Nanubhai Patel v. City of Los Angeles

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NANUBHAI M. PATEL; No. 22-55294

LALITABEN N. PATEL; VIMAL

NANU PATEL; VIMAL, INC., a D.C. No.

California corporation, 8:21-cv-01707-

DOC-KES

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. OPINION

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a

municipal corporation; LOS

ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S

DEPARTMENT; DOES, 1 through

10, inclusive,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 8, 2023 *

Pasadena, California

*

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Filed July 11, 2023

Before: Susan P. Graber and John B. Owens, Circuit

Judges, and John R. Tunheim,** District Judge.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY ***

42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Pre-Seizure Notice

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment

dismissing for failure to state a claim a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action in which plaintiffs alleged that the Los Angeles

County Sheriff’s Department violated their constitutional

rights by failing to provide pre-seizure notice.

The Sheriff’s Department seized $98,000 from Plaintiffs

pursuant to a state court judgment.

The panel concluded that the district court correctly held

that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of

procedural due process. The panel considered the Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), factors: the competing

interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation under

existing procedures, and the value of substitute

procedures. First, the competing interests strongly weighed

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the

**

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

***

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

against a conclusion that plaintiffs’ procedural due process

rights were violated. The City as creditor had a clear interest

in collecting the money judgment because it prevailed before

the California trial court and on appeal, and plaintiffs did not

allege that the funds were exempt or were needed for

subsistence. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation under

California’s procedures was small because the procedures

required the clerk of the court only to transcribe the amount

of the money judgment and take account of statutory

defenses like the exemptions asserted by a judgment

debtor. Finally, given the small risk of erroneous

deprivation, the value of the substitute procedure proposed

by plaintiffs did not outweigh the strong interests of the

City. The judgment put plaintiffs on notice to apply for

exemptions, which plaintiffs did not do. In addition, courts

have largely rejected the suggestion that pre-deprivation

notice is constitutionally required.

4 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

COUNSEL

Frank A. Weiser, Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Amber A. Logan, Logan Mathevosian & Hur LLP, Los

Angeles, California; Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City

Attorney; Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney;

Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney; Office of the Los

Angeles City Attorney; Los Angeles, California; Henry P.

Nelson, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, California; for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs Nanubhai M. Patel, Lalitaben N. Patel, Vimal

Nanu Patel, and Vimal, Inc., timely appeal from the district

court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for failure

to state a claim. After the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) seized $98,000

from Plaintiffs pursuant to a state court judgment, Plaintiffs

brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the failure

to provide pre-seizure notice violated their constitutional

rights. Reviewing de novo the dismissal, Bolden-Hardge v.

Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1220 (9th Cir.

2023), we affirm.

I. Background

In May 2018, the City of Los Angeles (the “City”)

brought an action against Plaintiffs for abatement, unfair

PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

competition, and public nuisance regarding their ownership

of a motel. After contested proceedings, the state court

entered judgment in the City’s favor in November 2019,

issued injunctive relief, and required Plaintiffs to pay the

City $98,318.71. The California Court of Appeal dismissed

Plaintiffs’ appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied

review in March 2021. At no time did Plaintiffs file for an

exemption. 1

On September 22, 2021, at the request of the City, a state

court issued a writ of execution in the amount of the

judgment. About six days later, the Sheriff’s Department

executed the writ against Plaintiffs’ personal and business

bank accounts at Bank of America and seized approximately

$98,000.

Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the

City, the Sheriff’s Department, and the County of Los

Angeles (the “County”) on October 14, 2021. A month later,

Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, the operative

complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the seizure of funds without

notice violated their procedural due process and other

constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’

motion to dismiss, holding in relevant part that Defendants’

execution of the writ in compliance with California’s post-

judgment collection procedures did not violate Plaintiffs’

due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 to review this timely appeal.

1

Under California law, judgment debtors may file to exempt certain

essential funds from execution of a judgment. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 703.030(a).

6 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

II. Due Process Analysis

The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to

state a claim for a violation of procedural due process. 2 To

determine whether there has been a due process violation,

we consider the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),

factors, which “include the competing interests at stake, the

risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures, and

the value of substitute procedures.” Duranceau v. Wallace,

743 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1984).

