Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

    237 F.3d 639 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 17, 2000

    Had the sentence established a general rule of law, we might agree. … Yet the Board has long held that employee misconduct does not completely immunize employers from their backpay obligations, even when the discriminatees would not have been hired but for their own wrongful conduct. Cf.

    Reversed on other grounds by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Passaic Daily News, T/a the Herald News v. National Labor Relations Board

    736 F.2d 1543 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 15, 1984

    Establishing these facts presupposes that the General Counsel establishes that the Company was aware of the employee’s activities on behalf of a labor organization. … The Court contrasted the case it was addressing with cases that might qualify for First Amendment protection.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • United States v. Haldeman

    559 F.2d 31 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 12, 1976

    They worried most about what the break-in defendants might say before the Committee if granted immunity. … United States, 420 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1969) (immune to process); cf., e.g., United States v.

    Cited 591 timesPublished
  • Cephas v. MVM, INC.

    520 F.3d 480 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 28, 2008

    In July 2006, the district court dismissed Cephas’s action against Chaney as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity or, in the alternative, as untimely. Cephas appealed both rulings. … plaintiff] knew or should have known that the union had stopped pursuing his griev- ance”); Keim, 1993 WL 40835, at *1 (statute of limitations “began to run ... when the Union dropped [the employee’s] grievance”); each clearly

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • Office of the Consumers' Counsel, State of Ohio v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., Washington Gas Light Co., Intervenors. State of Ohio v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., Washington Gas Light Co., Intervenors

    808 F.2d 125 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 6, 1987

    equal value to the consumers and (2) the Commission's order that Columbia bear "the full cost of conversion to propane service," 9 the Commission could choose the cheaper means of providing energy to the consumers without qualifying … Thus, FERC observed, "The consumers cannot expect a lifetime guarantee of service on the basis of those statements, particularly when the service agreements clearly provide for the abandonment of that service."

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Joseph N. Grano, Jr. v. Marion S. Barry, Mayor, District of Columbia, Oliver T. Carr, Jr.

    783 F.2d 1104 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 21, 1986

    In the case before us, the plaintiffs’ success before the District Court was clearly “on the merits”. … Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.Gir.1984) (establishing new method of calculating rates for firms such as the one involved here), cert. denied — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3488 , 87 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985).

    Cited 76 timesPublished
  • David M. Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc.

    357 F.2d 581 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 30, 1965

    But the New York courts have clearly indicated that this is not the primary purpose of the estoppel rule. In Phoenix Insurance Co. v. … Thus, the rule will likely prove ineffective in establishing a “deep-pocket” for the benefit of New York plaintiffs.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Milton M. Levin v. Ramsey Clark, Attorney General of the United States

    408 F.2d 1209 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 16, 1968

    Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P. limits our review narrowly to determining whether the District Court findings were clearly erroneous. … I suggest this is a transparent device to avoid the impossible task of demonstrating that the District Judge was “clearly erroneous” under Rule 52.

    Cited 49 timesPublished
  • Skelly Oil Co. v. Russell

    436 F.2d 910 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 3, 1970

    The Mandatory Oil Import Program was established pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 3279 of March 10, 1959, 24 Fed.Reg. 1781. … Skelly argues, however, that since the operations of the two companies were so clearly independent of each other, there is no justification for invoking the control provisions of Section *917 4(g); that in the administration

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission

    162 F.3d 1215 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 8, 1999

    It was this construction of the market that controlled when the spectrum cap was first established in the 1994 Third Report and Order. … As a cellular licensee, BellSouth qualifies as a competitor. Once an entity qualifies as a competitor, the Commission is concerned with how much spectrum that entity accumulates.

    Cited 62 timesPublished
  • McBryde, John H. v. Com Rev Cir Cncl

    278 F.3d 29 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 28, 2001

    Ray, the Court stated that "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdic- tion.... … Yet the Committee fails to establish that these inci- dents, taken together, were clearly abusive.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • National Wildlife Federation v. Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior

    839 F.2d 694 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 29, 1988

    The syntax of the Senate Report clearly makes “processing” an object of “coal at or near the mine site.” … establishes one variance, applicable solely to mining on steep slopes.

    Cited 156 timesPublished
  • Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Azar

    296 F. Supp. 3d 166 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 13, 2018

    assumption that it did not contain a previously approved active moiety," because, using the agency's interpretation of the NCE exclusivity regulations in place at the time, it had already determined that Prepopik did not qualify … the parties never disputed the issue. " 'Law-of-the-case doctrine' refers to a family of rules embodying the general concept that a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • McBryde, John H. v. Com Rev Cir Cncl

    278 F.3d 29 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 21, 2001

    Ray, the Court stated that "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdic- tion.... … Yet the Committee fails to establish that these inci- dents, taken together, were clearly abusive.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Murray Drabkin, Trustee v. A.I. Credit Corporation, (Two Cases)

    800 F.2d 1153 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 29, 1986

    other hand, argues that the parties intended merely to forestall AICCO from foreclosing on the unearned premiums (which would have terminated insurance coverage necessary to Auto-Train’s business), and that they did not clearly … AICCO’s second argument is that the payments qualified as exceptions to the voidable preference rule because they were made in exchange for “new value,” either contemporaneously or subsequently conveyed. 5 See 11 U.S.C. §

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • Hutchins, Tiana v. DC

    188 F.3d 531 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 18, 1999

    Roe, 1999 WL 303743 (grounding at least one component of the right to interstate travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. … The curfew clearly satisfies the "important interest" re- quirement of intermediate scrutiny.

    Cited 86 timesPublished
  • Csx Transportation v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Potomac Electric Power Company, Intervenor

    867 F.2d 1439 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 17, 1989

    This qualification of section 10704(a)(1) was deleted in conference, however, further indicating that Congress did not clearly intend to allow ZORF increases on prescribed rates. II. … First, the ICC’s construction is consistent with the long established rule of statutory construction that “gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Inc. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency

    317 F. Supp. 3d 394 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 17, 2018

    Next, Assassination Archives alleges that the CIA's no-records letters qualify as "troubling questions as to the conduct of the search." Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 19-20. … Inc. , 926 F.2d at 1201 , and that the CIA has established the adequacy of its search beyond any genuine dispute. B.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. v. Federal Maritime Commission and United States of America, Philipr. Consolo, Intervenor. Philip R. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission and United States of America, Flotamercante Grancolombiana, S.A., Intervenor

    342 F.2d 924 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 1, 1965

    We were prepared to affirm the Commission if it could establish that the circumstances were such as not to make it unfair to assess damages against Flota. 4 The Commission's opinion, presently under review, suggested that … 1957 Grace Line decision 12 'held that the carrier's duties to banana shippers would depend upon the factual circumstances attending the loading, transportation, and discharge of the bananas.' 13 The Grace Line decision clearly

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Alabama Power Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission

    852 F.2d 1361 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 2, 1988

    Conrail has failed to travel down any of these established tracks. … Attempting to rebut the charge that it was asleep at the switch, Conrail suggests that it was in fact a party in the ICC rulemaking and thus qualifies as a “party aggrieved” under section 2344.

    Cited 1 timesPublished

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