Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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6,967 results

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  • Teleprompter Cable Systems, Inc. v. Fcc

    543 F.2d 1379 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 26, 1976

    with the nature of the 1975 Johnstown hearings, however, we conclude that the Commission's action was arbitrary and cannot be justified under either of these principles. 30 The case law tracing the Root Refining doctrine clearly … establishes that the power to disqualify the corrupter stems from the inherent power of a tribunal to vacate its own tainted judgments.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Alliance for Community Media v. Federal Communications Commission

    56 F.3d 105 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 6, 1995

    Petitioners’ third way of establishing state action relies on section 10(d) of the 1992 Act, the provision removing the civil and criminal immunity of cable operators for obscene programming carried on their access channels … Indecent leased access programming thus hardly qualifies as an “invited guest,” see Judge Wald, dissenting, at 139.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

    768 F.2d 1434 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 19, 1985

    It is now clearly established, for example, that cable operators engage in conduct protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. … are clearly pointless.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board

    449 F.2d 1046 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 19, 1971

    But the fact that an employer claims its refusal to bargain is “technical,” reflecting only the desire to obtain review of a union’s certification, does not immunize the employer from injunctive relief if its claims are weak … Rep. at 28,671 (“the record indicates that this Respondent responsibly fulfills its legally established collective-bargaining obligations”) . . Id., 5 CCH Lab.L.Rep. at 28,672. .

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D. v. Department of Health & Human Services

    815 F.2d 1527 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 2, 1987

    These proposals are pre-deci-sional recommendations and hence clearly insulated from disclosure by Exemption 5 of the FOIA. … Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 8 (2d ed. 1978) (although on face of section 551(1) President “clearly” an APA agency, section 552(e) “clearly implies” that President not FOIA agency).

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Barry W. Wolfe v. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army

    835 F.2d 354 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 18, 1987

    Captain Boyer unsuccessfully attempted to obtain immunity for Wolfe, in return for information Wolfe might provide regarding other drug transactions. … The regulation at issue clearly contemplates input from intermediate commanders prior to final approval by the commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Frank Derek Greentree v. U. S. Customs Service Frank Derek Greentree v. Drug Enforcement Administration

    674 F.2d 74 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 26, 1982

    Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment to both DEA and Customs on the ground that the Privacy Act does qualify as a withholding statute. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied upon the … These provisions in the Senate bill clearly indicate to us that the Senate wanted to insure that FOIA and the Privacy Act not interfere with one another.

    Cited 72 timesPublished
  • Carolee Brady Hartman v. Joseph Duffey, Director, United States Information Agency

    88 F.3d 1232 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 23, 1996

    After the parties agreed to bifurcate the trial into a liability and a remedy stage, the district court held a bench trial on class liability and found that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination … Under the "clearly erro *1239 neous" standard, see De Medina, 686 F.2d at 1007 , we find no reversible error in the district court's factual finding.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Raub v. Carpenter

    17 D.C. App. 505 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 5, 1901

    The witness was so clearly incompetent to testify as an expert that it would be a waste of time to consider the question at any length. Moreover, we have held in the case of Lansburgh v. Wimsatt, 7 App. D. … In accordance with the well established rule of the common law and with *520 the general rule prevailing everywhere unless changed by statute, we have held in several cases that the rulings of a trial court on motions for

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Story of Stuff Project v. U.S. Forest Serv.

    345 F. Supp. 3d 79 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 27, 2018

    With these principles in mind, the court moves on to the elements that the Forest Service must establish. a. … Such a conclusory assertion is clearly insufficient to satisfy an agency's burden to invoke Exemption 6. See Prison Legal News v.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Horn & Hardart Company v. National Rail Passenger Corporation

    843 F.2d 546 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 8, 1988

    The “further relief" provisions of both state and federal declaratory judgment statutes clearly anticipate ancillary or subsequent coercion to make an original declaratory judgment effective. 3 Neither a completed appeal, … Though Ovemite states the general rule that an appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction, the court qualifies this rule by recognizing that jurisdiction can be "reserved” by statute. Id. at 792 .

    Cited 62 timesPublished
  • State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

    66 F.4th 288 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 27, 2023

    The States’ claim of immunity from laches encounters another difficulty – it tends to place the States on the horns of a dilemma. … To be sure, a “complaint seldom will disclose undisputed facts clearly establishing the defense” of laches. Menominee Indian Tribe, 614 F.3d at 532.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger

    56 F.4th 88 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 23, 2022

    Marine Corps Instruction 1730.9 § 4.3 9 (July 12, 2021) (defining a “qualified applicant”); Defs.’ … See 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 at 348 (1904–1937); An Act for the establishing and organizing a Marine Corps § 6, 1 Stat. 594, 596 (1798) (“[T]he [M]arine [C]orps established by this act, shall, at

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Southern Company Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, United Telecom Council, Intervenors

    313 F.3d 574 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 20, 2002

    This argument fails, because the cited provisions do not establish what parties qualify as “attaching entities” for purposes of apportioning costs under § 224(e)(2). … In sum, the agency’s interpretation of § 224(e)(2) is clearly a permissible interpretation of the statute to which we must defer.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Benny Lurk v. United States

    296 F.2d 360 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 9, 1961

    District of Columbia, when requested by the Chief Justice of either of said courts.' 28 U.S.C. 22 (1934 ed.). 7 Thus, the post to which the trial judge was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate was one which clearly … These men were not appointed because they were well qualified to be district judges. They were appointed because they were well qualified to pass upon questions arising under the tariff law.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Masonry Masters, Inc., Successor to Tenco Masonry, Inc., Rigoberto Perdomo v. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the U.S.

    875 F.2d 898 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 19, 1989

    The INS’s investigation into Masonry Masters’ ability to pay Perdomo is clearly within the INS’s authority because it relates to whether Masonry Masters’ job offer is realistic, and does not involve an inquiry into determinations … labor [shall be ineligible to receive visas], unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Termorio SA ESP v. Electrants SP

    487 F.3d 928 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 25, 2007

    In the classic formulation, a judgment that “tends clearly” to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or … Appellants claim that the District Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), because an affirmative defense only supports dismissal if that defense is unavoidably established by the facts alleged

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • United States v. Jeffrey Brown

    125 F.4th 1186 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 17, 2025

    Communications need not be verbal or written to qualify, Schmerber v. … After receiving an assurance of immunity, the respondent produced 13,120 pages of documents and “responded to a series of questions that established that those were all of the documents in his custody or control that were

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Elder v. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture. Furman v. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture

    184 F.2d 219 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 15, 1950

    No person shall be appointed unless (1) he has qualified by passing an appropriate examination prescribed by the Board or, (2) in case of special emergency, the Board has authorized his appointment subject to subsequent examination … The record does not clearly show that any war service appointee of Elder’s grade or lower, with a classification for retention preference inferior to subgroup B-l, was retained when he was discharged, so it does not appear

    Modified by Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277 (1951)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • CTIA—Wireless Ass'n v. Federal Communications Commission

    466 F.3d 105 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 26, 2006

    Prior to execution of this agreement, wireless communication tower construction was subject to the standard section 106 process established by the Council. … In the NPA Order, the FCC deferred to the Council’s “clearly stated interpretation of its own governing statute,” NPA Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 1117 ¶ 121.

    Cited 24 timesPublished

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