Case law

U.S. Airwaves, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

232 F.3d 227 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 21, 2000

(Entrepreneurs who did not qualify as small businesses were offered less favorable payment terms. See id. at n.10.) … In some respects, however, the new rules clearly do contra- dict the Commission's previously stated policies.

Office Of Communication Of The United Church Of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission

425 F.2d 543 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 5, 1969

As we noted in our dissenting opinion, the court of appeals clearly expressed its expectation that the Commission would resolve the problem by placing upon petitioners [Public Interest Intervenors] "only the burden of going … proceedings on remand had been hopelessly bungled and that the public interest was best served by taking note of the early expiration date * and getting on with a new hearing in which the Commission can decide who is best qualified

United States Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

952 F.2d 1434 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 14, 1992

The second disputed proposal calls for the establishment of an “open” parking policy for all employees and supervisory personnel working at the Cherry Point installation. … This view suffers from a flaw similar to that present in the Authority’s construction of the “vitally affects” test — it excludes from bargaining certain clearly mandatory subjects.

Joseph C. Steffan v. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense

41 F.3d 677 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 22, 1994

redressable by the court (through reinstatement and a declaratory judgment), thus clearly conferring Article III standing. … Clearly the Navy may not exercise this power over the minds of servicemembers by discharging them on the basis of inquiries about “homosexuality.”

Radio v. Federal Communications Commission

278 F.3d 1314 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 8, 2002

Cir. 1987) (noting that "otherwise qualified non-applicants may have standing to challenge a disqualifying statute or regulation"). … Nothing in either the record or Szoka's briefs convinces us that the Commission's decision to impose the maximum one-day penalty was clearly erroneous: Szoka intentionally operated a radio station with- out a license

Center for Auto Safety & Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

452 F.3d 798 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 23, 2006

In sum, the 1998 policy guidelines do not, as appellants claim, establish new rights and obligations for automakers. … But defacto compliance is not enough to establish that the guidelines have had legal consequences.

Tri County Industries, Inc., a Maryland Corporation v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation

104 F.3d 455 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 14, 1997

As to this claim, the District’s ripeness defense is clearly sound. Under Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm’n v. … “Only [1] a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or [2] a deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights, qualifies for relief ...” 845 F.2d at

Natl Assoc. of Manufacturers v. SEC

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 14, 2014

That a disclosure is factual, standing alone, does not immunize it from scrutiny because “[t]he right against compelled speech is not, and cannot be, restricted to ideological messages.” … The Exchange Act requires covered manufacturers to list products qualifying as “not DRC conflict free” under the statutory definition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii); see id. § 78m(p)(1)(D).

National Constructors Association v. Ray Marshal

581 F.2d 960 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 28, 1978

To hold otherwise would be to require the Assistant Secretary to follow the Committee's recommendation, which Congress clearly did not intend. … In establishing the Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health, See note 3 Supra, the Secretary took advantage of the authority to appoint persons, other than representatives of labor and industry, "who are qualified

National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. Securities & Exchange Commission

748 F.3d 359 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 14, 2014

That a disclosure is factual, standing alone, does not immunize it from scrutiny because “[t]he right against compelled speech is not, and cannot be, restricted to ideological messages.” … The Exchange Act requires covered manufacturers to list products qualifying as “not DRC conflict free” under the statutory definition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii); see id. § 78m(p)(1)(D).

New York v. Environmental Protection Agency

443 F.3d 880 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 17, 2006

Given Congress’s goal in adopting the 1977 amendments of establishing a balance between economic and environmental interests, see Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. … that the word “increases” in section 111(a)(4) is ambiguous, see New York I, 413 F.3d at 23 , does not suggest that the phrase “any physical change” is also ambiguous; unlike the latter, the former is unaccompanied by a qualifier

National Association of Home v. EPA

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 15, 2015

That proposition is so clearly established it is beyond question. Nor do parties have to wait until the government takes preliminary steps before enforcing – clearing its throat, so to speak. … The consultant report is submitted to the Corps and qualifies as a “preliminary jurisdictional determination” upon the Corps’ adoption of it, oftentimes with edits.

Moran v. Cobb

120 F.2d 16 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 3, 1941

Standing as such, it clearly was insolvent from the time of the transfer in September, 1932. … Whitney was duly appointed as receiver and qualified. Whatever power he has exercised or claimed is by virtue of his appointment in the receivership proceedings predicated on chapter 32 of title 18 of the Code.

Service Employees International Union, Local 250 v. National Labor Relations Board

600 F.2d 930 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 25, 1979

Brown, supra, at 290-292, 85 S.Ct. at 988 , pointedly stated that the phrase “limited judicial review” did not mean that the balance struck by the Board was immune from judicial examination and reversal in proper cases, and … When confronted with obvious insubordination, and to prevent a defense of condonement, it is essential that the employer act promptly. 23 The AU held “the fact of the loss was clearly established at trial.”

Francis X. McLaughlin v. Benjamin C. Bradlee (Two Cases)

803 F.2d 1197 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 21, 1986

This court has recently recapitulated the standards for establishing the preclusive effect of a prior holding. … Maryland state courts and the District Court for the District of Columbia encompassed actual litigation of essentially the same issues of constitutional privacy as arise from the claim McLaughlin asserts here. 3 An issue qualifies

Edward M. Kennedy v. Arthur F. Sampson, Acting Administrator, General Services Administration, (Two Cases)

511 F.2d 430 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 14, 1974

Id. at 682-684 , 49 S.Ct. 463 . 22 A significant exception to this holding was established in the Supreme Court’s only other pocket veto decision, Wright v. … This clearly was not the basis for its decision, however, since the Court expressly reserved the question of whether a more extended one-House adjournment might “prevent” the return of a vetoed bill. 302 U.S. at 598 , 58

Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service

117 F.3d 607 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 8, 1997

To accept these arguments, the Court thought, would be to read out of the Amendment the qualifier “in a form.” … It simply slaps § 6103 on the table and tells us that everything in an FSA, every line, every word, is immune from disclosure.

John Croley v. Joint Committee on Judicial Administration

895 F.3d 22 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 6, 2018

The Joint Committee recognized at argument that Croley’s complaint “clearly” levies “general policy-like” challenges, independent of challenges to specific D.C. court orders. See Oral Arg. … The Joint Committee maintains that, even were we to reverse the district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling, we should affirm its dismissal of Croley’s complaint on non-jurisdictional grounds, such as judicial immunity, preclusion

Athens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Hospital Corporation of America, a Tennessee Corporation v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services

686 F.2d 989 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 27, 1982

Under the Medicare Act, certain institutions known as "providers" are reimbursed for the cost of the services they provide to qualified Medicare beneficiaries. … This procedure would also render virtually meaningless the time limits for the filing of cost reports established by Medicare regulations.

Donald R. Parker v. District of Columbia

850 F.2d 708 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 17, 1988

(The majority seeks to distinguish Cameron on the ground that here Hayes’ shooting was clearly the proximate cause of Parker’s injury.) Maj.Op. at 715. But that is not in question. … Parker argued at trial that the District was grossly reckless in not establishing minimum physical fitness standards for officers in its ROP unit.