Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
6,967 results
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402 F.2d 215 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 6, 1968
Blaser, a qualified civil engineer, testified that the cracking first came to his attention in “late January or early February of ’62.” … was phrased by it in these terms: Therefore, an issue of fact of grave materiality is in issue, to wit, at what point in time were the plaintiffs aware, with sufficient, scientific and technical justification, to aver and establish
Cited 7 timesPublishedInternational Union, United Mine Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board
257 F.2d 211 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 12, 1958
About December 10,1954, the company advised the union of its desire to hire outside operators for new loading machinery due to the fact that there were no employees trained or qualified as operators. … A lockout, or a strike, without any real effort first to exhaust this contractual administrative machinery is clearly a violation of the contract.
Cited 27 timesPublished449 F.2d 1046 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 19, 1971
But the fact that an employer claims its refusal to bargain is "technical," reflecting only the desire to obtain review of a union's certification, does not immunize the employer from injunctive relief if its claims are weak … We are today entering an order establishing an early date for argument. The Board's motion for temporary relief under § 10(e) is denied. 22 So ordered.
Cited 32 timesPublishedRandall A. Terry v. Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States of America
101 F.3d 1412 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 10, 1996
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 , 70 S.Ct. 674, 691 , 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950)), the Access Act defines its terms narrowly and in clearly understandable language. … For the same reasons that the Access Act survives appellants’ First Amendment challenges, it clearly passes this more deferential test.
Cited 91 timesPublished919 F.2d 753 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 27, 1990
However, the amendments also allow state agencies to waive recovery of nonfault overpayments according to guidelines established by the Secretary. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2315 (a)(1). … Under Chevron's familiar two-part test, we first look to see if Congress had a clearly discernible intent on the precise question at issue. If so, then that intention must be given effect.
Cited 10 timesPublishedNew Mexico Cattle Growers' Association v. FWS
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 22, 2025
See, e.g., Petition 4 (J.A. 493) (“[G]enetic data . . . support the existence of a genetic cline, rather than clearly defined . . . subspecies”); id. at 5 (J.A. 494) (“The reanalysis reveals a gradual genetic transition from … And it is firmly established that the mere presence of “[c]ompeting views about scientific data and policy choices” is insufficient to show that the agency acted arbitrarily. Defs. of Wildlife v.
Cited 0 timesPublished872 F.2d 456 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 7, 1989
The Supreme Court has made clear that the RLA “instruct[s] the Board alone to establish the rules governing elections.” Id. at 669 , 85 S.Ct. at 1202 . … As we explain below, we likewise hold only that the Board did not act clearly contrary to its statutory authority. Cf. WES Chapter, 314 F.2d at 237 . 3 .
Cited 27 timesPublishedVan Hollen v. Federal Election Commission
811 F.3d 486 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 21, 2016
BCRA recognized and regulated a new category of political advertising called “electioneering communications,” defined as communications that “refer[] to a clearly identified candidate” “made within” sixty days of a general … And just as the FEC was authorized to decide how to implement BCRA’s disclosure provisions for qualified speakers in 2003, it was authorized to decide how to implement BCRA’s disclosure provisions for these newly qualified
Cited 58 timesPublishedHarris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc.
300 F. Supp. 3d 234 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 5, 2018
Rather, Plaintiffs have alleged Defendant exercised sufficient control over their work at all stages of their employment, from hiring, to performance, to termination, to qualify as a joint employer. … Plaintiffs here have failed to show the contracting parties clearly intended for them to be beneficiaries of the Contract.
Cited 17 timesPublishedHughes v. Securities and Exchange Commission
174 F.2d 969 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 9, 1949
The record shows clearly that, except for a few isolated instances, petitioner acted simultaneously in the dual capacity of investment adviser and of broker and dealer. … To follow this argument to its logical conclusion would be to allow a registered broker-dealer to immunize himself or herself merely by acquiring registration under the Investment Advisers Act.
Cited 53 timesPublishedWashington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor of the District of Columbia
107 F.3d 32 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 12, 1997
To have a property interest in a government benefit, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for [the benefit]. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. … Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017-18 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), for example, the Supreme Court held that because persons meeting state AFDC eligibility standards automatically qualified for benefits, eligible individuals
Cited 108 timesPublishedCommonwealth Of Pennsylvania v. Interstate Commerce Commission
590 F.2d 1187 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 21, 1978
specifies that after the seven month period has elapsed a tariff may only thereafter be set aside "if, upon complaint of an interested party, the Commission finds it to be unlawful." 24 Parties who initially file protests qualify … Such applications shall be governed by such general rules as the Commission may establish.
Cited 5 timesPublishedFrancis O. Day Co., Inc., a Corporation v. Jacob Shapiro, Usually Known as J. B. Shapiro
267 F.2d 669 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 21, 1959
Realities, in short, and not mere forms must be considered by the courts, and inevitably under certain circumstances, the limited liability normally to be attached to the corporate form will be qualified. … To prevent unjust enrichment under the circumstances is clearly an office to be performed by the courts. That our rule, above stated, permits the result is clear.
Cited 35 timesPublishedAssociation of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
627 F.2d 1151 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 16, 1980
The requirements of due process clearly recognize the necessity for rulemakers to formulate policy in a manner similar to legislative action. … The importance and legitimacy of rulemaking procedures are too well established to deny administrators such a fundamental tool.
Cited 162 timesPublished308 F. Supp. 3d 24 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 30, 2018
However, based on DOL's proffered justifications and the Court's in camera review, the Court concluded that only one email visibly qualified as privileged. See id. at 231-32 . … Jordan contends that (1) the Court's findings about the content of the DynCorp emails were not established and were refuted by evidence in the public record; (2) no evidence on record established that Mr.
Cited 14 timesPublishedSecurities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners, Incorporated and Brian D. Pardo
87 F.3d 536 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 5, 1996
I agree that the requirement of Howey’s third prong is most clearly met where the promoter engages in post-purchase activities. … Consequently, this type of derivative arrangement could qualify as an investment contract under the approach I have outlined, but it could not so qualify under the majority’s.
Cited 64 timesPublished863 F.2d 891 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 30, 1988
The district court's clearly correct finding that Eastern's operational changes were "motivated by sound financial reasons" establishes, under Wright Line, a sufficient and independent innocent motivation. 129 We also have … While Burley establishes the propriety of System Board adjudication of disputes not involving the interpretation of provisions of a collective agreement, it clearly confines System Board jurisdiction to claims concerning
Cited 8 timesPublishedRobert James Richards v. Milton Stanley Mileski (Two Cases)
662 F.2d 65 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 21, 1981
The critical question is not whether the appropriate period is one year or three years, since Richards will qualify or fail under either standard. … Our discomfit is not a valid reason, however, for rearranging the statutory limits on Richards’ cause of action by refusing to employ the doctrine of tolling in a case where it clearly applies.
Cited 127 timesPublished356 F.2d 351 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 24, 1966
Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U.CHI.L.REV. 680, 687-688 (1954): "However the case may be with respect to `unauthorized' conduct, estoppel clearly may be based upon `authorized' conduct. … Rogers, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 256 , 258 n. 5, 266 F.2d 457 , 459 n. 5 (1959), relied on by the majority, that estoppel does not lie against the Government, is dictum and arose in a context which clearly precluded application of
Cited 1 timesPublishedUnited States v. El Tora Graham
91 F.3d 213 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 9, 1996
Unless he can establish an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. … As noted in the prior paragraph, however, his one attempt to establish such a reason falls short.
Cited 41 timesPublished
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