Case law

United States v. John Allen Powers William Nichols, Contemnor/appellant

629 F.2d 619 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 6, 1980

Approval of the offer of immunity had been obtained from the Department of Justice. The immunity approved, however, was “use” immunity, not the transactional immunity originally proposed. … Although the district court improperly called the contempt “civil”, Nichols’ attorney was clearly apprised of the nature of the charges against his client.

Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder

645 F.3d 1035 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 9, 2010

Accordingly, Ramirez-Villalpando’s conviction did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony. … Conclusion [12] The record clearly demonstrates that Ramirez- Villalpando’s conviction under California Penal Code § 487(a) qualified as an aggravated felony under the modified categorical approach.

United States v. Park Place Association

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 22, 2009

We think the answer is clearly the latter. … Thus, Park Place’s claim clearly does “not exist independent of the . . . [c]ontract.” Id.

Parker North American Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Parker North American Corp.)

24 F.3d 1145 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 19, 1994

Section 106(a) of the Code provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity when the government files a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding: “A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim … The history of § 1821(d) indicates, for example, that FIR-REA “establishes a claims procedure, with specific deadlines for creditors." H.R.Rep.

William A. BROWN, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL MINERS HOSPITAL, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees

849 F.2d 1186 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 14, 1988

Brown’s expert testimony At trial, over the defendants’ objection, the court held that Brown qualified as an expert witness. … To establish that the district court’s evaluation of his evidence was clearly erroneous, Brown asserts that the district court made three “clearly erroneous findings of fact: (1) that the other white doctors who were granted

Lakiesha McCall v. Jeremy Jacobitz

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 18, 2021

established law. … In determining if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we evaluate whether (i) the alleged facts show a violation of a constitutional right and (ii) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time

Garver Ex Rel. Garver v. Brandt

584 F. App'x 393 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 30, 2014

Brandt and Negron moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. … infringed was ‘clearly established[.]’”

Big Horn County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Denis Adams

219 F.3d 944 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 14, 2000

I. 2 The Reservation, located in Southern Montana, was established by the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie ("Treaty") between the Tribe and the United States. … The starting point is to ascertain the full market value of a taxpayer's utility property as determined by the State of Montana or a qualified appraiser.

Robert Ray v. Monsanto Company, a Corporation

420 F.2d 915 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 5, 1970

The relation thus established is purely statutory. … The activity here involved was clearly an integral part of the main business of the Power Company.'’ 238 F.2d at 126, 127 . .

Concrete Tie of San Diego, Inc. v. Liberty Construction, Inc.

107 F.3d 1368 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 27, 1997

Such “sue and be sued” clauses are presumed to have fully waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 480-82 , 114 S.Ct. at 1003 . … “The first inquiry is whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Odila Penaloza v. City of Rialto

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 7, 2020

Second, was the constitutional right clearly established? Id. … Because the law does not clearly establish when an officer must intervene, Lopez is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for his failure to intervene when Boda was biting Goode.

United States v. Robert Cooper Smith

196 F.3d 1034 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 12, 1999

Evidence of such a plan, argues Smith, was probative of Thomason’s bias in favor of the government. *1038 This evidence clearly was excludable under Rule 403 because its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed … As the district court noted, to the extent that Thomason was biased in favor of the government, such bias had been established by Thomason’s own admissions (1) of wanting to curry favor with the government in order to avoid

Frank Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College District

26 F.3d 968 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 16, 1994

This advisory committee declared all three candidates to be qualified. The members of the advisory committee also testified that race was not considered in the ranking process. … Finally, the defendants introduced evidence showing why Tom was in fact the better qualified candidate for the job.

Kingman Lambert Cynthia A. Lambert Kristen Lambert Kimberly Lambert v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

847 F.2d 604 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 27, 1988

The trust agreement clearly intends to benefit the surviving spouse. Regardless of which spouse dies first, Trust A will be funded. … The issue, however, is whether the trust clearly provides that its assets shall belong to a spouse upon the death of the settlor. We believe that it does.

Marilyn Parver v. Jet Blue Airlines Corp.

649 F. App'x 539 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 4, 2016

We need not determine whether the removal was an unconstitutional arrest because the LVMPD officers’ conduct did not violate any “clearly established” law, and they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. … Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts need not determine whether there is an unconstitutional action before proceeding to the “‘clearly established’ prong” of the qualified immunity inquiry).

De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

743 F.2d 1388 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 2, 1984

THE TIE-IN CLAIM To establish a tying claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the defendant is selling two distinct products as a package. … This record, however, is not nearly sufficient to demonstrate that the operation of these state laws immunizes appel-lees’ conduct under the standard for antitrust immunity set forth in California Retail Liquor Dealer’s Ass'n

United States v. Jose A. Alonso

48 F.3d 1536 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 2, 1995

It is well established that an expert may not state his opinion about the defendant’s guilt. See United States v. … — brief and vague as the affidavit may be — was not clearly erroneous.

Hearn v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund

68 F.3d 301 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 6, 1995

Where the language in question cuts back or qualifies other language that sweeps very broadly, there’s a particularly strong inference that the legislature employed the qualifier to limit the more general language in some … Our task is to read the broad language and the qualifier together to reach a sensible result.

Apolinar Navarette, Jr., AKA Paul Medel Navarette v. Jiro J. Enomoto

536 F.2d 277 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 29, 1976

True, the existence of a public officer’s “good faith” immunity from § 1983 liability has been recognized in a number of situations. See Wood v. … Strickland, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that § 1983 should be construed to accord school board members a qualified good faith immunity from damages under that section where “common-law tradition” and “strong public-policy

United States v. Selso Orona

923 F.3d 1197 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 10, 2019

In that motion, Orona argued that his 2007 aggravated assault conviction no longer qualified as a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause, in light of Johnson, and could not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s force … Benally, 843 F.3d 350, 354 (9th Cir. 2016) (“After Leocal, we held that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under § 16.