Case law

United States v. Washington

394 F.3d 1152 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 6, 2005

Nor have the appellants clearly established the continuous informal cultural influence they concede is required. 80 The appellants' members are descended from treaty tribes, but they have intermarried with non-Indians and … That may be true of some members of tribes whose treaty status has been established.

Roberto v. Aguon

519 F.2d 754 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 8, 1975

(R.T. 294). 39 Our only concern on this claimed error is whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous. … But we need not speculate, for very clearly Guerrero did not qualify either as an expert medical witness, or as an intimate acquaintance. (People v.

Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.

432 F.2d 755 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 5, 1970

The rationale underlying the NoerrPennington defense does not dictate immunity for .this alleged conspiracy. … The allegations of the complaint are clearly sufficient to allow their proof,

Crane v. Arizona Republic

972 F.2d 1511 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 21, 1992

We also hold, however, that section 47(4) does not immunize The Arizona Republic from liability on the juxtaposing claim. II. … Actual Malice The district court ruled, in the alternative, that Henderson, as a public official, failed to establish actual malice on the part of The Arizona Republic.

Roberto Hernandez Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada Morgan Harris Thomas Rigsby

279 F.3d 1102 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 8, 2002

For liability to attach, a Monell plaintiff must establish the alleged inaction is so “closely related to the ultimate injury” as to constitute the “moving force behind” it. … If polygraph evidence may be used at trial, then its use by the County to assist the decision-making process here under review is clearly not constitutionally suspect.

United States v. Alvaro Gonzalez-Monterroso

745 F.3d 1237 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 14, 2014

Because documents in the record established that Gonzalez was 28 and the victim was 14 at the time of the state offense, the PSR concluded that Gonzalez had been convicted of a state offense that qualified as “sexual abuse … Our recent decisions in Caceres-Olla and Gomez clearly foreclose the government’s arguments.

Michael Hartsell v. County of San Diego

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 21, 2020

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”; and (2) if so, “whether the right was clearly established.” … Accordingly, the district court properly denied qualified immunity in part.

Stone v. Stone

632 F.2d 740 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 29, 1980

II The district court’s ruling on the merits was clearly correct. As our decision in Carpenters Pension Trust v. … Bryant sued her former husband and his pension plan for a declaratory judgment establishing her community property share of her husband’s pension benefits. The superior court found in favor of Mrs.

United States v. Claudio Salcido-Corrales

249 F.3d 1151 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 22, 2001

This may or may not be so, but it does not establish the clear error required for reversal. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” … We therefore conclude that the district judge’s ruling that an adjustment was warranted under § 3B1.1(c) was not clearly erroneous.

Carmona v. Carmona

544 F.3d 988 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 17, 2008

Tise established that a state court domestic relations order may be qualified even after a participant’s death, “[b]ecause a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest.” 234 F.3d at 421. … The Supreme Court has observed that the preemption provision is “clearly expansive” but that it cannot be taken “to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy.” Egelhoff v.

Fred Snow, Harold Snow and Tom Snow, D/B/A Snow & Sons v. National Labor Relations Board

308 F.2d 687 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 28, 1962

The Board is not limited in its power to reverse an examiner’s findings to cases in which the latter are “clearly erroneous.” … The basis of this conclusion is not clearly indicated by the trial examiner’s intermediate report and recommended order.

Gibson v. Merced County Department Of Human Resources

799 F.2d 582 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 12, 1986

, and (5) that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified good faith immunity. … As in Drummond, the foster care contract between the plaintiffs and defendants clearly did not create any expectation of a continuing relationship between the foster parents and child.

George Villegas, Bob Poelker, Marcelo Orta, and Don Derosiers v. City of Gilroy, and Gilroy Garlic Festival Association, Inc.

484 F.3d 1136 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 30, 2007

Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 , 94 S.Ct. 2727 , 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974), may also qualify for First Amendment protection. … There is nothing in the record tending to establish such a common message.

Nicholas Defiore v. Soc LLC

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 25, 2023

San Diego, 865 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2017) (assuming, without discussion, that an agency can qualify as an “officer”)). … SOC LLC any significant federal contractor with a colorable federal defense would not qualify for federal officer removal under § 1442.

United States v. Hermanek

289 F.3d 1076 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 15, 2002

Addressing the question of words experienced for the first time in this case, the court ruled over defense objection that: “The agents or witnesses need not state that the exact word is clearly established in the drug world … Having thus established the scope of permissible testimony, the court deferred to trial a determination of whether any witness in particular was qualified as an expert.

Kazarian v. US Citizenship & Immigration Services

596 F.3d 1115 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 4, 2010

Here, although the AAO committed clear legal error, that error “clearly had no bearing” on either “the procedure used or the substance of decision reached.” Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1071 (quotations omitted). … Kazarian failed to establish his eligibility for an “extraordinary ability” visa, and the District Court correctly granted USCIS’ summary judgment motion. AFFIRMED. .

Judy L. Moore v. Jerad D. Gerstein, M.D.

107 F.3d 16 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 12, 1996

Thus, Gerstein is entitled to qualified immunity unless Moore alleges the violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. … Assuming arguendo that Gerstein violated "clearly established" law, he is still entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably could have believed his conduct was lawful.

Kevin Lisle v. E. McDaniels

681 F. App'x 611 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 7, 2017

II Lisle’s due process claims as to his placement in the Condemned Men’s Unit (“CMU”) and current HRP status fail because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. … Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we must determine whether Lisle’s factual allegations “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and whether that right “was ‘clearly established’ at

Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District 213

565 F.2d 1087 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 5, 1977

Thus, the court was not clearly erroneous in determining as a factual matter *1092 that Cox’s decisions were automatically approved. … We find that the court was clearly erroneous as to the actual date of Chavez’ application.

Dan Clark v. City of Seattle

899 F.3d 802 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 9, 2018

Seattle, Wash., Qualifying Driver and Lists of Qualifying Drivers, Rule FHDR-1. The QDR contacts the qualifying drivers to solicit their interest in being represented by the QDR. … Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212 (“The only activity that appears to be clearly proscribed by the statute is ‘ambulatory picketing’ of secondary businesses.” (quoting DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 587)).