Case law

United States v. Webb, Dennis L.

255 F.3d 890 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 27, 2001

However, because of his two prior narcotics convictions, Webb qualified as a career offender. … All defendants qualifying as career offenders re- ceive a criminal history Category of VI. Id. life. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.

Andrew L. Stone v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. No. 87-1589

865 F.2d 342 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 10, 1989

Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the language of the Tax Court Rule applicable to this case (and still applicable under a different number) sought to establish the relatively high level of deference that the phrase “clearly … Moreover, reading Rule 182(d) as establishing a clearly erroneous standard gives its “due regard” language the same meaning as the similar phrase has in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 4 Cf.

Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep't of Energy

287 F. Supp. 3d 50 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 12, 2018

An agency's release of records in response to a FOIA request qualifies as an official and documented disclosure. … In this case, although Sandia's misdeeds became public, they hardly qualify as a "well-publicized scandal" that captured the public's attention.

Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. United States Department of the Interior

282 F.3d 818 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 1, 2002

An Act to Establish a National Park Service, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 595 (1916). … Replacement of a foundation, according to the conces- sioners, also would clearly be a capital improvement; accord- ing to the Park Service it would not qualify because a foundation is "merely a component of a structure

The Newspaper Guild v. Edward H. Levi, Attorney General

539 F.2d 755 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 19, 1976

This is particularly true since the original proposed regulation did not limit the filing requirements to newspapers seeking antitrust immunity. See 36 Fed.Reg. 20435, discussed supra. … The concept of a limited newspaper exemption from antitrust law clearly pervades the Act and the history of its enactment. Within the statute itself, this antitrust milieu is evident.

United States v. James Little

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 18, 2023

But Congress often borrows established legal phrasing when it writes statutes. See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012). … With the 1994 amendment, Congress clearly intended to authorize probation “for petty offenses” in instances where probation was not previously allowed.

Hobart N. Crocker, Jr. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.

933 F.2d 1024 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 24, 1991

The EPP, as enacted, provides two benefits for a displaced airline employee who qualifies as a “protected employee,” that is, an employee who “on October 24, 1978, ha[d] been employed for at least 4 years by an air carrier … Second, had Congress intended that the right of first hire be lost upon hiring by any carrier subject to regulation, it could easily and clearly have expressed that intent in the statutory language.

Schreiber v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.

11 F.3d 217 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 28, 1993

If the agency fails to establish the privilege with respect to the subpoenaed material, then the documents must be produced. … If the factual and privileged material are inextricably intertwined, then the court must determine whether the privilege, which is qualified, should be overridden for good cause and the documents produced.

American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission

978 F.2d 727 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 13, 1992

It is well established that a rule may be reviewed when it is applied in an adjudication — an agency need not explicitly reassess the validity of a rule to subject the rule to challenge on review. See NLRB Union v. … The Report, and the Commission’s desire to protect it, clearly provided the underlying rationale for the order under review.

Michael F. Dilley, Captain, U.S. Army Reserve v. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army Raymond W. Fontaine, Major, U.S. Army Reserve v. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army Milton D. O'Quinn v. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army. Major Russell A. Powell v. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army

603 F.2d 914 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 26, 1979

The military departments enjoy no immunity from this proscription. See Harmon v. Brucker, supra; Geiger v. Brown, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 135-37 , 419 F.2d 714, 717-19 (1969); Roberts v. … The Army construes this to mean that Reserve officers shall be included when "qualified and available." App. at 143.

Chai v. Department of State

466 F.3d 125 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 17, 2006

Clearly, Kach/Kahane Chai took a strong interest in the affair, as indicated by the demonstrations at the home of the Shin Bet official. … And it is established that the restraints imposed upon a FTO by the AEDPA — namely the organization’s loss of access to funds held by financial institutions subject to United States law, the inability of alien representatives

LaRouche, Lyndon H. v. Fowler, Donald L.

152 F.3d 974 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 28, 1998

Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972), subsequently established that all disputes over internal party rules are nonjusticiable. … If a party must produce the nation's "uncontested choice" for President of the United States to qualify as a state actor, the Democratic (or Republican) Party plainly does not qualify.

Manual De J. Gomez v. Jerry v. Wilson, Chief of Police

477 F.2d 411 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 23, 1973

As a part of our appellate jurisdiction, we .are empowered to “remand the cause and . . .require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” *417 29 This broad authorization clearly encompasses … The record is barren of any further effort by the parties to either establish or disestablish this jurisdictional element, and of any determination by the District Court on that score.

National Geographic Society v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, Lucy Arlene Thomas. National Geographic Society v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, Laura H. Dorsey. National Geographic Society v. District Unemployment Compensation Board

438 F.2d 154 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 8, 1970

I. 6 The District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act and regulations adopted pursuant to that Act establish the guidelines for determining whether these claimants are eligible for benefits and also establish the procedures … In that case, however, the Examiner explained that there were only a few jobs for which the claimant was qualified, that he made very strenuous efforts to obtain the job he sought, and that his chances of obtaining the job

United States v. Allen R. Hawkins

104 F.3d 437 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 19, 1997

While neither school nor swimming pool is defined in the Act, the other three terms are defined in a way that clearly implies that the whole statute is directed only to facilities where one would expect young people to congregate … As here used and qualified, a reasonable juror could take the word “school” to refer to an operating school. We therefore reject Hawkins’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him. C.

Frank B. James v. United States Department of Health and Human Services

824 F.2d 1132 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 24, 1987

First promulgated in 1978, they allow any Indian group that is not currently acknowledged by the Department of the Interior to apply for federal recognition, thereby qualifying for federal protection, services and benefits … Ensuring that the congressional determination that others similarly situated use the administrative procedures to achieve federal recognition is clearly served.

Conecuh-Monroe Community Action Agency v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, United States Department of Health & Human Services

852 F.2d 581 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 26, 1988

HHS contends that such loss of territory does not qualify as a “termination” and therefore does not trigger the direct funding obligation. b). … Such a transfer, in other words, may not qualify as a protected “termination.”

Inst. for Truth in Mktg. v. Total Health Network Corp.

321 F. Supp. 3d 76 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 13, 2018

Stacked next to these issues, the question of whether Total Health's marketing practices violated one of the federal standards for deceptive advertising hardly qualifies as "substantial" *87 in the context of the federal … But the amount in controversy does not clearly exceed the statutory threshold of $75,000 under the circumstances presented here. See Organic Consumers Ass'n , 222 F.Supp.3d at 77 .

United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert International Construction, Inc.

608 F.3d 871 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 22, 2010

The court clearly did not abuse that discretion. … This standard is clearly satisfied here.

Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. v. Federal Maritime Commission

342 F.2d 924 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 17, 1964

We were prepared to affirm the Commission if it could establish that *926 the circumstances were such as not to make it unfair to assess damages against Flota. … The Grace Line decision clearly did not settle the matter of the shipping companies’ obligations for the entire banana shipping industry. 6 The physical differences between Flota’s and Grace’s ships would make it more difficult