The competing interests strongly weigh against a

conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights

were violated. “The fact that the creditor has obtained a

judgment establishing the monetary liability of the debtor

gives it a strong interest in a prompt and inexpensive

satisfaction of the debt.” Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50,

58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc); see also Duranceau, 743 F.2d

at 711 (reasoning that states have a general interest in “the

effective enforcement of judgments”). In this case, the City

as creditor has a clear interest in collecting the money

judgment because it prevailed before the California trial

court and on appeal. Although a judgment debtor has a

strong interest in protecting statutorily exempt funds,

especially those needed for subsistence, e.g., Betts v. Tom,

431 F. Supp. 1369, 1375–77 (D. Haw. 1977), Plaintiffs have

not alleged—in either the original complaint or the first

amended complaint—that the funds are exempt or are

2

We reject the City’s argument that we should dismiss the appeal as

defective because Plaintiffs copied and pasted sections of their district

court brief. Although Plaintiffs repeat verbatim some of the arguments

that they made to the district court, those arguments are relevant to our

court as well. Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure nor any

other binding legal authorities require that we dismiss the appeal.

PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

needed for subsistence. In these circumstances, the City’s

interest in retaining the funds outweighs Plaintiffs’. See,

e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Invs., 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 1985)

(“The debtor’s interest in preserving non-exempt property

for his or her own use is of course subservient to the

creditor’s judgment.”).

The risk of erroneous deprivation under California’s

procedures is small because the procedures require the clerk

of the court only to transcribe the amount of the money

judgment and “take account of statutory defenses like the

earnings exemptions asserted by [a judgment debtor].”

Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 712 (noting, in similar

circumstances, that “the sources of error are few”); Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 699.510(a) (outlining the procedure for the

issuance of a writ of execution); Civ. Proc. § 699.520(f)–(g).

Further, under California procedures, certain property is

exempt automatically, without action by the debtor. See,

e.g., Civ. Proc. § 704.080 (deposit accounts that receive

public benefit or social security payments); Civ. Proc.

§ 704.120 (unemployment benefits); Civ. Proc. § 704.170

(aid payments from charitable organizations); Civ. Proc.

§ 704.220 (money in a deposit account equal to a minimum

standard of living).

Given the small risk of erroneous deprivation, the value

of the substitute procedure proposed by Plaintiffs does not

outweigh the strong interests of the City. Plaintiffs contend

that no safeguards prior to seizure exist in California and

suggest that they must receive notice before execution of the

writ to protect exempt property. But the value of pre-

deprivation notice—the substitute procedure—is de minimis

because Plaintiffs already had a contested court proceeding

that resulted in entry of the judgment. The judgment put

Plaintiffs on notice to apply for exemptions. See Civ. Proc.

8 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

§§ 703.020(b)(1), 703.030(a) (indicating that the judgment

debtor may claim exemptions and the time and manner to do

so); see also Phillips v. Bartolomie, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 62

(Ct. App. 1975) (noting that a judgment debtor could file an

exemption “immediately after the judgment is entered”).

Moreover, as mentioned above, California has several

automatic exemptions that apply without action by the

debtor. Plaintiffs did not invoke these statutory safeguards,

assert that their funds are exempt, or state that the funds are

necessary for subsistence. Additional notice prior to

execution of the writ would therefore not reduce the risk of

erroneous deprivation.

In addition, courts have largely rejected the suggestion

that pre-deprivation notice is constitutionally required. E.g.,

McCahey, 774 F.2d at 550; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of

Duval, 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976); but see Betts,

431 F. Supp. at 1377–78 (holding a Hawaii statute

unconstitutional because it permitted garnishment of a bank

account containing funds from an aid grant without pre-

deprivation notice). Because the City’s interests outweigh

Plaintiffs’, the risk of erroneous deprivation is small, and the

value of the substitute procedure is minimal, we join those

courts in holding that the lack of pre-deprivation notice did

not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights in this particular

situation. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“[D]ue process is

flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands.” (cleaned up)).

PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’

Fourth and Fifth Amendment 3 and Equal Protection claims. 4

We need not reach the remaining issues. 5

AFFIRMED.

3

Plaintiffs briefly challenge the dismissal of their Fourth and Fifth

Amendment claims on the basis of a due process violation, but those

claims fail because there was no due process violation.

4

Plaintiffs rest their equal protection claim on a comparison between

pre- and post-judgment debtors. However, this comparison is misplaced:

post-judgment debtors clearly differ from pre-judgment debtors because

post-judgment debtors already have had a judicial proceeding. See

Brown, 539 F.2d at 1366; Wyshak v. Wyshak, 138 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812–

13 (Ct. App. 1977) (emphasizing the different due process concerns of

pre-judgement and post-judgment debtors). Because the distinction is

rational, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim cannot succeed on this ground.

5

Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief does not mention the First Amendment, so

they have forfeited any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of that

claim. See Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874, 880 n.7 (9th Cir.

2021). They also do not argue “specifically and distinctly” that the

district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend, so we do

not review that issue. Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.

1994). Nor do we reach whether the Sheriff’s Department and the

County have immunity.