Case law

Armando Valles v. County of Pima

502 F. App'x 651 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 19, 2012

The Lot Owners cannot establish promissory estoppel because the County made no promise to them which they could have reasonably relied upon. Chewning v. … Finally, the Lot Owners cannot prevail on their negligence claims, since the County and County officials are protected by Arizona’s qualified immunity statute. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.02.

United States v. Joe Charles Beaudion

416 F.3d 965 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 19, 2005

The addition of "possess[ion][of] a firearm” clearly broadens the realm of possible conduct that qualifies for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The 1998 amendments also added the definition of "brandish.” … An error not plain to the district court but which becomes plain by the time of appeal qualifies as plain error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). 6 .

Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 28, 2007

Lua, however, bears the burden to establish his eligibility thereun- der. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (“The respondent shall have the bur- den of establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege and … Of course, that analysis clearly rests in the text of the relevant statute, which in Taylor was the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). But the same analysis applies in  SANDOVAL-LUA v.

United States v. David H., Juvenile

29 F.3d 489 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 8, 1994

It merely establishes a basis for district court jurisdiction of prosecutions to which it applies. … The district court clearly erred when it looked beyond the statute to determine whether David H.’s actual conduct qualified *495 as a crime of violence triggering application of the mandatory transfer provisions of § 5032

Moore v. Czerniak

574 F.3d 1092 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 28, 2009

In Anderson , we held that the state court had unreasonably applied the clearly established law of Miranda v. … A contrary ruling would necessarily constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.

Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah County

556 F.3d 797 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 12, 2009

“It is well-established that an appellate court will not consider issues that were not properly raised before the district court.” Doi v. … Although being placed on administrative leave might qualify as an adverse employment action and we have suggested an investigation of an employee might so qualify, see, e.g., Poland v.

Dale Evans v. City of Los Angeles

446 F. App'x 4 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 26, 2011

Even if we determined that Machado had stepped over the “‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,’”3 we would be constrained to hold that he did not run afoul of clearly established law.4 Therefore, the district … court should have granted Machado qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. 3 See Saucier v.

United States v. Melchor-Meceno

620 F.3d 1180 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 1, 2010

Melchor- Meceno appeals, claiming his prior Colorado state conviction for menacing does not qualify as a “crime of violence.” … Grajeda, 581 F.3d at 1196-97 (holding that assault, a general intent crime, satisfied the mens rea requirement for a crime of violence, because it requires “an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish

Reynold Floyd Reep v. United States

557 F.2d 204 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 13, 1977

. § 8101 et seq.) establishes under the Secretary of Labor a program of workmen’s compensation for government employees injured in work-related accidents. … Injured federal employees must first pursue their administrative remedies before instituting actions under the FTCA 'unless their injuries are clearly not covered under FECA. Joyce v.

Christopher Parker v. City of Los Angeles

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 28, 2018

The district court therefore correctly found that a reasonable official in Sergeant Krempa’s position would not have understood that his actions violated clearly established law. See Anderson v. … The district court also did not err in holding that Officer Geitheim was entitled to qualified immunity on Parker’s excessive force claim based on the shove.

Hadley v. Olsen

953 F.2d 1387 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 3, 1992

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known … Thus, the district court correctly determined that Ekstrom's conduct did not violate clearly established law and granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 .

Kramer v. Tosco Corp.

233 F. App'x 593 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 14, 2007

In addition, we will not vacate a judgment when the party benefitting from the instructional error clearly satisfied its requisite burden of proof. See Modeler v. … A review of the evidence adduced at trial shows that Tosco clearly established that the rotating shift, tank farm duties, and emergency response responsibilities were essential functions of the Head Operator position, job-related

Neil M. Baizer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

204 F.3d 1231 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 1, 2000

II The Internal Revenue Code imposes taxes on a disqualified person who participates in a prohibited transaction with a qualified plan. … The tax court’s factual determination that a correction did not occur is not clearly erroneous.

United States v. Fred Lenn Jones

612 F.2d 453 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 13, 1980

This court must defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979). … The proscribed purpose was established. V.

Martin v. Naval Criminal Investigative Service

539 F. App'x 830 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 5, 2013

The law prohibiting Special Agent Martin’s alleged conduct is clearly established. “The question is not whether an earlier case mirrors the specific facts here. … Because plaintiff failed to state a plausible constitutional violation, defendant Martin was entitled to qualified immunity.

Nanubhai Patel v. City of Los Angeles

72 F.4th 1103 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 11, 2023

“The fact that the creditor has obtained a judgment establishing the monetary liability of the debtor gives it a strong interest in a prompt and inexpensive satisfaction of the debt.” Finberg v. … Nor do we reach whether the Sheriff’s Department and the County have immunity.

Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Ken Girouard, D/B/A Two Left Feet

994 F.2d 1359 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 18, 1993

We cannot find the district court clearly erroneous in its finding that FRUIT Of The LOOM was not diluted by FRUIT CUPS or FRUIT FLOPS. … Because “FRUIT” was found without clear error to be not strong enough to qualify for protection against dilution and because the finding of a lack of mental association of FRUIT with TLF’s products was not clearly erroneous

Flint v. Dennison

488 F.3d 816 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 31, 2007

DENNISON 6637 injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Rounds v. Or. … The Univer- sity, as required by Board of Regents policy, has established ASUM as the associated student organization on the campus.

Board of Trustees v. Whitewater Engineering Corp.

64 F. App'x 39 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 17, 2003

It is clearly established that the split-time rule applies to managerial employees who perform bargaining unit work. … However, it is well established that the terms are not coextensive.

United States v. John A. Walczak

783 F.2d 852 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 21, 1986

Congress has not specifically authorized the President to conclude executive agreements such as this in the realm of civil aviation, but clearly did contemplate that the executive branch would negotiate “agreement[s] with … foreign governments for the establishment or development of air navigation, including air routes and services.” 49 U.S.C. § 1462 (1982).