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  • Michael Brainerd v. County of Lake

    357 F. App'x 88 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 24, 2009

    Even if probable cause were lacking, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the deputies on the basis of qualified immunity because the deputies were reasonable in concluding that they had probable cause … And, even if the entry was not justified by either, the deputies are protected by qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have thought that it was. 4 See Franklin

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Rodriguez v. Smith

    541 F.3d 1180 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 4, 2008

    If the statute is clear, we then decide whether the BOP’s regulations violate that clearly expressed intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 . … In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the Commission had not "clearly said whether confinement in a community treatment center qualifies as incarceration,” and relied upon the rule of lenity as further support for our

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • McDougal v. County of Imperial

    942 F.2d 668 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 20, 1991

    County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 , 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2386 , 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), as “clearly” indicating that the County might avoid “ ‘the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the … However, they have no obligation to “establish” the illegitimacy of the County’s *680 motivations on a motion to dismiss.

    Overruled on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)Cited 142 timesPublished
  • United States v. Edward Kail, United States of America v. Seymour Bergen, United States of America v. Russell Callahan, United States of America v. Clarence Elden Freeman

    612 F.2d 443 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 13, 1980

    In paragraph 45 of the affidavit, Shaver averred that confidential informants stated that even if they were immunized and given protective custody they would be unwilling to testify at any proceedings for fear of their safety … S.Ct. 961 , 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969)) hearing, the district court found that the Government had sustained its burden of showing that the affidavit was not derived from illegal wiretap. 20 The district court's finding was not clearly

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Brisco v. Shinn

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 13, 2025

    immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim. … County of San Diego, 28 F.3d 89, 93 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the issue of qualified immunity “should be addressed in the first instance by the district court”). 5

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Fmc v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes

    905 F.2d 1311 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 18, 1990

    The Tribes and amicus argue for a more deferential standard of clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious on both factual and legal questions, while FMC argues for clearly erroneous on factual questions and de novo on … Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 , 105 S.Ct. 2447 , 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), which established that a federal court must initially "stay[ ] its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Anthony Garcia v. Tom L. Carey, Warden

    395 F.3d 1099 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 20, 2005

    The clearly established law, as we have already stated, is Jackson v. … These robberies helped to qualify El Monte Flores as a "criminal street gang,” see CAL.

    Declined to follow by Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210 (2010)Cited 40 timesPublished
  • Ackerman-Chillingworth, Division of Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n

    579 F.2d 484 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 22, 1978

    Thus, the anticompetitive effects of the closed agency relationship were clearly “intended.” (See also Albrecht v. … On summary judgment, however, the burden was upon the defendants, who moved for summary judgment, clearly to establish the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact material to judgment in their favor. (E. g., SEC v.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Marsha Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., a Delaware Corporation

    150 F.3d 1217 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 31, 1998

    Guthier and Ruschman had primary responsibility for selecting the qualified candidates for the marketing manager positions. … We have held, clearly, that a plaintiff at the pretext stage must produce evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie ease in order to rebut the defendant’s showing.

    Cited 509 timesPublished
  • Forester v. Ins

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 29, 2007

    Sovereign immunity is a threshold question that is sometimes described as “jurisdictional.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990). … Waiver of sovereign immunity will be strictly construed in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Terry Christensen

    801 F.3d 970 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 25, 2015

    The Fifth Circuit has persuasively rejected a similar argument: A fair reading of Skilling ... reveals that the Court was establishing a uniform national standard by construing § 1346 to clearly exclude conduct outside of … Neither did the recordings qualify for protection under the work product doctrine. 1.

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Sidell T. PIRUS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of HHS, Defendant-Appellant

    869 F.2d 536 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 9, 1989

    The “special factor” suggested by Congress as an example— “the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved” — received considerable attention. … We cannot say that these findings were clearly erroneous, nor that it was an abuse of discretion for the district judge, on the basis of these findings, to award fees in excess of the statutory cap. 8 Since we affirm the

    Cited 76 timesPublished
  • Simon J. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd. Midway Hospital Medical Center the Medical Staff of Midway Hospital Medical Center Mitchell Feldman

    894 F.2d 1024 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 25, 1990

    Under the Midcal test, “ ‘the challenged restraint must be “one clearly articulated *1029 and affirmatively expressed as state policy,"'" and "the anti-competitive conduct `must be "actively supervised" by the State itself … An attorney is not immune from antitrust liability if he becomes an active participant in formulating policy decisions with his client to restrain competition. See Tillamook Cheese and Dairy Ass'n v.

    Cited 48 timesPublished
  • Federal Trade Commission v. AT & T Mobility LLC

    835 F.3d 993 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 29, 2016

    AT&T filed a motion to dismiss the FTC’s Complaint, contending that it is immune from liability under section 5 because of its status as a common carrier. … Grant Brothers Construction Company, 228 U.S. 177 (1913), for example, the Court noted “the established doctrine . . . that common carriers cannot secure immunity from liability for their negligence by any sort of stipulation

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Boose v. TRI-COUNTY METRO. TRANSP. DIST. OF OREGON

    587 F.3d 997 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 23, 2009

    These regulations must establish, inter alia, “minimum service criteria for determining the level of services to be required under this section.” Id. § 12143(c)(3). … However, because this regulation also uses the qualifying term “applicable,” it does not purport to extend the reach of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Punikaia v. Clark

    720 F.2d 564 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 7, 1983

    These interpretations of state law are not clearly wrong. … Even assuming that the patients qualify as third-party beneficiaries, their argument fails.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • No. 98-17072

    225 F.3d 1068 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 18, 2000

    Having found that "the Skyy bottle is clearly a preexisting work," the court further held that the bottle's "trade dress (the blue bottle, the gold label, etc.) and copyrighted material (the label and all non-utilitarian … That language is often invoked to immunize from liability similarity of incidents or plot that necessarily follows from a common theme or setting.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lindquist v. King County

    89 F.3d 845 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 29, 1996

    Lindquist argues that the search of his residence was unlawful and his constitutional rights were violated. 3 We AFFIRM. 4 Officers Tucker and Lewis are entitled to qualified immunity if, "in light of clearly established … can be established. 6 The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. * The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Howenstine v. United States

    263 F. 1 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 2, 1920

    It is objected that there is no allegation that the persons to whom disloyal statements were made as charged were registered, or of age to require registration, or of an age to qualify them to enlist. … It clearly was not involved.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Joseph A. Radici, Theresa A. Radici, Michelle E. Radici v. Associated Insurance Companies, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Indiana

    217 F.3d 737 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 29, 2000

    COBRA beneficiaries must be treated in the same manner as similarly situated beneficiaries for whom a qualifying event has not taken place. See id. at § 300bb-2(l). … Although Moran is clearly on point, the opinion is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Moran’s counsel “conceded” that the PHSA had the same preemptive force as ERISA.

    Cited 9 timesPublished

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