Case law

Beryl P. Williamson v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service

974 F.2d 1525 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 14, 1992

by Harvey Williamson as a farm: that use clearly is a “qualified use”, as § 2032A(b)(2) defines “qualified use” as (among other things) “the devotion of the property to ... use as a farm for farming purposes.” … Subsection (e)(1) states that the recapture tax is imposed when the qualified heir ceases to use the property for a qualified use, and subsection (c)(6) — which defines how subsection (c)(1) shall be construed — clearly states

Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co.

431 F.3d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 5, 2005

;” and (3) “there is no stated or clear Congressional intent to abrogate litigation immunity.” … “Rule 702 allows admission of ‘scientific, technical, or other special- ized knowledge’ by a qualified expert if it will ‘assist the trier of fact to 15664 LIVING DESIGNS v. E.I.

Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.

432 F.2d 755 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 5, 1970

The rationale underlying the NoerrPennington defense does not dictate immunity for .this alleged conspiracy. … The allegations of the complaint are clearly sufficient to allow their proof,

John Penny v. City of Los Angeles

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 8, 2024

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo.” … Second, we ask “whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

G.F. Company v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., Ltd., Aka, Panobulk America, Inc., and Pan Queen, Its Engines, Tackle, Apparel and Furniture Banque Indosuez

23 F.3d 1498 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 5, 1994

The court clearly felt, at least implicitly, that it was not unjust or impractical to do so. … Pan Ocean contends, however, that the Wood Clause qualified the representations and therefore enabled it to establish that the damage occurred prior to its receipt of the goods.

Jessica Fidler v. State of Arizona

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 10, 2024

Qualified immunity is therefore the only potentially applicable immunity defense. Id. at 897. … See id. at 753 (observing that the plaintiff has the “burden to identify the clearly established law”).

Steve Marquez v. C. Rodriguez

81 F.4th 1027 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 6, 2023

The Supreme Court’s Bivens jurisprudence squarely forecloses Marquez’s argument that Farmer established a cognizable Bivens context. As we have already stated, in Ziglar v. … Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), seven years later, the Court held that qualified immunity for a federal officer in a Bivens action should match qualified immunity for a state officer in a § 1983 action.

Crane v. Arizona Republic

972 F.2d 1511 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 21, 1992

We also hold, however, that section 47(4) does not immunize The Arizona Republic from liability on the juxtaposing claim. II. … Actual Malice The district court ruled, in the alternative, that Henderson, as a public official, failed to establish actual malice on the part of The Arizona Republic.

Michael Allen v. Richard Ives

950 F.3d 1184 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 24, 2020

United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), retroactively established that under the categorical approach of Taylor v. … United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), retroactively established that under the categorical approach of Taylor v.

Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Kathy Baran

983 F.3d 428 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 16, 2020

criteria for qualifying as a specialty occupation. … USCIS contends that the OOH alone cannot establish “whether an occupation qualifies per se as a specialty occupation” because “[i]n some instances, as with the Computer Programmer occupation here, it is not a sufficient source

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez

431 F.3d 1212 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 15, 2005

In the stipulated 995 Motion, 6 Hernandez-Hernandez admitted to a particular set of facts that clearly involve violence and the use of force. … It looked to the statute of conviction and to judicially noticeable facts, the stipulated factual basis, which “unequivocally establish!]”

Sara Lowry v. City of San Diego

858 F.3d 1248 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 6, 2017

The district court erroneously relied on precedent from the qualified immunity context to conclude that the City’s bite- and-hold policy was constitutional as a matter of law, and thus that the City could not be liable even … But our cases analyzing whether the constitutionality of a bite-and-hold policy was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity did not hold that all applications of a bite-and-hold policy are constitutional.

Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v. United States

541 F.3d 1189 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 4, 2008

The QTA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to numerous exceptions and restrictions, including a statute of limitations. … Here, there is no evidence in the record that an appropriate government official clearly and unequivocally abandoned the United States’s interest in Kingman Reef.

United States v. Washington

394 F.3d 1152 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 6, 2005

Nor have the appellants clearly established the continuous informal cultural influence they concede is required. 80 The appellants' members are descended from treaty tribes, but they have intermarried with non-Indians and … That may be true of some members of tribes whose treaty status has been established.

United States v. Claudio Salcido-Corrales

249 F.3d 1151 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 22, 2001

This may or may not be so, but it does not establish the clear error required for reversal. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” … We therefore conclude that the district judge’s ruling that an adjustment was warranted under § 3B1.1(c) was not clearly erroneous.

Frank Galvan v. Kenneth Duffie

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 3, 2020

Under the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity analysis, a “right’s contours [are] sufficiently definite [if] any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood he was violating it.” … Therefore, Defendant-Appellant had “fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful,” based on the clearly established law. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018).

Roberto Hernandez Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada Morgan Harris Thomas Rigsby

279 F.3d 1102 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 8, 2002

For liability to attach, a Monell plaintiff must establish the alleged inaction is so “closely related to the ultimate injury” as to constitute the “moving force behind” it. … If polygraph evidence may be used at trial, then its use by the County to assist the decision-making process here under review is clearly not constitutionally suspect.

United States v. Alvaro Gonzalez-Monterroso

745 F.3d 1237 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 14, 2014

Because documents in the record established that Gonzalez was 28 and the victim was 14 at the time of the state offense, the PSR concluded that Gonzalez had been convicted of a state offense that qualified as “sexual abuse … Our recent decisions in Caceres-Olla and Gomez clearly foreclose the government’s arguments.

Michael Hartsell v. County of San Diego

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 21, 2020

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”; and (2) if so, “whether the right was clearly established.” … Accordingly, the district court properly denied qualified immunity in part.

Fred Snow, Harold Snow and Tom Snow, D/B/A Snow & Sons v. National Labor Relations Board

308 F.2d 687 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 28, 1962

The Board is not limited in its power to reverse an examiner’s findings to cases in which the latter are “clearly erroneous.” … The basis of this conclusion is not clearly indicated by the trial examiner’s intermediate report and recommended order.