Case law

United States v. John Doe

730 F.2d 1529 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 27, 1984

This argument, of course, is correct, as far as it goes, but it ignores a long line of precedent and practice establishing that, for good reason, this presumption may be overcome and records may be sealed. … It is clearly not enough for a court merely to expunge those portions of the record that explicitly state that the ex-offender was convicted.

United States v. Mary Treadwell, A/K/A Mary T. Barry, A/K/A Mary T. Williams

760 F.2d 327 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 30, 1985

This was clearly sufficient to inform the jury of the .“essential nature” of the conspiratorial agreement — the meeting of minds — that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. … This deletion was clearly appropriate, and we join other circuits in disapproving the inclusion of the old instruction on the standard of admissibility. See United States v.

U.S. Department of the Treasury v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

996 F.2d 1246 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 29, 1993

The Circular states that, except for the agency’s own internal appeal system, “[t]his Circular and its Supplement shall not ... establish and shall not be construed to create any substantive or procedural basis for anyone … Since the OMB Circular was clearly a regulation, the union had a legitimate right to bargain over grievance procedures to enforce or implement that regulation.

J.G.G. v. Donald Trump (EN BANC ORDER)

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 14, 2025

The government has never asserted any immunity or privilege to withhold the identities of the decision makers. … In merely seeking information about the government’s apparent contempt of court, the district court did not violate any nondiscretionary duty nor clearly abuse its discretion.

United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC

347 F. Supp. 3d 38 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 15, 2018

This need to establish deception explains the D.C. Circuit's decision in In re Sealed Case , 223 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 2000), on which Concord relies. … And it defines "independent expenditure[s]" to include "an expenditure by a person ... expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id. § 30101(17).

William R. Tucker, Marion J. Tucker v. Maurice M. Meredith

232 F.2d 347 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 17, 1956

Meredith answered, first, that the complaint failed to state a claim against him upon which relief could be granted and, second, he pleaded facts which, if established as such, showed him to be a holder in due course. … For Meredith’s testimony, which the trial court believed, showed affirmatively that he fully qualified as a holder in due course under the defining statute. The Tuckers proved nothing to the contrary.

National Aviation Trades Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board

420 F.2d 209 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 2, 1969

Finally, the need for such a detailed investigation is explained by the fact the Board’s approval of an agreement under section 408 confers immunity from the antitrust laws by virtue of section 414 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § … However, the witness further stated that in the Port Authority’s estimation, Pan American was “qualified to promote and fully develop Teterboro over the shortest interval of time”; specifically, Pan American has a detailed

Pittsburgh Press Company v. National Labor Relations Board, Pittsburgh Mailers Union Local No. 22, Intervenor

977 F.2d 652 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 27, 1992

Standard of Review Under well-established principles of deference, we must uphold the Board’s determination unless it has “acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts at issue.” … The General Counsel’s offer of proof would have established that the Union’s participation in the call-in system took place entirely at Press expense.

Clifton Terrace Associates, Limited v. United Technologies Corporation

929 F.2d 714 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 5, 1991

The court concluded that the language of section 804(a) does not reach Otis’s actions because it is clearly confined to discrimination by the providers of housing. Id. … attempted to obtain elevator service from Otis and was refused; that it was “qualified” to be Otis’s customer because it was willing and able to pay for the service; and that at the time Otis refused to deal, Otis continued

Perkins v. Beryhill

379 F. Supp. 3d 1 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 7, 2019

To qualify for Supplemental Security Income, a claimant must establish that she is "disabled." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (a)(1)(D), 1382(a)(1). … More so than in these cases, the record here is far from clearly substantiating a disability.

I.A.M. National Pension Fund, Plan A, a Benefits v. Clinton Engines Corporation, (Two Cases). I.A.M. National Pension Fund, Benefit Plan a v. Cooper Industries, Inc

825 F.2d 415 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 28, 1987

On the basis of Congress' clearly expressed intent, we conclude that the employers in these cases were bound initially to resort to arbitration. … No. 86-7015, at 29-34 15 As discussed supra text at 7-9; see also supra notes 12-13, Cooper's dispute concerned whether a sale of one of its divisions qualified for the exemption contained in 29 U.S.C.

Bernard Feinberg v. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

522 F.2d 1335 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 17, 1975

constitutes a valid exercise of Congressional power in an *1338 area in which the Congress clearly has jurisdiction. … Although the Court specifically held that jurisdictional withdrawal provisions are not automatically inapplicable where constitutional claims are raised, it qualified this holding by stating: This is not a case in which an

Johnson v. Matthews, United States Marshal

182 F.2d 677 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 1, 1950

be afforded opportunity to prove his allegations. 17 We do not deviate from that rule or qualify its unequivocal terms. … Pennsylvania, in the Third Circuit, does not appear to have been immune from these allegations. In Commonwealth v.

Remola Boykin v. The District of Columbia

689 F.2d 1092 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 10, 1982

It is now well established that a private cause of action exists against federal officials for the violation ■ of Fourth Amendment rights. Bivens v. … Sweeney, 573 F.2d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978) (sovereign immunity protects municipalities from respondeat superior liability in Bivens claims). Tarpley v.

The Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States

409 F.2d 1146 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 18, 1969

claim to be a religion and hence within the protection of the First Amendment, they have shown that the Founding Church of Scientology is incorporated as a church in the District of Columbia, and that its ministers are qualified … Were the literature here introduced clearly secular, we might well conclude that under existing law it constituted “labeling” for purposes of jUje Act.

Valero Energy Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency

927 F.3d 532 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 25, 2019

Nonetheless, EPA concludes that they suffice to establish compliance with the requirements of § 7545(o)(11). … We have never held that legal novelty alone establishes finality.

Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

631 F.3d 543 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 18, 2011

The parties have radically different ideas as to which of these orders qualifies as “the first order ... imposing quality bank adjustments.” In the Compliance Order, the Commission chose its Hearing Order. … Our observation here is not the standard claim that if Congress preferred a particular outcome it could have expressed the idea more clearly (a proposition that is always true in any seriously disputed case, and therefore

Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management

460 F.3d 13 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 18, 2006

The individual roundups might qualify; the Bureau’s budget proposal does not. … But the record does not establish, at this stage, that the Instruction Memorandum has been withdrawn.

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

347 F.3d 964 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 7, 2003

FERC may then order refunds for any period subsequent to the ‘‘refund effective date,’’ a date FERC establishes that must be at least sixty days after the filing of the complaint. Id. § 824e(b). … Although it is true that in their initial complaint, the LSEs did not describe their claim as one of tariff violation, they clearly did so in their rehearing request.

John Miller, Jr. v. Hillary Clinton

687 F.3d 1332 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 7, 2012

But the authorship and formality of both the LCP and the PSA are so uncertain that we are doubtful either would qualify for Chevron deference. See Pub. … Whenever Congress has decided to exempt either groups of U.S. citizens or specified circumstances from the coverage of those statutes, it has done so clearly.