in 1991, in alleged violation of his

constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, rendered

them personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for monetary damages

and injunctive relief against ‘‘[e]very person who, under color

of [law] TTT subjects, or causes to be subjected, any TTT other

person TTT to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’’ Id.10

10 Singletary’s amended complaint included section 1983 claims

not only against the individual defendants, but against the District

of Columbia as well. A municipality can be held liable under

section 1983, however, only when its ‘‘policy or custom TTT inflicts

the injury.’’ Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658,

17

Although the district court found that RSA’s 1991 failure to

promote Singletary constituted discriminatory retaliation in

violation of Title VII, it nonetheless rejected Singletary’s

Title VII claim on the ground that it was barred by that

statute’s 300–day limitations period. Singletary, 225 F. Supp.

2d at 59–60; see supra note 4. The court did not, however,

expressly consider the plaintiff’s claim that the 1991 adverse

action also constituted a denial of equal protection in violation

of section 1983. What the court did say was that ‘‘any

incidents that occurred before March 3, 1991’’ were time-

barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to suits

brought under section 1983 in the District of Columbia. 225

F. Supp. 2d at 63.11 Apparently, the court thought that the

1991 failure to promote took place in January 1991, and hence

fell outside the three year period. See id. at 57 (‘‘[P]laintiff

has demonstrated that within months of his second complaint

to the OHR, defendants failed to provide plaintiff with priori-

ty consideration when interviewing him, and ultimately reject-

ing him, for five supervisory positions in January 1991.’’).

This factual assumption was clear error. Although the five

vacancies were posted in January 1991, id. at 53, the decision

not to promote Singletary was made in April 1991 at the

earliest. See Letter from City Administrator to Counsel for

Singletary (March 5, 1993) (J.A. 52) (stating that Singletary

was considered for a supervisory position on April 26, 1991);

694 (1978). The district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to

adduce any evidence that the defendants’ actions toward him ‘‘were

the result of a District of Columbia custom, policy or practice.’’

Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 63–64. Singletary’s opening brief

does not challenge that conclusion, see Appellant’s Br. at 27–29

(arguing for personal liability only), and, in any event, we do not

perceive clear error in the district court’s conclusion.

11Singletary filed his complaint in the district court on March 3,

1994. ‘‘The Supreme Court has held that TTT claims under section

1983 are governed by’’ the relevant state’s ‘‘residual or general

personal injury statute of limitations,’’ which in this case is the

three-year bar of D.C. Code § 12–301(8). Carney v. American

Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235, 243–50 (1989)).

18

Pl.’s EEOC Compl. (J.A. 17) (stating that Singletary was

interviewed on April 25, 1991 and notified that he was not

selected on June 8, 1991); see also Singletary, 225 F. Supp.

2d at 63 (noting that the selection process for the positions

took place during April and May of 1991). It is thus undis-

puted that the adverse action taken against Singletary in 1991

fell within the three-year limitations period. Hence, the

court’s implicit holding that the 1991 claim was untimely was

incorrect.

Of course, the fact that Singletary’s failure-to-promote

claim fell within the limitations period does not end the

matter. The district court has yet to consider either the

merits of Singletary’s claim or the individual defendants’

defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that ‘‘government officials per-

forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known’’). We there-

fore remand for the district court to determine whether

Singletary’s 1991 non-promotion constitutes a violation of

section 1983 for which the individual defendants may be held

liable.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court erred in: (1) rejecting Singletary’s Title VII retaliation

claim regarding the 1993 failure to promote on lack-of-

causation grounds, without recognizing the close temporal

proximity between the alleged retaliatory acts and Single-

tary’s protected activity; (2) holding Singletary’s Title VII

hostile work environment claim to be time barred, without

applying the appropriate limitations analysis; and (3) denying

Singletary’s section 1983 claim regarding the 1991 failure to

promote, on the erroneous assumption that the failure did not

take place within the limitations period. Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s judgment on those three issues

19

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded for further proceedings.