Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell

    830 F.3d 552 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 29, 2016

    At the time there was no prohibition on qualifying for both exceptions at the same time, but that changed in 2008. See Confederated Tribes, 75 F. … That sentence does not mean, however, that the IRA is wholly immune to a Chevron analysis. 12 We thus turn to the text of the statute, which defines “Indian” as: [1] [A]ll persons

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Potomac Passengers Association v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, a Corporation

    520 F.2d 91 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 25, 1975

    Although this doctrine has been criticized as often advancing form over substance, it is firmly established. … Central of Georgia Railway Co., whose complaint clearly made out a violation of the Amtrak Act and which had also been dismissed for lack of standing.

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • Air Alliance Hous. v. U.S. Chem. & Safety Hazard Investigation Bd.

    365 F. Supp. 3d 118 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 4, 2019

    The case for informational standing is clearly stronger in this case. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Friends of Animals v. Jewell also contradicts the Board's excessively narrow view of informational standing. … In the past, the CSB readily conceded that "a reporting regulation is clearly required by the statute." Chemical Release Reporting at 30,260. It does not contend otherwise now.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Campaign Legal Center v. FEC

    952 F.3d 352 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 13, 2020

    (“The statute clearly requires that for any official Commission decision there must be at least a 4-2 majority vote.”). -11- Reasons at 6 n.36 (J.A. 152). … What is particularly troubling in this case is that the Commission’s position in CREW was perfectly consistent with the well-established law of the circuit.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Richard D. Meehan v. John W. MacY Jr., Chairman, Civil Service Commission

    392 F.2d 822 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 22, 1968

    The regulation by its terms provides for presentations within official channels, and establishes no special warrant for appeals to the public. … The fact that appellant was a union president does not establish legal immunity.

    Modified by Richard D. Meehan v. John W. MacY Jr., Chairman, Civil Service Commission, 425 F.2d 469 (1968)Cited 120 timesPublished
  • Cohen v. United States

    650 F.3d 717 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 1, 2011

    Nevertheless, establishing our jurisdiction over Appellants’ claim for declaratory relief is not an academic exercise. … FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 700 (D.C.Cir.2003). “[0]nce we have determined that an issue is clearly fit for review, there is no need to consider ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Action for Children

    Cited 89 timesPublished
  • Associated Builders and Contractors v. Patricia Shiu

    773 F.3d 257 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 12, 2014

    The goal establishes “a benchmark against which the contractor must measure the representation of individuals” with disabilities. Id. § 60– 5 741.45. … Rather, the word “qualified” describes the statute’s beneficiaries—“qualified individuals with disabilities.”

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • United States v. Mary Rose Oakar and Joseph Demio

    111 F.3d 146 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 18, 1997

    United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 , 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907-08 , 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (indictment can set forth offense in language of statute itself as long as that language clearly sets out all elements). … how one defines the Justice Department’s “jurisdiction,” and whether the perjurious statement itself was “in a matter” within that jurisdiction, see pp. 161-62 below, than on whether statements in courtrooms are somehow immune

    Cited 74 timesPublished
  • New Jersey Chapter Incorporated of the American Physical Therapy Association, Inc. v. The Prudential Life Insurance Company of America

    502 F.2d 500 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 3, 1974

    Thus, the effect of the guidelines is to provide for automatic payment of physical therapy costs when they do not exceed the adjusted rate charged by salaried therapists; for the provider incurring such costs has clearly … In other words the guidelines establish a level of costs which Prudential will pay without additional proof of their reasonableness.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • In Re Samuel R. PIERCE, Jr. (Kisner Fee Application)

    178 F.3d 1356 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 22, 1999

    Because the Act “constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity it is to be strictly construed.” In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1991) (per curiam). … Therefore, in order to establish eligibility for counsel fees under the “but for” test, Kisner must either put his facts within category three or four or otherwise establish the necessary unique special features.

    Cited 36 timesPublished
  • Bermudez v. United States Department of Agriculture

    490 F.2d 718 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 10, 1973

    In any event this court does not base its decision upon any sovereign immunity which the State may possess but rather upon the fact that the statute creating the federal right clearly shows a congressional intent to hold … The district court specifically so found. 24 In addition, the plaintiffs must meet one of the established under subsection (b) of Rule 23.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Palestine Information Office v. George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

    853 F.2d 932 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 5, 1988

    The PLO is accorded certain privileges and immunities by virtue of its status as an observer to the United Nations. … To support its position under the statute, then, the Government must establish the PIO is an entity substantially owned or effectively controlled by an organization granted official privileges and immunities under United

    Cited 48 timesPublished
  • Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Jack Anderson

    746 F.2d 1563 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 2, 1984

    One further clarification is needed: In reviewing the district court’s application of the foregoing principle, we do not defer *1572 to its conclusions and reverse only if they are clearly erroneous. … In our view, all of the assertions in allegation 25 except those repeated elsewhere 8 also qualify as opinion.

    Vacated on other grounds by Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)Cited 57 timesPublished
  • National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Department of Education

    366 F.3d 930 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 14, 2004

    Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“The APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not.”). … However, the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 702 is limited by the “adequate remedy” bar of § 704. See Transohio Sav. Bank v.

    Abrogated on other grounds by Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (2017)Cited 247 timesPublished
  • Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs & Washington Legal Foundation v. Von Eschenbach

    445 F.3d 470 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 2, 2006

    District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C.Cir.2001), the court confronted, in the context of a qualified immunity defense, the claim of a substantive due process right to life, personal security, and bodily integrity. … immunity, id. at 1310-11 , bears no legal or factual relevance to the question before this court.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Securities & Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.

    758 F.3d 357 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 18, 2014

    Congress established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to protect investors’ assets held on deposit by financially distressed brokerage firms. … We, like other courts, understand that provision to establish that “a claimant cannot qualify for customer status under SIPA to the extent that he or she is a lender rather than an investor.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 12.12

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • USA v. USCC Wireless Investment, Inc.

    128 F.4th 276 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 11, 2025

    To implement this statutory goal, the FCC established a program that provides qualifying small businesses, i.e., designated entities, with bidding credits that effectively discount the cost of their licenses. … Unless Congress “clearly states” that a statutory limitation is jurisdictional, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • McCreary, Maurice v. Offner, Paul

    172 F.3d 76 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 13, 1999

    In 1986, Congress expanded the buy-in program beyond dual eligibles to include a newly created category of "qualified medicare beneficiaries" ("QMBs"): elderly people not quite poor enough to qualify for Medicaid but … II According to the doctors, pre-1997 law clearly required states to reimburse them for all Part B cost-sharing obli- gations incurred by QMBs.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coalition v. District of Columbia

    846 F.3d 391 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 24, 2017

    The three justices who concurred in Reed also clearly would not strictly scrutinize the rule we face here. … Section 1983 “give[s] a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position.” Monroe v.

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • United States v. Civil Aeronautics Board

    511 F.2d 1315 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 23, 1975

    So much was virtually conceded by the Board when it established a full-scale evidentiary inquiry into the earlier economic capacity reduction agreements. … He points out that this is because the granting of antitrust immunity “is not lightly implied” and because “[c]artels of any kind derogate from this country’s free enterprise system.

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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